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This issue of the Media Studies brings insights from Poland, Turkey, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The journal thus continues its 12 years long tradition of publishing outstanding international and multidisciplinary research in media, communications, political communication, journalism, public relations, cultural studies and other related disciplines.

The first article by Magdalena Musiał-Karg and Izabela Kapsa discusses electronic voting and how this idea is perceived by the media and the public in Poland. They established that the Polish public supports digitalisation of political processes, including e-voting.

Ayşen Gül discusses globally popular phenomenon of *dizis*, Turkish TV dramas. Turkey has become the world's second-biggest TV drama exporter after the USA in 2016. However, Gül argues that the industry has been facing serious problems. The author interviewed creative professionals involved with the industry to discuss these challenges and to establish what needs to be done to sustain Turkish TV drama industry's export success.

Urša Golob, Medeja Kraševac and Tanja Oblak Črnič analyse an emerging phenomenon of video gameplay watching on YouTube. They deconstruct motives behind video gaming spectatorship and resort to the "uses and gratification theory" to identify four types of viewers – *Spectator, Performer, Selector, Viewer, and Substitutor*.

Dragana Trninić investigates how audiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina use information on COVID -19 and discusses their ability to recognize fake news and disinformation. She argues that age may be an important factor in predicting interest in pandemic-related news while education is possibly a predictor of the level of media literacy when it comes to identifying fake content.

The last two articles focus on Croatia. Gabriela Galić and Domagoj Bebić analyze the use of personalization strategies on Facebook in the 2019/2020 Croatian presidential election. They compare communication of the three most successful candidates and their use of privatization techniques.

Finally, Nikša Dubreta and Karlo Lugarić examine representation of new psychoactive substances on Croatian news websites. They conclude that Croatian media mainly use "society without drugs" frame to contextualize the topic.

This issue also brings one novelty for prospective authors. The journal transitioned to APA style of referencing, so we encourage our readers to check our revised Instructions for Authors.

**Marijana Grbeša Zenzerović**  
Editor-In-Chief

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# POLISH MASS MEDIA COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON E-DEMOCRACY. THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING

Magdalena Musiał-Karg :: Izabela Kapsa

ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER / DOI: 10.20901/ms.12.23.1 / SUBMITTED: 17.12.2020.

**ABSTRACT** *The rapid development of new technologies and their impressive communication capacity has fundamentally changed modern democracy by providing easy and universal access to information, as well as increasing participation and accessibility of political involvement tools. One of the electoral participation tools is e-voting which has been used in only a few countries. The main aim of the paper is to explore whether and how e-voting has been presented in Polish mass media (1), as well as to investigate people's opinions about e-voting against certain political factors (2). The research is based on a media content analysis (quantitative and qualitative), data collected via the Content Analysis System for Television (CAST) and a quantitative analysis of data from a survey conducted by the authors (2018, sample: 1717 Poles). The results of the analyses show that the debate on the implementation of e-voting is rather poor, but the support for e-voting among Poles remains considerable. The public media rhetoric is interlinked with attitudes towards political parties. To some extent, determinants are reflected in the public opinion on the implementation of e-voting since Poles declare both their support for the introduction of e-voting and willingness to vote online.*

## KEYWORDS

ELECTRONIC PARTICIPATION, E-VOTING, POLAND, POLISH MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION

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## INTRODUCTION

Due to the rapid development of new technologies and their impressive communication capacity, the Internet has fundamentally changed modern democracy by providing easy and universal access to information, increasing participation and accessibility of political involvement tools. Opinions among e-democracy theorists differ, but most share the belief that online communication may overcome the barriers in contemporary liberal-democracy politics.

The research subject described in the paper is related to e-democracy understood as the use of information and communications technology (ICT) to support and enhance democratic institutions and processes (Grossman, 1995; Kersting, 2012; Lindner & Aichholzer, 2020; Noveck, 2004; Tsagarousianou, 2000; Vedel, 2006; Weale et al., 1999). E-democracy has the potential to widen the range of available participation tools and to strengthen participatory opportunities and prerequisites for citizens' political participation. Particularly, the Internet has become a new vehicle for traditional political activities and influence of democratic processes. One of electoral participation e-tools is *e-voting*. In the majority of countries, regardless of how many problems e-voting generates, citizens show very positive attitude towards the e-tool. This is noticeable at the public debate stage before e-voting is actually introduced.

The research is based on the *diffusion of innovation (DOI) theory* (Rogers, 1962/2003) that explains and measures the potential spread of e-voting among citizens (Vassil et al. 2016). As e-voting systems may be considered to be a technological innovation (Sambo & Alexander, 2018), we may assume that the e-voters profile in Poland will converge with the evidence from the research into the e-voting practice (Alvarez et al., 2009; Krimmer et al., 2020; Schlozman et al., 2010; Vassil & Solvak, 2016; van Dijk, 2005).

The main aim of the paper is to explore whether and how e-voting has been presented in the Polish mass media (1), as well as to investigate public opinions on this e-tool in the context of political factors (2).

According to the general hypothesis, although the debate on the implementation of e-voting is rather poor, there are significant differences in the way of presenting e-voting in various Polish mass media (news services). The attitude of the public media is rather negative towards e-voting, whereas the position of commercial media is neutral or rather positive. Such rhetoric is interlinked with attitudes towards certain political parties. Although the main determining factors are reflected to some extent in public opinion on the implementation of e-voting, Poles declare both their support for the introduction of e-voting and willingness to vote online.



The research is based on a media content analysis and data collected via the Content Analysis System for Television (CAST)<sup>1</sup>, as well as a quantitative analysis of data from a survey conducted by the authors (2018, sample: 1717 Poles). The media content analysis helps to investigate news services by three largest TV stations in Poland: *Wiadomości* (TVP1 - public), *Fakty* (TVN - private) and *Wydarzenia* (Polsat - private).

## E-VOTING AS A TOOL OF E-DEMOCRACY

Information and communication technology (ICT) has changed social, economic and political life in many ways. It means that new electronic tools not only inform and communicate, but also mobilize, increase participation, engage citizens, and provide tools that have the potential to change previous relationships between citizens and governments. According to OECD (2003, p. 9), ICT is a powerful tool for enhancing citizen engagement in policy-making. However, we need to remember that technology is rather an enabler than a solution. In a similar way Jan van Dijk and Kenneth Hacker (2000, p. 1) describe digital democracy as the use of ICT and computer-mediated communication (CMC) in all kinds of media for the purposes of enhancing political democracy or the participation of citizens in democratic communication.

Some researchers do not raise the issue of participation and define electronic democracy as any democratic political system in which computers and computer networks are used to carry out crucial functions of the democratic process, such as information and communication, expression of interest and aggregation, and decision-making (both deliberation and voting) (Hagen, 1997). Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute the statement that the contemporary civilization faces the era of electronic democracy based on modern ICT tools and a new method of exercising democratic power (Musiał-Karg, 2014, p. 99). Moreover, the Internet has transformed the political process together with the space of communication (Castells, 2011, p. 101). The previous mass-media monopoly that was controlled by businesses and governments has been replaced by the Internet which is not easily controlled. We observed the power of the Internet (and its communication and mobilization potential) during revolutions that took place at the beginning of the 21st century, e.g., in Iran, South Korea, Arab countries (Kapsa, 2018; Park, 2010; Tufekci, 2014).

While applied to democratic processes, ICT has the potential to overcome barriers which prohibit the electorate to participate in decision-making (Musiał-Karg, 2014, p. 104). Apart from numerous examples of citizens using ICT to influence governments, new technology enables to deliver public services by governments more conveniently. It facilitates three types of activities: information sharing, involvement in political debate, and participation in political decision-making (Tsagarousianou, 1999). The latter also applies to elections. According to the Council of Europe (2009, p. 16), we deal with

<sup>1</sup> The Content Analysis System for Television (CAST) serves as an archive of TV content. Additionally, it is a digital tool that might be applied in a process of coding and analyzing audiovisual data. The system uses DVB-S and DVB-T signal. The signal is later processed by a digital headend and multicasted into the LAN (approx. 20 concurrent TV channels, Polish and foreign). The signal is then recorded and stored based on EPG data.

e-voting when an election or referendum involves the use of electronic means at least to cast votes. Moreover, remote e-voting accelerates procedures, enables voting to be electronically monitored and votes electronically registered, and facilitates participation of people in remote locations and people with special needs. For the first time, electronic systems were used in voting in 1970. E-voting machines, called Direct Record Electronic (DRE), were used in the 2000 election in the United States. As many as 10.7% of American voters chose to cast their votes electronically (Tokaji, 2005, p. 1722). A few years later, in the Mid-Term Congressional Election (6 Nov 2018), DRE voting machines were used in 15 states, with five states relying on them exclusively (OSCE, 2019). E-voting typically means that voting takes place via computers or terminals in a polling station relevant to one's voting residence. It might also enable voters to cast their votes in any polling station. Moreover, remote e-voting supports voting via special computers and public terminals (*kiosk voting*), as well as via the Internet (*i-voting*) on virtually any computer, phone or a television set (Mider, 2011, pp. 224-225).

We have been witnessing an interesting situation, since three quarters of the population have access to the Internet but electronic voting is used only in a few countries (*i-voting* solely in Estonia). Citizens benefit from digital communication more in other spheres than politics. Although most of the e-voting experiments in European countries have failed, the popularity of electronic voting is growing. Many voters prefer e-voting (especially online voting) over traditional methods because it is far more convenient and faster. It seems that technology which supports governing systems should also benefit citizens. The use of 20th-century political methods can be facilitated by the 21st-century technology. The technology supporting participatory instruments is readily available (Council of Europe, 2009, p. 41). The challenge is to do it in a secure and accessible manner. Actually, despite the advantages of e-voting, some experts or scientists are concerned with the possibility of electoral fraud or the lack of transparency of the election process. The issue is that "all processes of data generation, transformation, and storage occur in 'black boxes' that are often not fully transparent even for technical experts" (Gerlach & Gasser, 2009, p. 5). Moreover, a concern has been growing regarding the participation gap, also known as the 'digital divide'. It may be an important factor increasing welfare disparities between geographical regions. Most of them seem to be surmountable, but the governments do not take the challenge.

## E-VOTING EXPERIENCE IN POLAND

Poland has very little experience with using IT systems during elections. Although for the first time such a system was used during the 1993 parliamentary election, it is still impossible to vote over the Internet in national elections. The Internet was also used for the first time in the 2000 presidential election to transfer data and in some constituencies during local elections of 2002. As a part of a pilot program, encrypted data confirmed with the electronic signature were sent directly from polling stations to the central database of the National Election Commission. Voters could follow results over the Internet. This system evolved and supported election committees several times. Due to the problems

which occurred during the 2014 local elections, vote counting and reporting were not possible, and regional committees had to count votes manually. Finally, in consecutive local elections, the use of the system was auxiliary only. Instead of counting votes, the system supports election committees in the preparatory phase, e.g., storage of data regarding voting, candidates (e.g., numbers, names, political affiliations) and composition of election committees in particular constituencies. During voting, the system helps to collect information about turnout and afterwards to examine the arithmetical compliance of data in reports and accuracy of results. The platform is used to transfer voting results, revised by election committees, from constituencies to the National Election Commission. It also enables voters to check results over the Internet (Musiał-Karg & Kapsa, 2020, pp. 146-147).

Regarding e-voting, it is worth mentioning that before its use in the presidential election of 2010, the national leadership of Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform), one of the main political parties in Poland, decided to elect the party's official candidate by two methods of voting, namely Internet and postal voting. Any member of the party registered in the central register of party's members had the right to vote. Members who chose the traditional method had to cut the ballot paper from the *POgłos* magazine, insert it into an envelope, and send it by post (Musiał-Karg, 2011). To prevent double voting (online and traditional), members were advised to attach one-off codes to the envelope together with their ballot papers. After opening of the envelope, it was not possible to send a valid vote by mail. Turnout in the PO primary election was 47.47%. PO voters definitely preferred the Internet. Over 17,000 votes were cast via the Internet, whereas 4,000 were sent by mail.

Currently, Poland does not have laws supporting electronic voting (Musiał-Karg, 2020, pp. 44-47) and Polish authorities are not even working on implementing any of the electronic voting methods. It is caused by the shortage of infrastructure of the internet-based voting system and lack of relevant legal solutions. Despite limited experience with this method of voting, it has been present in the public discourse. Political parties raise the issue during electoral campaigns, mainly to boost their election capital. Some of them declare their willingness to implement innovative voting methods (e.g., i-voting) to make the election process more convenient for those eligible to vote. They expect it to mobilize the electorate which typically do not utilize their universal suffrage. However, one political party rejected the possibility of introducing e-voting in Poland.

## POLISH MEDIA POSITION ON E-VOTING

### Methodology

The research in this part of the article contains quantitative and qualitative media content analysis based on data collected via the CAST (Content Analysis System for Television) including the broadcasting coverage by the main news services delivered by three nation-wide TV stations of the top rating (Kordupski, 2020) - Fakty TVN, Wiadomości TVP and Wydarzenia by Polsat. The content of TV news programs was recorded and

archived with the use of the CAST<sup>2</sup>, and thanks to the advanced search engine, it was possible to construct complex queries, allowing for precise selection of materials for analysis. Data collected via the CAST included the broadcasting coverage in two study periods, 24 September – 7 October 2019 and 27 April – 10 May 2020. The analysis covered 1248 items of news in 28 newscasts of the three TV stations. The study was designed to examine the position of top-rated TV stations on e-voting in their main newscasts. Additionally, the analysis covered data from news websites. In this part, analyzed information was published in the 2015-2020 period.

The quantitative approach was used to extract components of debate on e-voting, which allowed the determination of the frequency of appearance of e-voting topic, related issues, as well as the number of TV materials. For the purpose of quantitative research, a two-part codebook was developed. The first part was adapted to television news program materials, while the second one was prepared as a tool to encode Internet press material.

## Results

The media content analysis (quantitative and qualitative) of data collected via the CAST has been carried out as follows:

- >in the case of electoral news, examined in detail, certain developments have their influence on the media content: voting methods as such were criticized (i.e., mail voting), parliamentary voting on the bill introducing voting by mail; the main criticism resulted from the fact that a few days before the election, no one knew whether the election would actually take place;
- >news was considered to support the advantage of voting by mail when it referred to the fact that initially, according to the law, the Polish Post was to be responsible for the organization of the election, and then, after the J. Kaczyński - J. Gowin conflict, the State Electoral Committee. It was considered positive, as it emphasized better anonymity, faster delivery of ballots, better conditions for Poles abroad.

In none of the periods examined was e-voting or other voting methods present in the news. The general conclusion is that the debate on implementation of e-voting in Poland is rather poor. Undoubtedly, the main reason is that Poland has no specific legal provisions for introducing this voting method and a shortage of technical infrastructure (e-voting system), and the access to the Internet seems to be problematic.

Considering the above, it was assumed that newscasts could periodically include announcements, chiefly in the context of the election, on the introduction of Internet voting to other methods available in Poland, especially that Internet voting had become increasingly popular in various countries. In this respect, Estonia is considered to be the global leader (e-voting has been used since 2005). In many other European countries and

<sup>2</sup> The CAST is a system developed and implemented by the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism of the Adam Mickiewicz University. Its primary task is to record, store, and make television programs available. Since mid-2014, the system records six channels: TVP 1, TVP 2, Polsat, TVN, TVN24, and TVP Info continuously, 24 hours a day. The programs are stored in a database, described by metadata generated on the basis of EPG (Electronic Program Guide).

elsewhere in the world, online voting has been considered and tested (e.g., Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, Canada and other). As mentioned above, Polish experience in Internet voting is somewhat scarce (e.g., discussion before the pre-term election in 2007, the primary election in Civic Platform before the 2010 presidential election, a growing popularity of online voting for local citizen budgets). Undoubtedly, the public discussion on the new technologies in elections has been evolving. However, it has not led to broad media debates as yet. The assumption was made that the content analysis performed might reveal a very limited presence of e-voting, and news presented would be positioned in the context of the upcoming national election.

Moreover, if it comes to the nature of media in Poland, the authors assume that there should be significant differences in the presentation of e-voting in various Polish TV stations (news services). Due to the fact that the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)<sup>3</sup> has a negative opinion on introducing e-voting, the public media rhetoric is rather negative towards this way of participation in elections, whereas the commercial media message is neutral or positive (attributable to their commitments with opposition parties, which are more open to innovative voting methods). Therefore, the media rhetoric depends on their attitudes towards political parties. Although Poles declare both their support for the introduction of e-voting and their willingness to vote online, determining factors are reflected to some extent only in public opinions on the implementation of e-voting.

The media content analysis covering the top-rated TV news in Poland has confirmed that the media debate regarding the introduction of e-voting in Poland is virtually non-existent. In the period concerned, the analysis showed that no news discussed electronic voting. The analysis included the terms such as electronic voting, e-voting, Internet voting, i-voting, and online voting).

According to the study, the main top-rated TV news in Poland neither convey information about e-voting nor initiate debate on the subject. Surprisingly, no information about e-voting was present in any of the TV news during the Covid-19 pandemic and a debate on having a safe presidential election in the country. While discussing the reform of the electoral law and the introduction of all-postal voting, references were made to the experience of other countries, such as Switzerland, which tested e-voting in parallel to postal voting. The Swiss experience could be a pretext to discuss e-voting as one of safe voting options.

Due to the lack of data, the authors decided to expand the analysis and examine web-based TV news of the same TV stations (TVN24, Polsat news, TVP Info). It should be emphasized that this part of the analysis covered an extended period of January 2015 - May 2020.

The generally available Internet resources contain eight news items on electronic voting, of which the earliest one was published in 2015 and the latest in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

<sup>3</sup> The English translation of the party's name is "Law and Justice".

Table 1. Analysis of web-based TV news on e-voting

Station	Date	Context	Broadcaster	Party affiliation	Voting method	Attitude	Ex.
TVN24	11/03/2015	after election – new MPs	Piotr Liroy-Marzec	Kukiz'15	e-voting, i-referenda	positive	-
TVN24	06/12/2017	Meeting of KUKIZ-15 leaders with President	Paweł Kukiz	Kukiz'15	e-voting, Internet voting, electronic voting system	positive	-
TVPInfo	09/03/2017	Tyszka requests BAS opinion	Stanisław Tyszka	Kukiz'15	Internet voting, i-voting	positive	Estonia
TVN24	08/15/2019	#SzóstkaSchetyny – electronic voting	Grzegorz Schetyna	PO	Internet voting, electronic voting	positive	Estonia
Polsat News	04/18/2020	election during the pandemic	-	-	i-voting, Internet voting	positive	Estonia, Sierra Leone
Polsat News	04/19/2020	election during the pandemic	Izabela Leszczyna	KO	Internet election	-	-
TVN24	04/25/2020	election during the pandemic	Toomas Hendrik Ilves	Estonia president	i-voting, Internet election	positive	Estonia
Polsat News	04/28/2020	election during the pandemic	Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz	PSL	Internet election	-	-

Based on the findings, the following conclusions have been drawn:

>Since 2015, the main initiator and the promoter of the debate on e-voting in Poland is Kukiz-15<sup>4</sup>. Since it appeared on the Polish political stage in 2015, the political camp has been promoting the increase of citizen participation in decision making using direct democracy tools (they promote introduction of obligatory referenda) and encouraged

<sup>4</sup> Kukiz'15 is a political party in Poland led by rock musician turned politician Paweł Kukiz. Initially it was an informal movement, then formally registered as an association in 2016 and later as a political party in 2020. Since its creation, the Kukiz'15 has been considered as the main right-wing populist opposition to the government of the Law and Justice (PiS) party. However, Kukiz'15 has supported the PiS on some key votes in the parliament.

- to consider e-voting during elections and referenda while assuming that the use of new methods can boost citizen interest and participation;
- >Interestingly, according to the media content analysis, in spring 2020m during the pandemic, electronic voting was referred to in web-based news chiefly by journalists (twice) and representatives of the Civic Platform (once) and the Polish People's Party (once);
  - >Law and Justice representatives did not refer to e-voting at all in the news analyzed. In one of the news, Paweł Kukiz, the Kukiz'15 leader, mentioned after the meeting with Andrzej Duda that the incumbent president (affiliated to PiS) would consider the introduction of e-voting in state referenda;
  - >All the news presented Internet voting in a positive manner as an opportunity to increase citizen participation in decision-making;
  - >All web-based news referring to the experience of other countries mentioned Estonia as the main reference and a positive example of using ICT in elections;
  - >News on Internet voting were most frequent in commercial TV stations (four times in TVN24 and three times in Polsat News). Only one news item was broadcast by the public TVP Info.

The analysis enables to conclude that e-voting is not the lead topic of the debate on the introduction of alternative voting methods. Moreover, although the Covid-19 pandemic boosted the discussion on new forms of participation, it failed to increase the presence of e-voting in the media debate.

## E-VOTING IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL FACTORS

### Methodology

This part of the article is based on the data sets collected during a 2018 survey conducted by the authors on a sample of 1717 Poles. It was a quota-based sample taking into account the demographics of the population. Respondents filled out paper or electronic questionnaires with questions and statements referring to their participation in elections and political preferences, the use of the Internet, as well as a number of statements on electronic voting and electronic administration.

The article presents mean results regarding e-voting including answers to all questions and statements in the questionnaire<sup>5</sup>. These also include declarations regarding the use of the Internet to vote during elections, provided there is such an option, assessment of e-voting regarding its convenience and transparency in counting votes, as well as possible

<sup>5</sup> = 1. I use electronic administration services. 2. I would like to see more matters to be dealt with over the Internet in Poland. 3. The introduction of voting via the Internet seems to be a question of time only. 4. In Poland, we should have voting via the Internet as an additional form of election participation. 5. I would use the possibility of voting via the Internet during election, provided there is such an option. 6. If voting via the Internet is introduced, it should be possible before the election day (e.g., in the week preceding election Sunday) and it should be available for several days. 7. I do not want any additional voting methods to be introduced. 8. Traditional voting is better. 9. Voting via the Internet diminishes the significance of voting. 10. Voting via the Internet facilitates participation in elections. 11. Voting via the Internet reduces the probability of an error. 12. E-voting is more convenient. 13. Voting via the Internet boosts turnout. 14. E-voting poses a threat to the universal nature of voting. 15. Voting via the Internet creates the possibility of election fraud. 16. No confidentiality can be guaranteed with Internet voting. 17. Compared to voting in a polling station, e-voting is less safe."

negative consequences of its application and the inability to ensure full confidentiality. Negative answers were recorded, and the general e-voting support indicator was built; the higher the result is, the stronger the support for e-voting. Answers were placed on the Likert scale (particular options had a specific number of points assigned as follows: *definitely yes* – 5 points, *rather yes* – 4 points, *hard to say* – 3 points, *rather no* – 2 points, *definitely no* – 1 point).

Political preferences of respondents were recorded as their declaration about frequency of participation in parliamentary elections as well as their answers to the following question: "If the parliamentary election was held today, who would you vote for?". The respondents could choose among: a) "Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej" (Democratic Left Alliance); b) "Wolność Janusza Korwin-Mikke (KORWIN)"; c) "Kukiz '15"; d) "Nowoczesna" (Modern); e) "Partia Razem" (Together); f) "Platforma Obywatelska RP" (Civic Platform); g) "Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe" (Polish People's Party); h) "Prawo i Sprawiedliwość" (Law and Justice); i) another party, which one?; j) "hard to say"; k) "I would not vote". Political parties mentioned in all possible responses included those represented in the Polish parliament during the period of the research.

Answers to research questions necessitated statistical analyses of descriptive data together with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, U Mann-Whitney tests, Kruskal-Wallis tests,  $\chi^2$  tests and precise Fisher tests. In the analysis, we also took into account the political preferences of respondents, expressed in their declaration of support to a given political party and frequency of their participation in parliamentary elections. Moreover, regarding the characteristics of e-voting supporters, the study looked for the correlation between time spent on the Internet as a variable useful to determine whether the use of the Internet had any influence on using it as a voting tool.

## Results

The analysis of survey results starts from descriptive statistics and the e-voting support index. Quite a high mean was reached ( $M=3.61$ ) with a high level of support for e-voting in Poland. Although the distribution differed from the Gauss distribution, the skewness indicates that it was not so much asymmetrical (standard deviation  $SD=0.74$ ; skewness  $Sk=-0.60$ ; Kurtosis  $K=-0.12$ ; lowest distribution value  $Min.=1$ , highest distribution value  $Max.=5$ ; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test result  $K-S=0.08$ ; significance  $p<0.001$ ).

Data presented in Table 2 demonstrate that respondent opinions regarding e-voting differ depending on their political preferences. This, however, does not apply to electoral participation. Political participation has no significant effect on the level of support for electronic voting, the level of support declared by abstainers was very similar to that of those participating frequently in parliamentary elections. Therefore, since non-participants consider electronic voting methods attractive, they might be encouraged to participate provided innovative e-tools are used. This seems to be promising although experience in e-voting has a very limited impact on turnout (only a few countries practice



this method of voting). Nevertheless, the study by Germann and Serdült (2017) showed that voting online has the potential of becoming more convenient than postal voting.

The analysis of support to electronic voting in relation to political variables demonstrates that political preferences are a statistically significant predictor for voters' attitudes towards the introduction and use of Internet voting (Musiał-Karg & Kapsa, 2019). We observe the lowest level of support among voters supporting PiS (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, Law and Justice) and PSL (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, Polish People's Party), who could be described as conservative and not necessarily progressive. It needs to be emphasized that the only political party expressing their objection to e-voting in Poland is Law and Justice, the governing party. The representatives of the other political parties were overtly positive about e-voting. The positive attitude to e-voting among supporters of other political parties in Poland is scored higher than the population average. It also corresponds with views of these political parties on electronic voting. Some political parties in Poland have considered the implementation of e-voting. These include PO (*Platforma Obywatelska*, Civic Platform), Kukiz'15, Partia Razem (Together) and Janusz Korwin-Mikke Party (Korwin).

Table 2. Political features and e-voting support index

Political factors	e-voting support index (M)	
<b>Participation in parliamentary elections</b>		
<i>never</i>	3.55	$H(4) = 15.48;$ $p = 0.004$
<i>rarely</i>	3.5	
<i>hard to say</i>	3.6	
<i>often</i>	3.55	
<i>always</i>	3.67	
<b>Political preferences</b>		
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Self Left Alliance)	3.52	$H(4) = 15.48;$ $p = 0.004$
Wolność Janusza Korwin-Mikke (Freedom of Janusz Korwin Mikke)	3.85	
Kukiz'15	3.82	
Nowoczesna	3.88	
Partia Razem (Together)	3.98	
PO (Civic Platform)	3.76	
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)	3.4	
PiS (Law and Justice)	3.27	
<i>other</i>	3.81	
<i>hard to say</i>	3.56	
<i>I would not vote</i>	3.24	

M – mean; U – U Manna-Whitney test result; p – statistical significance; r – impact rate;  
H – Kruskal-Wallis test result

Interestingly, supporters of parties promoting the introduction of online voting are relatively reserved and discrete in declaring their support to the use such solutions, since they better recognize certain threats than supporters of other political parties. Such differences can be explained by the correlation between age and education and the proficiency in using technology. Younger and more educated people (most of them supporters of parties promoting e-voting) have probably higher levels of computer skills, and they are more critical about security issues than people who lack the knowledge to be able to detect a potential threat to security.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Internet has fundamentally influenced democracy by providing easy and universal access to information, increasing participation and accessibility of political involvement tools. It is a completely new medium that “we don’t ‘watch’ as we watch television” (Castells, 2011, p. 100). We live with and on the Internet, so we are permanently connected. As the research by Luengo and Vázquez shows (n.d., p.243), there is a negative influence of watching television on political activity and a significant connection between the use of the Internet and levels of political engagement, which in all instances is positive. The Internet has changed not only the communication but also the relationship between citizens and governments. The use of new technology for the purpose of enhancing political democracy or the participation of citizens in democratic communication is the pillar of electronic democracy. E-voting is one of e-democracy tools. Although it is not a widely used by governments, the method of voting seems to be of great interest among citizens.

The main goal was to answer a question about the presence of a debate on electronic voting in general and remote or Internet voting, in particular in Polish news. The authors analyzed the presentation of this particular voting method in the media as an alternative to other voting methods available in Poland, and to draw attention of people promoting such a debate/discussion on e-voting. In the period concerned, the survey analyzing the main news services by the three largest TV stations in Poland: *Wiadomości* (TVP1 - public station), *Fakty* (TVN - private station), *Wydarzenia* (Polsat - private station) has confirmed that the media debate on the possible introduction of e-voting in Poland does not exist. The analysis examined media content data from the CAST which proved that no news actually referred to electronic voting (the terms examined included “electronic voting”, “e-voting”, “Internet voting”, “i-voting”, and “online voting”).

According to the study, the main top-rated TV news programs in Poland neither convey information about e-voting nor do they initiate debate on the subject. Surprisingly, no information about e-voting was present in any of the TV news programs during the Covid-19 pandemic, neither was there debate on having a safe presidential election in the country. While discussing the reform of the electoral law and the introduction of all-postal voting, references were made to the experience of other countries, such as Switzerland,

which tested e-voting in parallel to postal voting. The Swiss experience could be a pretext to discuss e-voting as one of safe voting options.

Due to lack of data, the authors decided to expand the analysis and examine online news by the same TV stations (TVN24, Polsat news, TVP Info). The generally available Internet resources have contained eight news items on electronic voting, of which the earliest one was published in 2015 and the latest one in 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The study of public opinion on the implementation of e-voting as an alternative participation in elections has proven that the general public in Poland declares a high level of support (mean general e-voting support index was 3.61 out of 5). We find some differences in attitudes of Poles towards e-voting depending on their political preferences, rather than on their electoral participation. The results of our study indicate that e-voting has the highest support among people supporting parties other than PiS (the only political party in Poland which overtly objected to e-voting) and PSL.

Therefore, we may conclude that, regardless the presence of e-voting in the media, the access to the Internet, a medium which is neither controlled by the media nor by business, encourages citizens to use the tool. Preferences shaped by the web-based community can be surprising and the example of Poland is the best proof of it. Although neither politicians nor traditional media have managed to develop support for e-voting as an alternative voting method, it is still the voting method most frequently referred to.

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# IZVJEŠTAVANJE MASOVNIH MEDIJA I JAVNO MNIJENJE O E-DEMOKRACIJI U POLJSKOJ: SLUČAJ ELEKTRONIČKOG GLASOVANJA

Magdalena Musiał-Karg :: Izabela Kapsa

**SAŽETAK** Brz razvoj novih tehnologija te njihov impresivan komunikacijski kapacitet iz temelja su promijenili modernu demokraciju, omogućujući jednostavan i univerzalan pristup informacijama, kao i sve veću participaciju te dostupnost alata za političko sudjelovanje. Jedan od alata za sudjelovanje na izborima je e-glasovanje koje se koristi u samo nekoliko zemalja. Glavni cilj ovog rada jest istražiti je li i kako je e-glasovanje predstavljeno u poljskim masovnim medijima (1) te istražiti mišljenja ljudi o e-glasovanju u odnosu na određene političke čimbenike (2). Istraživanje se temelji na analizi medijskog sadržaja (kvantitativnoj i kvalitativnoj), podacima prikupljenim putem Sustava za analizu televizijskog sadržaja (Content Analysis System for Television - CAST) te na kvantitativnoj analizi podataka prikupljenih anketom koju su proveli autori (2018, uzorak: 1717 Poljaka). Rezultati analiza pokazuju da je rasprava o implementaciji e-glasovanja prilično loša, ali podrška e-glasovanju među Poljacima ostaje značajna. Također, rezultati pokazuju da je retorika javnih medija povezana sa stavovima prema političkim strankama. Donekle se te odrednice odražavaju u javnom mnijenju o implementaciji e-glasovanja, budući da Poljaci daju potporu uvođenju e-glasovanja te izražavaju spremnost za glasovanje putem interneta.

## KLJUČNE RIJEČI

ELEKTRONIČKA PARTICIPACIJA, E-GLASOVANJE, POLJSKA, POLJSKI MEDIJI, JAVNO MNIJENJE

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# HOW TURKEY'S CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS SEE THEIR TV DRAMA INDUSTRY: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH ACTORS, PRODUCERS, DIRECTORS, SCENARISTS AND DISTRIBUTORS

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**ABSTRACT** *Turkey's TV drama industry has made a quantum leap in the past decade and exported many of its dramas (dizis) to more than a hundred countries. Turkey has become the world's second-biggest TV drama exporter after the USA in 2016. The dizi industry's transnationalization is attributable to the tireless efforts and unique features of its associated creative industry. However, the industry has some deep problems. This paper seeks to shed light on the challenges that the Turkish TV drama industry faces. The author has conducted in-depth interviews with Producers, Directors, Scenarists, Actors and Distributors. Their replies reveal the basic characteristics and difficulties of the dizi industry and provide clues as to what needs to be done to sustain and build upon the Turkish TV drama industry's export success.*

## KEY WORDS

TURKISH TV DRAMA, DIZIS, EXPORT, TURKISH CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS

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## INTRODUCTION

The global audiovisual market is undergoing a great transformation driven by increasing globalization, liberalization, commercialization, and digitization. Much recent work in the field (Chan, 2011; Esser, 2017; Jensen & Jacobsen, 2017) draws attention to the expanding interconnectivity among peripheral markets and between the periphery and the center as an outcome of this transformation. Jensen and Jacobsen (2017) say that there is “a demand for good stories no matter where they are from” (p. 326). Asserting that “what succeeds in one market is likely to succeed in another”, these scholars emphasize the idea that the world’s audiovisual markets now all resemble one another. Thus, it would not be wrong to maintain that conventional trade-flow theories based on notions of cultural discount, geo-linguistics, and geo-cultural markets now seem to hold only to a certain degree. Esser (2017) notes that the term *transnational* now denotes “plurality” (p. 426). This is a plurality of a large number of TV program producers, commissioners, distributors, and buyers working across borders on a daily basis in complex, fluid webs of collaboration and interdependency. Some scholars like Hilmes (2008), however, dismiss such arguments claiming that nothing much has really changed: “From the beginning, television programs, styles, genres, and pleasures have drawn on a world repertoire of experience. The industry knows this, creative producers know this, and viewers know this: It is only scholars who largely choose to ignore it” (p. 101).

Recent evidence indicates that the dramas of a peripheral market, a case in point being the Turkish audiovisual market, currently have great appeal in global markets. In the second half of the 2000s, Turkish dramas were first exported to Arab countries and the Middle East and then to markets in the Balkans and Asia. In October 2016, it was announced that annual revenues from overseas sales of Turkish TV dramas amounted to USD 350 million. On that measure, Turkey had the world’s fastest-growing TV drama industry and had overtaken Mexico and Brazil to become the world’s second-biggest TV-drama exporter after the USA (Vivarelli, 2017). Although the industry lost steam in 2018, it continued to penetrate new markets. People in Latin American, African, and some European countries started to watch Turkish dramas. The remarkable diversity of viewers following *dizis*, in a way, confutes the arguments of scholars (Sinclair, 2009; Straubhaar, 2007) who assert that non-Anglophone TV drama rarely travels outside its geo-linguistic region. In March 2020, industry insiders said that stock Turkish TV dramas<sup>1</sup> were still doing quite well in markets around the world despite the Covid-19 pandemic (Interviews with MADD and Eccorights executives). In August 2020, it was reported that owing to pandemic-related lockdowns and restrictions, Turkish TV dramas have been achieving great success on many platforms and reaching viewers all over the world (Singh, 2020).

These dramas are frequently called *Turkish telenovelas* in Latin America, Spain, and other telenovela-consuming countries. Alzuru (in press) attributes this to the melodramatic features of Turkish TV dramas. The author of the present study as well as many scholars (Alzuru, in press; Aslan, 2019; Öztürkmen, 2019) who work on these dramas

<sup>1</sup> Stock dramas are TV shows which are kept in stock and are thus regularly available for sale and distribution.



prefer to use the Turkish term *dizi*<sup>2</sup> for several reasons. Firstly, these dramas inherit some of their features from “Yeşilçam”<sup>3</sup> and borrow stories and characters from Ottoman and Anatolian folkloric culture, thereby making them unique. Secondly, production values tend to be higher than those of telenovelas (Alzuru, in press; Piñón, 2019, pp. 207-209; Yeşil, 2015, p. 53). Thirdly, outdoor shots are frequent and camera movements are usually more dynamic than is the case with telenovelas. Finally, as an outcome of the social and political conditions of their country of origin, *dizis* never have steamy love scenes. Lacking predetermined endings, *dizis* are aired on a once-a-week schedule and are produced and broadcast on a seasonal basis.

Recalling Smith (2018), authors Aslan (2019) and Alzuru (in press) categorize *dizis* as a hybrid genre that combine the characteristics of many different genres. Alzuru rationalizes this so-called hybrid generic form by claiming that episodes which last about 140-165 minutes necessitate structurally complex narratives: to keep viewers watching till the end of each episode, *dizis* are designed so as to offer them elements that are characteristic of many different genres. However, whether the intermingling of genres in *dizis* should be called “hybridization” (Smith, 2018) or “recombinants of two or more previous types” (McAllister, 1992), or “cross-genre mating” (Woodman, 2005) is a matter that deserves detailed analysis; some scholars like Lauerbach (2013) make a distinction between “constituent genres” and “sub-genres” in TV dramas (p. 136). To date, however, there has been hardly any research into *dizis* based on such hierarchical genre assumptions. Arguing that their evolution is still incomplete, Öztürkmen (2019) simply says that *dizis* are “a genre in progress”.

There are numerous studies on *dizis* which explore the impact of Turkish TV dramas. Several authors (Aslan, 2019; Balaban, 2015; Berg, 2020; Kraidy & Al-Ghazzi, 2013; Larochelle, in press; Yörük & Vatikiotis, 2013;) claim that these dramas counteract prevailing prejudices about Turks and Turkey. According to Karlıdağ and Bulut (2014), the impact of *dizis* is so “enormous” that fans tour the localities of their favorite dramas and buy clothes, accessories, and food items that appear onscreen (p. 88). Many studies concerning *dizis* (Çetin, 2014; Işık, 2013; O’Neil, 2013) involve content/textual analyses, and a few studies (Rappas et al., 2018) look into *dizis*’ production processes. Some studies (Alankuş & Yanardağlıoğlu, 2016; Algan, 2020; Alzuru, in press; Ateşalp, 2016; Bulut, 2016; Yeşil, 2015; Yörük, 2018) concentrate on the opinions of Turkey’s creative industry members. Algan (2020) writes on the tactics the industry comes up with to combat challenges posed by the transnationalization of *dizis*. Yeşil (2015) confutes the cultural proximity thesis and attributes the transnationalization of *dizis* to the political-economic factors of the mid-late 2000s. Alzuru (in press) compares the capacity of the *dizi* industry with the telenovela industry in general. Bulut (2016, p. 82) and Ateşalp (2016, pp. 25-26) draw attention to activist campaigns targeting the adverse working and problematical retirement conditions with which *dizi* industry members must contend. They cite examples from campaigns in which industry members sought to reduce episodes to 45 minutes each,

<sup>2</sup> *Dizi* is derived from *dizmek*, a verb that means “line up”, “arrange in a row or series”.

<sup>3</sup> A metonym for the Turkish cinema industry. See Arslan (2011).

to fix working hours to eight, and to be entitled to more favorable retirement benefits.<sup>4</sup> Referring to issues such as insufficiently-organized labor and problems with rights allocation, Yörük (2018) draws attention to the problem of the precariousness of *dizi* scriptwriters (pp. 813-820).

A characteristic of all of the studies mentioned above is that each selectively touches upon one or more "separate" problems of the *dizi* industry according to the particular aims of the researchers involved. As the main concern of the present study is to shed light on "what needs to be done to sustain and build upon the *dizi* industry's export success", the problems and shortcomings of the industry as a "whole" become important.

For this purpose, the author consulted the opinions of *dizi* industry members who have witnessed and/or are witnessing developments first-hand. To evaluate the present situation and to elicit respondents' opinions on the main concern of the study, the author's research explores such questions as "What are the structural problems of the *dizi* industry?", "Did recent political economic developments in Turkey lead to additional difficulties for the *dizi* industry?", "Have policymakers resolved any industry problems mentioned in previous studies?", "What are the strengths of *dizis*?", and "What are the challenges that the Turkish TV drama industry faces abroad?".

### FROM TRT'S QUALITY DRAMAS TO INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS' INTERNATIONALLY-WATCHED *DIZIS*

After a decade of experimental broadcasting, Turkey's government embraced the UK's public-service broadcasting model and established the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) in 1964. At the outset, TRT (most of whose producers had undergone BBC training) focused on providing informative/educational content, churning out hundreds of programs. In the 1970s, there was a shift to entertainment and TRT began buying American shows such as *Star Trek* produced in 1972, *McMillan & Wife* of 1971, and *The Six Million Dollar Man* of 1974.

Although TRT's autonomy was politically fraught and its viability was made problematic by economics, its general directors took the initiative in producing home-grown entertainment in the early years. İsmail Cem encouraged productions based on Turkish literary works that were filmed by well-established Turkish film directors (Çankaya, 2015, p. 144). In most of these endeavors, TRT was the sole producer. Actors, scenarists, and directors were all recruited from Yeşilçam's ranks. As economic and political unrest increased in Turkey from 1975 onwards, TV shows began playing a more important role in people's lives (Ateşalp, 2016; Çankaya, 2015; Erus, 2007; Tanrıöver, 2015). By the 1980s, however, Turkish viewers had become so thoroughly enamored of American and Turkish TV shows that one evening's offerings made up a large part of the next day's public discourse. In 1985, a year before the launch of its second channel, TRT began soliciting

<sup>4</sup> These scholars attribute the problematic retirement conditions to members' being freelancers. According to current Turkish governing social security and general health insurance (Statute 5510), they have to wait for retirement and to pay insurance premiums for considerably longer than other members of the workforce do.

independently-produced programs in order to keep pace with viewers' demand for Turkish content. This was an important decision for Turkey's TV drama industry as it encouraged film and video producers—and also former TRT employees—to establish independent companies (Çelenk, 1998, p. 78).

Another important development came with a new law designed to attract foreign investment. According to Pekman (2001), this law encouraged multinational companies to begin playing a major role in audiovisual production by acquiring partnership interests in Turkish filmmaking and advertising companies (pp. 214-215); according to Ateşalp (2016), multinationals' advent helped improve technical standards and production quality. However, it was deregulation and the establishment of privately-owned channels in the late 1980s that most profoundly transformed the Turkish TV drama industry. By the early 1990s, Turkey had nine national private channels vying with TRT and each other for content with which to fill the huge surge in broadcasting time. At first, the newcomers were fond of broadcasting American (and very infrequently Brazilian and Mexican) programs.

However, Turkish viewers also demanded homegrown dramas and this nourished growth in independent production. By 1997, İstanbul had more than fifty independent production companies, with varying technical qualifications (Çelenk, 1998, p. 109). As Ateşalp (2016) points out, during 2000-2007, nearly 600 domestic dramas were produced by 179 private producers (p. 19). Unsurprisingly, most privately-owned channels, whose income largely depended on ads, ordered more prime-time *dizis*. Some channels, like ATV and Kanal D, even established their own production companies. This give-and-take naturally accelerated the pace of *dizi* turnover: those that fell behind in ratings were quickly replaced with new ones. Meanwhile, a single episode's evening airtime ballooned to three hours because broadcasting rules permitted up to twelve minutes of ads an hour.

### Themes and Genres

In order to appeal to viewers, *dizis* incorporate features characteristic of many different genres, allowing viewers to experience the suspense of a thriller, the sparkle of a comedy, and the gravity of a drama as the story of a single *dizi* episode unfolds. Scriptwriters employ certain themes in the formulation of their main and secondary plots. One consequence of this was an early slew of *dizis* centered around the idea of "neighborhood": examples like *İkinci Bahar* [*Second Spring*] of 1998, *Yeditepe İstanbul* [*İstanbul of Seven Hills*] of 2001 all focus on the lives of small-time shopkeepers and the goings-on in somewhat out-of-the-way İstanbul neighborhoods. In most of these programs, the emphasis is on family ties and friendship dished up with a good helping of morality.

"Romance" is another theme that *dizi* scriptwriters are fond of. In fact, there is no *dizi* that does not have a romantic plot or subplot, probably because *dizis* are mostly watched by women (Çelenk, 2015, p. 152; Deloitte, 2014, p. 16). Romance-heavy *dizis* were among the first to be shipped abroad in the second half of the 2000s. Notable among these early export successes were *Binbir Gece* [*1001 Nights*] produced in 2006, *Gümüş* [*Noor*] of 2005, *Aşk-ı Memnu* [*Forbidden Love*] of 2008, *Fatmagül* of 2010, *Kara Para Aşk* [*Black Money Love*]

of 2014, *Kara Sevda* [Endless Love] of 2015, and *İstanbul Gelin* [Bride of İstanbul] of 2017. Such *dizis* successfully compete on many international platforms.

"Comedy" is generally employed in *dizis'* subplots. When it does rise to the level of main theme, the *dizi* typically becomes a situation comedy, the exportability of which is very limited because humor is so heavily dependent on local agendas. There are however many romcom *dizis* and examples of them—notably *Kiraz Mevsimi* [Cherry Season] produced in 2014, *No. 309* [Number 309] of 2016 and *Erkenci Kuş* [Daydreamer] of 2018—have been exported and done well in countries like Spain, France, and Italy.

A few *dizis* such as *Ezel* produced in 2009, *Çukur* [The Pit] of 2017, *Kurtlar Vadisi* [Valley of Wolves] running from 2003 to 2016, and *Babil* [Babel] of 2020 conform to the "crime drama" trope, with family relationships being tightly woven into them and a melodramatic structure driving the plot forward. Some *dizis* are set in "exceptional" periods of Turkish history: in *Hatırla Sevgili* [Remember Darling] produced in 2006 and *Öyle Bir Geçer Zaman ki* [Time Goes By] of 2010 for example, narratives unfold against a background of political events in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, while *Vatanım Sensin* [Wounded Love] produced in 2016 takes place during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). The most successful of period dramas have been those that are set in the Ottoman imperial era. *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* [The Magnificent Century] produced in 2011 was not only hugely popular in Turkey but was also exported to more than 100 countries. Although its sequel *Muhteşem Yüzyıl: Kösem* [The Magnificent Century: Kösem] of 2015 did at least as well if not better, *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* drew vociferous condemnation from conservative circles in Turkey for such reasons as "indecent inappropriate for family viewing" and "misrepresentation of historical figures". Public broadcaster TRT responded by ordering period-drama *dizis* with more "appropriate" scripts, resulting in the production of *Bir zamanlar Osmanlı: Kiyam* [Once Upon a Time in the Ottoman Empire: Rebellion] produced in 2012 and *Diriliş Ertuğrul* [Resurrection: Ertuğrul] of 2015. Some pro-government channels like ATV did likewise by ordering *dizis* such as *Kuruluş: Osman* [Founder: Osman] of 2019.

"Counterterrorism" provides the background for a few *dizis* like *Savaşçı* [Warrior] produced in 2017 and *Söz* [The Oath] of 2017. "Medical drama" is a relative newcomer to the *dizi* industry and the few instances so far have been transplanted adaptations: *Doktorlar* [Doctors] of 2006 was a remake of America's *Grey's Anatomy*, while the more recent *Mucize Doktor* [Miraculous Doctor] produced in 2019 is a remake of South Korea's *Good Doctor*. The transformation of the well-known *Grey's Anatomy* story into a Turkish *dizi* was successful enough for *Doktorlar* to attract attention in a number of other countries.

### New Digital Platforms

By the second half of the 2010s, production companies also began making *dizis* for newly-emerging non-linear digital platforms like BluTV, PuhuTV, and Netflix. Produced by Kanal D, Turkey's first streamed *dizi* *Masum* [Innocent] produced in 2017 was launched on BluTV. Ay Production produced first *Phi-Fi* in 2017 and then *Şahsiyet* [Persona] in 2018 for PuhuTV. *Dizis* originally produced for TV have also begun showing up on digital platforms.

*Behzat Ç: An Ankara Detective Story* of 2010 was sold in 2019 first to Netflix and then to BluTV. Recalling Esser (2017), the proliferation of distribution platforms heightened “competition for viewer-binding serial content” in Turkey (p. 425). Seeking new content with which to bind its viewer and making use of “drama fantasy” (a rarity in Turkish TV shows), Netflix produced *Hakan: Muhafız [The Protector]* in 2018 and *Atiye* in 2020. Besides new content, these new platforms are likewise spawning new production models involving relatively shorter episodes and bolder scenarios.

## THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study takes “the presence of *dizis* in international markets” as its principal research variable while also shedding light on the challenges the industry faces abroad. The study presents the opinions of creative professionals who have witnessed and are witnessing developments first-hand. The first part of the study reflects their ideas about the basic features of the *dizi* industry and the present condition of the *dizi* market in Turkey; the second considers the presence of *dizis* in international markets. The first part of the study also provides key information that will help readers follow the ideas generated by creative professionals and will be used in the second part. The author concludes the study with suggestions about what needs to be done to sustain and build upon the Turkish TV drama industry’s export success in light of the opinions that have been elicited. At this point, it is important to state that, recalling Mc Chesney (2000), the author prefers a political-economy assessment of the findings of the study in order to move beyond description to explanation.

Based on the foregoing literature review, a research strategy was formulated to find answers to the six questions presented below. The first three provide the framework for the first part of the study, which considers the basic features of the *dizi* industry and the present condition of the *dizi* market in Turkey:

- RQ 1: How do creative professionals regard the *dizi* industry’s current state in Turkey?
- RQ 2: What do creative professionals see as *dizis*’ strengths?
- RQ 3: What aspects of the *dizi* industry do creative professionals criticize the most?

The last three questions provide the framework for the second part of the study, which considers the presence of *dizis* in international markets:

- RQ 4: How do creative professionals regard the *dizi* industry’s current state abroad?
- RQ 5: What challenges confront the exportation of *dizis*?
- RQ 6: What needs to be done to sustain and build upon the Turkish TV drama industry’s export success?

## METHOD

### Research setting and sampling

The study was conducted in İstanbul where the *dizi* industry is based. The researcher identified four different categories of *dizi* workers to collect data from: *Producers*, *Directors*, *Scenarists*, and *Actors*. A quick review of professional backgrounds revealed that some individuals could be assigned to more than one category, so the researcher first asked each respondent to specify which category they most identified with and then classified their interview accordingly. For each category, three interviews were conducted with individuals who have or have had professional connections with leading production companies such as Ay Production,<sup>5</sup> MinT Production<sup>6</sup> and Tims Production<sup>7</sup> (Deloitte, 2014, p. 24). Based on their 2013-2014 revenues, these were among the top ten production companies.<sup>8</sup> Only one respondent self-identified as a freelance producer. The first round of interviews took place on 10 January 2020 and the last on 19 March 2020.

After completing the first round, it was observed that additional interviews needed to be conducted with another category of respondents– “Distributors”–in order to get more information about the international marketing of *dizis*. For this purpose, the author decided to communicate with distributors who attended the world’s largest TV content marketing fair MIPCOM 2019 (Yılmaz, 2019). Emails were sent to companies like Calinos Entertainment,<sup>9</sup> Global Agency,<sup>10</sup> Intermedia,<sup>11</sup> MADD Entertainment,<sup>12</sup> and Ecchorights.<sup>13</sup> Ecchorights and MADD Entertainment accepted the author’s invitation. Thus, two more in-depth interviews with the executives of these distributors were conducted between 20 and 26 March 2020. This round also made it possible to elicit information about international buyers’ habits before and during the Covid-19 pandemic.

## INTERVIEWING

Following scholars like Kvale and Brinkmann (2018, p. 52) and Chenail (2011, p. 257), the researcher first conducted a pilot interview to determine the main aspects of the topics under consideration. Based on the results of the pilot interview, a finalized set of topics was identified for each category. Although the final question was always about what needed to be done to sustain and build upon the *dizi* industry’s export success, the researcher preferred a semi-structured qualitative interviewing approach. Kendall (2014) defined semi-structured interviews as “having a planned list of questions but allowing

<sup>5</sup> Ay Production was founded by Kerem Çatay in 2005.

<sup>6</sup> MinT Production was founded by Birol Güven in 1996. It is unrelated to London-based Mint Productions.

<sup>7</sup> Tims Production was founded by Timur Savcı in 2006.

<sup>8</sup> According to Deloitte’s report (2014), the revenues of Ay Production, MinT Production, and Tims Production respectively were as follows: 44 million dollars; 28, 5 million dollars and 29, 6 million dollars. These companies produce a maximum of six *dizis* each year (p. 24).

<sup>9</sup> Calinos Entertainment was founded in Los Angeles in 1997; it opened an office in İstanbul in 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Global Agency started selling *dizis* in 2008. It acquired the Australian company World Wide Entertainment in 2012.

<sup>11</sup> Intermedia was founded in 1992, initially to serve the domestic market and subsequently began exporting *dizis*.

<sup>12</sup> MADD Entertainment (Med Production – Ay Production Drama Distribution) is a joint venture of two leading Turkish production companies that was established in 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Echo Rights is a global rights management company whose head office is in Stockholm. Echo Rights Turkey was founded in 2009.

room for dialogue and follow-up questions" (p.133). The researcher avoided asking leading questions and gave respondents a chance to clarify any points they might make. Similar to what Dowling et al. (2016) asserted, the researcher sought to draw out the "interpretations and experiences" of the industry members through these semi-structured interviews (p. 680), which were usually conducted in respondents' workplaces but also in settings such as cafés. Recalling Liu (2018, p. 4) and Driscoll (2011, p. 165), these face-to-face interviews also gave the researcher non-verbal clues about the interviewees' feelings. Audio recordings were made of all fourteen interviews, each of which lasted between 45 and 60 minutes.

### Transcription and analysis

Interviews were transcribed and checked against recordings for accuracy. Each interview was labeled using a category name and number ("Director 1", "Actor 3", etc.). About 138 pages (71760 words) of interview data were collected. The researcher first created meaningful data units appropriate to the research questions by comparing and contrasting the elements of all the interviews. The second step involved classifying and ordering these units under specific headings. Using the descriptive method, the researcher sought to give typical examples from each category under each heading as answers to each research question.

## FINDINGS

### The Current State of the Dizi Industry

Asked to characterize the current state of the *dizi* industry, Turkish creative professionals' responses focused mainly on "cutthroat competition" and "onerous economic conditions".

#### *Cutthroat Competition*

Although every respondent noted the competitiveness of the *dizi* industry, none actually complained about it: everyone accepted it as a fact of life and some even expressed the belief that such competition was keeping the industry dynamic. Respondents seemed to have resolved the long working hours problem mentioned in previous studies like Bulut (2016), Ateşalp, (2016) and Yörük (2018).

Producer 1:

*Dizis with good production values and interesting storylines survive; those that aren't watched get cancelled even after the second episode. The rapid pace of dizi production keeps us on our toes. For my current show, I'm working with three directors and four scriptwriters and we have two production and postproduction teams working alternately. We have largely resolved the working conditions problem, at least the big production companies have.*

#### *Onerous economic conditions*

Turkey's economic indicators began to deteriorate in 2016. In 2018, the country went through a currency and debt crisis. It was said that this crisis was caused by an excessive current account deficit and foreign-currency debt in combination with the ruling Justice



and Development Party's increasing authoritarianism and President Erdoğan's unorthodox ideas about interest-rate policy (Daragahi, 2018; Pitel, 2018). By end-2018, the Turkish economy was in recession. In 2019, an already high level of systemic unemployment was made even worse by job losses (European Commission, 2020). Respondents said that the onerous economic conditions affected the *dizi* industry just like every other sector in Turkey. As their production costs soared, *dizi* production companies were unable to finance their projects. Some explained how they are trying to cope with economic difficulties; a few said that everything will be even worse after the epidemic passes unless essential measures are taken.

Producer 2:

*Economic crisis had increased production costs and advertisers had downsized their purchasing budgets. We finance projects mainly in Turkey, but to do that, we need high ratings. Just about anything we can export is pure profit, but if a dizi is cancelled after a couple of episodes, it becomes total rubbish because international customers never buy fewer than 26 episodes. With the pandemic financing will get worse.*

Scriptwriter 3:

*Because of the deteriorating economic conditions of 2019, we started writing more "production-friendly" scenarios: if a character owns a jet we don't show him boarding the aircraft but have him tell someone to get it ready. Sometimes we happen upon music that'll suit a scene perfectly but we don't use it because we can't afford the rights.*

### **Dizi features that strengthen the industry**

When we asked *dizi* industry workers about their sector's strengths, their first response was overwhelmingly "creative scenarios"; coming in close second was the quality of *dizis'* "preproduction, production, and postproduction stages". A great majority mentioned "musical and visual diversity" while some cited "character-development" and "star performers".

#### ***Creative scenarios***

Every respondent said dynamically-structured, creative scenarios were the source of the industry's success.

Scriptwriter 3:

*The protracted length of individual dizi episodes has somehow triggered "creativity". Coming up with such long episodes was a big problem in the beginning because it demanded such long working hours. We write about a hundred pages a week. Eventually we learned how to deal with this and nowadays writing is a group effort. Nevertheless, the crucial problem is keeping the viewers watching till the end of the episode and, more importantly, to make sure they are eager to see the next one. Scenarios have got to be "animated". Stories have got to be original. We use surprise to manage and control viewers' reactions. We don't write many episodes in advance: we usually keep at most three or four episodes in reserve.*

Scriptwriter 1:

*We usually start with the current season's story arc; we also know how each character will evolve. However, things can change after a broadcast because we follow viewers' reactions on the Internet and through their e-mails etc. A good way for a story to hold onto viewers is to surprise them. So, a dizi is never about just one genre: an episode may have aspects of a romantic comedy, but it might suddenly turn into a thriller or a tragedy or something else.*



Producer 1:

*Turkish viewers want "tempo" in dizis. They don't want to watch actors eyeing each other silently for minutes on end. Such shows are quickly eliminated. Ten years ago, we were leading viewers: they watched whatever we gave them; nowadays viewers are leading us: they're demanding and looking for "originality".*

Director 2:

*We're lucky because we can create very different shows with very interesting storylines. It's hosted 35 different civilizations; it is the crossover between East and the West; one side is the Muslim world, the other side is indexed to the Western world. We have a marvelously intellectual generation that can produce many captivating scenarios from these resources.*

### **Preproduction, production, and postproduction quality**

Creative professionals also emphasized the "quality of preproduction, production and postproduction stages" as one of the strongest aspects of *dizis*.

Producer 3:

*We produce dizis at almost the same pace they appear on TV. Production usually completes only 72 hours before an episode airs. We're very fast and have become masters of the preproduction, production, and postproduction stages: we can complete post within three days max. Many foreign companies now prefer Turkey for their projects' postproduction. Disney's an example.*

### **Musical and Visual Diversity**

"Musical and visual diversity" were also mentioned as strong aspects of *dizis* that deserve praise.

Director 1:

*Every dizi has its own repertoire of theme music, which is usually composed specifically for that show. Music helps by cuing the attention of the viewer. Another thing is our inventory of real locations rather than constructed sets, even for interior shots. These can range from seaside palaces on the Bosphorus to village cottages in Adana.*

### **Character development and stars**

A number of professionals cited "character development" as an important element of *dizis*. Director 3, expressed it saying "characters in dizis aren't clear-cut, set-in-stone puppets: they are flesh-and-blood people who evolve as the story moves forward." While most producers and directors said that having a "star" in the cast did not always contribute much to ratings, every distributor said that having one made it easier to market a show abroad.

Producer 1:

*There was a time when we used to headline well-known stars when marketing a show; nowadays, it's more effective to introduce a dizi by putting up clips and teasers on social media. Of course, this only works if the content and acting are genuinely good.*

### Most-criticized issues

"Problems encountered during the design stage", "RTÜK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) practices", "the new ratings panel system" and "problems with rights allocation" were the issues Turkish creative professionals criticized the most.

#### *Problems encountered during the design stage*

Some said the industry suffered especially from problems during the design stage.

Producer 3:

*Our real problems are in designing a project. We don't budget time for developing a project or capital for the design stage: we just feel our way forward. In our industry, it's usually scriptwriters approaching producers, whereas creator-producers should be the ones designing and generating projects, finding scriptwriters, making cast and location arrangements, and so on. Broadcasters are gatekeepers and they make deals; their contributions are limited. That's largely because they don't employ commissioning editors.*

Some attributed design-stage problems to a lack of creativity.

Director 2:

*The problem isn't time. I know of many shows that had more than a year or two for the design stage. The main problem is that they're not nourished by Turkish—or indeed anyone's—literature and have no general appeal. This is related to a lack of creativity.*

#### *The regulator's practices*

Turkey's Radio and Television Supreme Council was founded in 1994 as an autonomous and impartial public legal authority charged with the regulation and supervision of radio, television, and on-demand media services. However, the council's approach and rulings are decidedly political and its structure is far from being impartial (Yıldız, 2003; Işık, 2007). Although the body's main concern is ostensibly to regulate and develop healthy relationships among media-industry actors, RTÜK seems to be most known for the frequent and sometimes stiff penalties that it imposes on TV and radio channels. Unsurprisingly, every respondent criticized RTÜK practices and said they chafed under the council's restrictions, which they see as a real threat to creativity.

Producer 2:

*RTÜK punishes channels with heavy fines. There are rules but they're not clear yet. What's "Turkish family structure"? What does "appropriateness" mean? Unavoidably, we omit anything we think RTÜK might find controversial. Some themes like homosexuality aren't touched at all.*

Director 2:

*I've observed a change in the "content" and "form" of dizis in the last decade: they're getting more and more impoverished. But this isn't just because of political pressure. I believe it's largely due to the length of dizi episodes and also to "RTÜK paranoia".*

#### *New viewer ratings panel system*

Since December 2011, TNS has been monitoring Turkish TV channel ratings and audience shares. Initially, AGB Nielsen created a panel system consisting of 2,200

households in which education level was the main determinant; it then defined a sample consisting of five categories<sup>14</sup> with a particular percentage assigned to each group.<sup>15</sup> In 2012, the new company, TNS, increased the number of households to 4,200 and changed the sampling definition by adding a new category<sup>16</sup> and introducing a new percentage-assignment method.<sup>17</sup> TNS also added income level as a determining factor (Kuyucu, 2020). TNS's inclusion of this new category to the panel system is heavily criticized by all distributors and by many creative professionals. While it is accepted that production teams must ultimately take home-market cultural preferences and tastes into account in order to capture the ratings of non-urban households, in order to appeal to viewers in other countries' markets, producers need to target educated people living in big cities whose tastes have largely come to resemble those of "Western" cultures (Zincirkıran, 2016).

Producer 3:

*In 2012, the demographic groups represented on the ratings panel changed and the relative weights of every group shifted. Education used to count for more than income; now it's the reverse. Lower socioeconomic groups have trebled in weight, and rural preferences dominate. We've moved away from international tastes in other words. This should be changed.*

#### **Problems with rights allocation**

Although *dizi*, cinema film, and similar copyrights are protected in Turkey by Statute 5846, a law governing intellectual properties and works of art, some scholars (Yörük, 2018, p. 819) say that in practice, many scriptwriters simply hand over their rights to producers when they enter contracts with them. In a similar way, respondents of this study (mostly scriptwriters and actors) voiced problems with how rights are allocated. Some interpreted the problem of rights allocation as a result of weak labor organizations and poor union rights.<sup>18</sup> Actor 1 mentioned this, saying "Broadcasters share profits from foreign sales mainly with producers. Stars get a cut but scriptwriters rarely do. If we had a strong labor organization behind us, we would maintain our rights." It should be noted also that some producers are dissatisfied with the copyright conditions offered by new digital platforms. Producer 3 expressed the issue saying "If you work with the new digital platforms, you give the show along with all its property rights. So, you are becoming a contractor-producer, not a producer."

#### **The current state of dizis abroad**

When asked about the current state of *dizis* abroad, all creative workers said they are pleased by the shows' worldwide appeal.

<sup>14</sup> Category A (100% highly educated and hold at least a bachelor's degree from a university), Category B (60% highly educated; the remainder highschool and equivalent graduates), Category C1 (60% highschool or equivalent graduates; the remainder hold a bachelor's degree), Category C2 (20% highschool or equivalent graduates; the remainder have primary or middle school diplomas), Category D (70% primary school diplomas; the remainder are school dropouts).

<sup>15</sup> The allocation of categories was 4% Category A, 9% Category B, 25% Category C1, 32% Category C2, and 30% Category D.

<sup>16</sup> Category E consists of 95% primary-school graduates or dropouts. This category is especially representative of rural audiences.

<sup>17</sup> The new apportionment of categories is 4% Category A, 9% Category B, 22% Category C1, 29% Category C2, 28% Category D, 9% Category E.

<sup>18</sup> There are eight *dizi* industry unions in Turkey but they have hardly any collective bargaining power because of their very limited membership (Karaca & Hoş, 2019).

### ***Penetrating markets***

Many offered reasons for the global popularity of *dizis* and stated that they were looking for new markets.

Producer 1:

*Global viewers are attracted by dizis' new landscapes, their patriarchal society with strong mothers, their melodramatic content, their high production values, and their fast-paced scenarios. But different things appeal to different audiences: some viewers—the Balkans for example—have similar cultural backgrounds; some are interested in seeing Turkish society practicing Islam in a relatively modern way; for some, it's historical and natural settings; for others it's because Turkish society represents an "exotic" culture, which some are even observing with an "orientalist" mindset.*

Distributor 1:

*We're distributing dizis to over 150 countries in the Middle East, Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Most of these viewers want colorful melodramas; they want love, revenge, and Cinderella stories like Kara Sevda. Some European countries such as Italy and Spain want romantic comedies. With the world in lockdown because of the pandemic, we continue to market dizis.*

Distributor 2:

*People in more than 150 countries want to watch dizis. We've marketed many shows to Sweden as well. The new digital platforms are also aware of this demand: one reason they come into Turkey is to order new Turkish dramas.*

### **Challenges in exportation of dizis**

"Conflicting demands" and "insufficient management of success" were seen as the most common challenging issues among Turkish creative professionals.

#### ***Conflicting demands***

Some producers and distributors noted that the expectations of international customers are no longer matching those of Turkish broadcasters. The international buyers want dramatic *dizis*, whereas Turkish viewers want to see more action. They found these conflicting demands rather challenging.

Producer 2:

*We're up against a wall lately because what Turkish viewers expect of a dizi no longer matches what international buyers want: what they want from us is telenovelas. Our older dizis like Kara Sevda, Aşk-ı Memnu, and Gümüş were more like telenovelas. But RTÜK is more repressive lately: it can see anything as threatening "Turkish family structure". Moreover, Turkish viewers want to see more action: that's why Çukur and Babil get such good ratings.*

#### ***Insufficient management of success***

Many Turkish creative professionals believe that *dizis'* success is not being managed well by policymakers.

Actor 2:

*After 30 years, we've become one of the world's leading TV drama exporters: our shows are being watched in more than 150 countries. This success is not being managed well. Owing to rising production costs, we can't produce as we wish. Nor have we been getting the support we need. But they let us produce*

*dizis during the Covid-19 pandemic after just a six-month hiatus even while other sectors continued to be locked down.*

### **What needs to be done**

There was a consensus among industry professionals about what needs to be done to sustain and build upon the Turkish TV drama industry's export success. Their responses fall into two categories: "What policymakers should do" and "What creative professionals must do".

#### ***What policymakers should do***

At the head of the first category's list comes "regulatory framework revision". All of the respondents want the long-awaited amendment of "Turkey's copyright law" to be completed with the inclusion of elaborated, up-to-date provisions addressing present-day issues. They also want to start benefitting again from the "government incentives" that they used to receive when producing *dizis*.

Producer 1:

*Seven or eight years ago, the economics ministry published a communiqué about foreign-currency-earning sectors that qualify for these incentives: our industry is one of them. We used to receive incentives, but along with the economic crisis, authorities have become more miserly. Another thing is that it should be easier to get permits to use public spaces as settings for filming.*

All respondents agree that RTÜK should define its "rules of content" more explicitly. They also want the "ratings system panel" revised in favor of more educated viewers. Distributor 1 mentioned it saying, "If we want to penetrate new markets, the relative weight of "AB" viewers needs to be increased."

#### ***What creative professionals must do***

At the head of the second category's list was "development of language and creative skills". Most industry members say their second-language skills are insufficient to follow international viewer feedback or to develop international co-productions. In addition to their language skills, they also want to expand their creative skills. Scriptwriter 3 expressed this desire, saying "We've got lots of subjects that can be turned into world-beating *dizis*. All we need is brainstorming to create successful projects. Workshops should be organized with broadcasters, producers, directors, and scriptwriters taking part in them."

Most professionals emphasized the importance of giving preference to "partnerships" in *dizis'* production and distribution stages.

Producer 3:

*We think co-production is useful for international sales. We have co-production knowhow and we're getting involved in new shows almost every day. For example, *Şahsiyet* is going to be produced with the Mexicans. We sold them the story, but we're also investing in the project. We'll be distributing in Latin America and many other countries. We believe partnerships like this will stimulate the *dizi* industry and add to our export success.*

## DISCUSSION

Twenty years ago, there was scarcely any mention of Turkish TV dramas in international markets: nowadays *dizis* make a strong showing at trade fairs around the world; with the advent of new streaming platforms, they are being watched in over 150 countries. International *dizi* sales generate significant foreign currency earnings for the Turkish economy and they are even said to boost the country's tourist arrivals. All of which begs the question of how Turkish dramas have become so popular even in countries that are often linguistically and culturally remote. Recent research (Esser, 2017; Jensen & Jacobsen, 2017) suggests that this situation is not peculiar to *dizis*: nowadays peripheral industries are often as well-positioned to satisfy international customers as are well-known, long-established central industries. These are obviously hopeful developments for the *dizi* industry.

The first part of this study looked at some basic features of the *dizi* industry and the current condition of the *dizi* market in Turkey. One finding is that the industry's existing production and business model is still largely dependent on a show's home-market performance. Another is that international partnerships have been increasing over the last five years: interviews reveal many successful co-production projects. We are also seeing partnerships among distributors and producers. Nearly all respondents were excited about newly-emerging digital platforms and many expressed the view that streaming platforms represent a production model alternative. There is also a belief that these platforms' orders for new *dizis* will help shows travel even further afield.

Creative professionals offered many examples of *dizis'* strengths. Scriptwriters pointed to the shows' "dynamic structures" and "creative storylines" and to the use of more than one genre within a *dizi* as a means of holding viewers' interest; they noted also that they write only three or four episodes ahead so that they can use viewers' reactions as input for surprising viewers in subsequent episodes. Most producers, directors, and actors reported being satisfied with *dizis'* "creative scenarios", "evolving, flesh-and-blood characters", and "surprise" endings. Like Danish TV dramas (Esser, 2017, p. 423), *dizis* are often praised for their "musical and visual diversity". Most industry professionals said they are proud of *dizis'* preproduction, production, and postproduction quality. However, they point to the many structural problems that beset the *dizi* industry too: Most said for example that they felt personally offended by the way rights are being shared. Some blamed poor labor organization for this. Everyone criticized "the new ratings panel system". Some found the design stage of *dizi* projects rather weak but said this could be improved through the efforts of creative professionals. So, it would be difficult to maintain that many industry problems pointed to by previous studies have been resolved.

The second part of the study reveals two main things: firstly, that, although *dizis* are penetrating many markets and have reached more than 150 countries, the sustainability of *dizis'* international market presence faces additional challenges apart from the above-mentioned structural problems; secondly, that these challenges urgently need to be addressed too. For instance, the mismatch between domestic and international

customers' expectations and demands is a significant problem. Furthermore, buyers' perceptions of *dizis* as "Turkish telenovelas" pose threats that might hobble the industry's future creativity and development in different genres. This part of the study also turns up some new findings that are not to be observed in previous ones. Contrary to Yeşil (2016), most creative members claimed that "success is not being managed well" by the authorities; neither did any of the participants make reference to any "new-Turkey discourse" emphasizing the country's economic growth and development (p. 51). This difference, however, could be due to the rollback in government-provided support mechanisms as a result of the deterioration in Turkey's economy since 2017. Nearly all respondents referred to RTÜK's rules and practices as a "threat to their creativity". They are almost certainly referring to RTÜK's new content "guidelines" as laid out in "Regulation on the principles and procedures for promoting family and child-friendly productions and *dizis*" (RTÜK, 2018), whose provisions are considered to be long on ambiguity but short on specifics by industry members. In fact, the ruling party reiterated its protectionist and conservative tone (article no: 596) in *The Eleventh Development Plan of Turkey: 2019-2023* saying that "media tools will be used in a way to strengthen family ties" (Office of the President, 2019).

## CONCLUSION

Turkey's *dizi* industry made a tremendous entrance into the world's TV drama scene; however, in order to sustain and build upon this success, there are certain things both professionals and policymakers need to do. The author has attempted to present these things based on typical examples obtained through interviews. He explains them in the context of political economic developments in Turkey. Although creative professionals express hope that improvements in the regulatory framework will be forthcoming and although they believe that new production models which facilitate domestic and international co-productions and partnerships will help the *dizi* industry to build on its export success, the reality is that the most recent content regulation published by RTÜK looks like being a real threat to the *dizi* industry because TV drama is a product of a creative process and mandated/reined-in creativity cannot thrive.

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# KAKO TURSKI KREATIVNI PROFESIONALCI VIDE INDUSTRIJU TELEVIZIJSKIH DRAMA: INTERVJU S GLUMCIMA, PRODUCENTIMA, REDATELJIMA, SCENARISTIMA I DISTRIBUTERIMA

Ayşen Gül

**SAŽETAK** *Turska televizijska industrija naglo se razvila u posljednjem desetljeću i povećala izvoz televizijskih drama (dizis) u više od stotinu država. Turska je 2016. godine postala drugi najveći izvoznik televizijskih drama u svijetu nakon Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Transnacionalizacija industrije televizijskih drama, dizi, rezultat je rada i karakteristika kreativne industrije. Međutim, ta industrija ima i neke ozbiljne probleme. Ovaj rad nastoji objasniti izazove s kojima se sreće turska televizijska industrija kroz intervju s glumcima, producentima, redateljima, scenaristima i distributerima, te dati preporuke za uspjeh izvoza turskih televizijskih proizvoda.*

## KLJUČNE RIJEČI

TURSKA TELEVIZIJSKE DRAME, DIZI, IZVOZ, TURSKI KREATIVNI PROFESIONALCI

Bilješka o autorici \_\_\_\_\_

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# VIDEO GAMING SPECTATORSHIP: WHAT DRIVES GAMEPLAY WATCHING ON YOUTUBE?

Urša Golob :: Medeja Kraševc :: Tanja Oblak Črnič

ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER / DOI: 10.20901/ms.12.23.3 / SUBMITTED: 1.4.2020.

**ABSTRACT** *This article addresses the phenomenon of gameplay video watching on YouTube. The study investigates what drives people to watch gameplay videos and what gratifications they seek in performing the activity of gameplay viewing. To this end, the authors adopted the uses and gratifications theory (UGT) and a qualitative methodology involving three online discussion groups with 100 members of international gameplay communities. While the results pinpoint the attractiveness of the player as the most important motive, other reasons, such as preview and learning aspects or substitution for the real game, also appear to be important. The qualitative approach enabled to uncover unique aspects of the motives of watching YouTube gameplay videos. In this respect, five distinctive types of gameplay viewers are identified – Spectator, Performer, Selector, Viewer, and Substitutor – where each of them seems to engage in such practices with specific motives and accompanying gratifications.*

## KEYWORDS

GAMEPLAY VIDEOS, SPECTATORSHIP, YOUTUBE, GAMING PLATFORM,  
USES AND GRATIFICATIONS, DIGITAL GAMES

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## INTRODUCTION

Trends in the global video gaming industry indicate that the number of online video gaming viewers has grown exponentially across the world in the last few years, and the same growth is expected for the future (PRNewswire, 2019, April 5). As part of this trend, uploading gameplay footage and streaming video games have become very popular activities on different media platforms, such as Twitch and YouTube, which both provide these services for free (Villapaz & Mueller, 2015). Services like the YouTube Gaming platform have induced several changes in the media landscape and in content related to video gaming (Sjöblom et al., 2017). Looking at the numbers, in January 2020, YouTube Gaming had more than 83 million subscribers uploading, streaming, and watching video games (YouTube, 2020). The number of viewers of this content increased from around 609 million globally in 2016 to 743 million in 2019 (Anderson, 2018). In 2016, about 2% of all daily trending videos on YouTube were focused on gaming and were largely fueled by a younger audience (Mediakix, 2016). Gameplay broadcast via YouTube or similar platforms, which offer a combination of digital gameplay and video, has become a new hybrid genre (Burgess & Green, 2018; Burwell, 2017) and a typical representative of "homecasting" (van Dijck, 2007), where spectators watch gameplay from home or on their personal mobile device.

Spectators are defined as those who remain engaged by watching and not necessarily interacting directly with the game (Cheung & Huang, 2011). Spectatorship as such is not new to the gaming world; it has been present since the early days of arcade games, when people would gather around to watch live gameplay (Taylor, 2016). Today, although video games are primarily designed for playing in the privacy of a living room, they are increasingly attracting spectators too (Sjöblom & Hamari, 2017). Such large—and growing—crowds of viewers suggest that gameplay watching is not a mere fad or type of niche entertainment; it is becoming a general trend (Sjöblom et al., 2017) constituting a new digital culture (Deuze, 2006).

While quite a lot has been written about why people tend to play video games and how this affects their daily lives (for a detailed meta-analysis of why people play, see Hamari & Keronen, 2017), we know much less about gameplay watching and the motives behind this activity. However, the explosive popularity of video game streaming suggests that watching others play video games represents a novel process in digital media consumption caused by the rapid development of accessible online video content that merits more scholarly attention.

Research on the phenomenon of gameplay watching still has significant potential to contribute to the trending domain of game research in the fields of media, communication, and information sciences (e.g., Sjöblom et al., 2017). The scarce literature on game viewership mostly centers on the video streaming audience on the Twitch platform, and research on YouTube's gameplay footage and gaming audience is particularly rare. Dominating the existing research are, for instance, investigations into the simultaneous presence of players and viewers (Anderson, 2017; Wulf et al., 2020), identification and

classification of video game spectators (Cheung & Huang, 2011), exploration of the reasons for watching competitive video gaming (Hamari & Sjöblom, 2017) or mapping of the experience of the video game audience (Corbett, 2009), and examination of pre-defined motives and gratifications of live-streaming viewers (Gros et al., 2017; Hilvert-Bruce et al., 2018; Sjöblom & Hamari, 2017; Sjöblom et al., 2017; Wulf et al., 2020). The latter example represents the strongest stream of research addressing the *why* of gameplay watching (e.g., Sjöblom & Hamari, 2017). This research is rooted in the uses and gratifications theory (UGT) (Katz et al., 1974) and provides useful insights into the socio-motivational engagement of gameplay audiences. On the downside, however, studies dealing with the motives and gratifications of gaming audiences have often been adaptations of studies on social networking sites (e.g., Hilvert-Bruce et al., 2018), leaving little room to uncover motives that are unique to this particular hybrid genre (Kaye, 2010).

To address these gaps in the literature, our study focuses on the people who watch pre-recorded video gameplay. For this purpose, we adopted UGT as a guiding framework in a critical way (Steiner & Xu, 2018). This allowed us to observe game watchers on YouTube and gain insight into why people watch videos of others playing video games and the extent to which their motives or the gratifications they seek are unique compared to those identified in other online contexts. We employed a qualitative methodology involving three online discussion groups with 100 members of gameplay communities. Following the reasoning of Corbett (2009), who argued that video games, to a certain extent, reflect a theatrical situation of which spectatorship is a definitive element, we expected that certain motives could be quite specific to the particular situation of gameplay watching. Thus, by uncovering the gratifications sought without making prior assumptions about them, we aimed to understand why people watch gameplay videos, what gratifications they potentially seek from the specific activity of gameplay viewing, and how this, in turn, affects their daily lives.

In sum, our study's contributions lie in our attempt to fill three voids in the literature and practice of video gaming and new media. First, our study adds new insights about video game spectatorship, which is quickly becoming an important new element in a broader ecosystem of media consumption (Orme, 2021). Explaining the unique motives for gameplay watching can allow for exploring and understanding the associated behaviors and psychological effects of watching video gaming (e.g., Steiner & Xu, 2018) and, thus, provide a better understanding of the role of spectators in co-creating video gameplay meaning (Bowman, 2018). Since most gameplay video watchers are young, this research may also provide insights into youth culture and ways of consuming media, thus dictating a new media literacy (e.g., Burwell, 2017; Smith & Sanchez, 2015). Second, implementing the UGT framework through a qualitative lens allows for uncovering the specifics of gameplay watching that are defined by new societal and technological impacts that have been neglected often in the UGT research (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). For instance, a priori UGT models are mainly able to present only those gratifications that already exist in the UGT research, while exploratory research could produce new insights (Dhir et al., 2017) foremost in newly emerging hybrid genres, such as watching gameplay videos. Third, instead of following previous studies on gameplay watching on Twitch, we

focused on YouTube, a relatively understudied social media site (Khan, 2017). It plays an important role not just as a go-to site for general video watching (Khan, 2017) but also as the most popular video sharing website for pre-recorded "Let's Play" (LP) videos with gaming content (Smith et al., 2013), which is widely used by gamers (Burwell and Miller, 2016) as well as other types of audiences (Arthurs et al., 2018).

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF GAMEPLAY WATCHING

### Online gameplay videos and spectatorship

Video games are primarily designed for players, but the players are not the only ones engaging. Gameplay watching has become one of the most popular forms of online digital entertainment (Burwell, 2017), and the audience members, although not actively playing, are considered an important part of the social situation of gaming (Downs et al., 2014). While gameplay watching or spectatorship can take many forms (e.g., watching games at tournaments and in public places, over-the-shoulder watching; Cheung & Huang, 2011), this relatively new form of spectatorship is defined in the context of watching games via online videos.

Among the young audience that tends to watch gameplay the most, this hybrid genre is commonly known under the above-mentioned LP and normally includes gameplay footage with simultaneous commentary, which is either audio or video recorded to capture the player's reactions (Burwell, 2017). Gameplay videos appear in other forms as well, such as speed runs, walkthroughs, tutorials, and top plays reviews. The idea of gameplay videos is simply to capture and show gameplay with added commentary by the players; it is not to create stories or narratives but to display the process by which "players engage with and appropriate games to fit their specific play styles and preferences" (Glas, 2015, p. 83). Gameplay videos, and LP videos specifically, contain an interesting aspect of meaning-making. That is, the commentary not only reveals how a player is playing the game but also what he or she feels and knows about the game (Burwell, 2017). Thus, in the LP videos, the important source of enjoyment for the viewer is what the player adds to the gameplay to create the experience, which is then experienced by the audience (Burwell, 2017; Smith et al., 2013).

### Engaging audiences: Viewers, performers, spectators

As Burwell and Miller (2016) observed, LP is an invitation to the audience to join in the gameplay in one way or another. Thus, in terms of the viewing experience, LP viewing can be discussed within the spectacle/performance paradigm, which explains media use in an increasingly performative, consumerist, and media-intensive society where different forms of media are omnipresent in our daily lives (Gosling & Crawford, 2011). In this context, gameplay viewing has been presented as a reproduction of either theatre spectatorship (Corbett, 2009) or early film—specifically Gunning's cinema of attraction—where the event of gameplay, an exciting spectacle, is interesting in and of itself (Glas, 2015; Menotti, 2014).

The audience watching the gameplay footage is by no means passive; viewers are eager not just to participate in conversations about the meanings of games and gameplay (Burwell, 2017) via gaming paratexts (Burwell & Miller, 2016) but also tend to engage in vicarious play, which unfolds in their minds parallel to the active play (Cheung & Huang, 2011). Furthermore, according to the spectacle/performance paradigm, the audience's activity is hidden in other aspects of gaming (Gosling & Crawford, 2011). One such aspect is using the media as a resource for constructing and maintaining one's social identity and being part of the gaming community, and another is the everydayness of gaming, which is reflected in conversations and identities of people around the world (Gosling & Crawford, 2011).

Overall, the research on video gameplay spectatorship has established that this new hybrid clearly supports the experience of viewing, which implies that experiencing media integrates both the activities of viewing and using (Roig et al., 2009). Since it can be assumed that viewers of gameplay videos seek to gain certain value and gratification, rather than being passive observers, the theoretical framework of UGT seems to provide solid ground for tapping into the reasons why individuals use gameplay videos in any context (Hilvert-Bruce et al., 2018).

### Principles of Uses and Gratifications Theory

UGT, which was formally established in the 1970s, is an audience-oriented theory underpinned by the assumption that individuals' selection and usage of media is active and goal-directed and that certain psychological and contextual factors can influence how individuals use media to gratify their needs and wants (Katz et al., 1974). The motives for media use are products of psychological dispositions, social factors, and environmental conditions (Katz et al. 1974), while gratifications are manifested as perceived fulfillments through activities, such as media use (Palmgreen, 1984). Palmgreen (1984) distinguished between *pursued gratifications*, which encourage behavior such as media use, and *received gratifications*, which are a result of the behavior and do not necessarily match the gratifications sought. Understanding motives or pursued gratifications can allow for comprehending and addressing the negative effects of watching different media content (Strizakova & Krcmar, 2003). As Katz et al. (1974) argued, it is the understanding of social and psychological sources of needs that generates expectations of mass media and other media, which then leads to different media exposures that, in turn, gratify the needs but can also produce unintentional consequences.

UGT's central assumption, thus, concerns the predictive power of motives in terms of an individual's media use, choice of medium, and time spent with the medium (Dhir et al., 2017). Apart from the factors researched in traditional UGT, researchers are increasingly acknowledging that the characteristics of new media technologies tend to impact audiences' gratifications and change their habits or cause them to form new ones (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). More generally, scholars have extracted three categories of gratifications that are relevant for new media use: (1) process, (2) socialization, and (3) content (e.g., Dhir et al., 2017; Peters et al., 2007). Process gratification relates to inclusion in the process itself, especially with time-passing activities, rather than in the content



itself. Socialization gratification is experienced through interaction and relationships, while content gratification is characterized by information sharing and learning (Peters et al., 2007).

Over the years, UGT has provided a useful framework for the systematic study of media use. However, within its capacity to evolve, UGT remains open for continuous updates, revisions, and refinements and is exposed to the challenges of new media technologies and newly emerging (hybrid) genres (Steiner & Xu, 2018). Increasingly, UGT is being used for studying the Internet (Dhir et al., 2017) and specific online contexts including new media technologies and genres, such as online games (Sherry et al., 2006), social media (Alhabash & Ma, 2017), video sharing (Chiang & Hsiao, 2015), and more recently, gameplay watching via live video streaming (Hilvert-Bruce et al., 2018; Sjöblom & Hamari, 2017; Sjöblom et al., 2017).

### Questioning the motives and gratifications of gameplay viewing

Most studies have employed a general, standardized approach for measuring uses and gratifications by adapting pre-existing scales of media use (Dhir et al., 2017; Kaye, 2007). In the context of video gameplay viewing, Hilvert-Bruce et al. (2018) researched what motivates engagement in live-stream gaming via Twitch with eight motives derived from social media research: entertainment, information seeking, meeting new people, social interactions, social support, sense of community, social anxiety, and external support. In contrast, Sjöblom and Hamari (2017) and Sjöblom et al. (2017) followed a broader UGT pool of motives for using old and new media and focused on five categories of motives for engaging in live streaming on Twitch: cognitive, affective, personal integrative, social integrative, and tension release. All of these studies suggested that *entertainment* (affective category) and *information seeking* (cognitive category) are the most significant motives for gameplay viewing on Twitch. In the context of YouTube, one study similarly identified relaxing entertainment alongside information and self-status seeking as the most important motives (Khan, 2017).

Some scholars have called for further inquiries to develop a more robust understanding of how individuals engage with new and emerging hybrid genres (Kaye, 2010). Thus, the novelty and various specifics of new technologies, media, platforms, and genres urge researchers to understand and uncover the uniqueness of gratifications per outlet and the implications (e.g., Alhabash & Ma, 2017; Kaye, 2010; Steiner & Xu, 2018). For example, Alhabash and Ma (2017) suggested that social media platforms have more room for a *diverse set of gratifications* sought and obtained from their use when they are new and perceived as more specialized. Furthermore, Burwell (2017) noted that gameplay videos are in themselves highly diverse in terms of their aim, content, and ways they are made—again, implying that various gratifications can relate to watching these videos. Following the reasoning above, the current study is aimed at answering the following research question: What are the motives and gratifications sought while watching gameplay videos on YouTube, and how do they resemble or differ from those researched in previous studies on gameplay video watching?

## METHODOLOGY

### Study design and method

Our study was qualitative and intended to grasp gratifications sought from gameplay watching in an exploratory manner. In selecting a qualitative method, we were not attempting to generalize uses and gratifications of gameplay viewing but, rather, to obtain data from a small group of people belonging to gaming communities to gain an in-depth understanding of their thinking and practice of gameplay watching. With this aim in mind, we selected asynchronous online group discussion as our research method, which seemed to be a highly appropriate approach for gathering data on the topic at hand (Ullrich & Schiek, 2014). As Schiek and Ullrich (2017, 2019) reported, individuals tend to use asynchronous communication when they want to share an unusual experience and determine its meaning or attempt to study themselves.

### Sample and data gathering procedure

For the purpose of our study, we decided to tap into pre-existing social groups – namely, members of gaming communities. As Stewart and Williams (2005) noted, taking advantage of groups that already exist online is a common and successful sampling approach. In our case, we wanted to focus on geographically dispersed individuals with prior gameplay watching experience.<sup>1</sup>

Our online group discussions were both public and non-public debates with international users, who were either open-forum participants or members of certain closed groups (the latter were on Facebook). We selected an open type of discussion to allow for an unlimited number of debaters (Schiek & Ullrich, 2019). In such settings, participants are normally not required to introduce themselves (e.g., Schiek & Ullrich, 2019); thus, their gender, age, and other demographic information was not gathered.

Three asynchronous online group discussions were initiated in the spring of 2016 in a span of six days: a Facebook-based discussion with 85 participants, a discussion on Reddit (subreddit/r/letsplay) with seven participants, and a discussion on the Path of Exile forums with eight participants. Thus, in total, there were 100 participants, with an average of one or two posts per participant, similar to Schiek and Ullrich's (2019) experiment on asynchronous online group discussions.

Table 1. Sample of participants in online discussion groups

Type of discussion group	Number of participants	%
Facebook-based	85	85%
Reddit-based	7	7%
Path of Exile forums	8	8%
Sum:	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Participants were recruited by one of the researchers, who is a gamer herself. She approached dedicated fans of gaming who frequent various forum discussions about gaming.

Participants were asked to answer three general questions and were then encouraged with some additional sub-questions. The first general question asked whether they watch YouTube gameplay videos and why. We also wanted to know what they enjoy the most about watching and on which occasions they tend to watch them. In addition, it was underlined that we were not interested in video streaming (Twitch) but in gameplay watching on YouTube. The participants were informed that their answers would be analyzed for academic research purposes only and that their identities would not be revealed in the reporting of results. Such research allows participants to be quite open and responsive, with minimal questioning from the facilitator (Stewart & Williams, 2005).


### Data analysis

To analyze the answers, we used thematic analysis based on a coding process recommended by Silverman (2001). The data were inspected for words and phrases reflecting gratifications sought and obtained. The codes were first developed at a latent level using a smaller sample of participants and were then further developed and refined by coding all answers corresponding to each theme. This process ensured that the themes were mutually exclusive and that the coded data and extracts best represented each theme. Furthermore, if a particular person listed more than one gratification in their answer, this answer was coded in both themes and types of gratifications. The themes were developed by the analyst who conducted the group discussions and was familiar with the context. They were then checked by the second coder and refined following a discussion.

## FINDINGS: FROM GLORIFYING GAMERS TO SUBSTITUTING THE GAMING EXPERIENCE

Numerous themes and subthemes emerged from our analysis, indicating that the participants watched gameplay videos on YouTube for several very different purposes. The most prominent one was to follow a specific player or gamer personality, the second was to get some kind of help or advice, and the third was to preview games. Other critical purposes were entertainment and substituting the personal gaming experience. Trivia, background noise, and competitive sport were less significant in the sample (for details, see Figure 1).

When analyzing the most frequent purposes, we identified five distinctive personas from the data to understand the motives of gameplay watchers as persons: *Spectator*, *Performer*, *Selector*, *Viewer*, and *Substitutor*. These personas are not mutually exclusive; one person can embody a combination of personas. Nevertheless, each type of viewer seemed to prevail in specific types of motives and gratifications of gameplay watching.



▲ Figure 1.  
Frequency of the main purposes of gameplay watching (in %)

## Spectator

This viewer, who reported being motivated to watch gameplay videos primarily because of the person creating and/or narrating the videos, has a very specific perception of his or her own activities. To *Spectator*, the player or performer and the context that he or she creates with his or her meaning-making activities is much more important than the actual game:

*I think I speak for a lot of people when I say, I don't watch Let's Play for the game itself. It's usually the person playing the game I watch for. I watch for the personality of the content creator more than anything.*

*Spectator* enjoys watching the players' reactions and hearing about their experience of a game; he or she can get immersed in the narrative. *Spectator* can also develop a close attachment to the player despite the lack of direct social interaction in the relationship. *Spectator* believes that the person playing the game in the footage lends a personal touch or feel because he or she can observe the player's reactions. It is as if "you have a friend you're playing with." However, *Spectator* is also very selective about whom he or she decides to watch:

*I only watch a select few people. And they usually all play in the same group together. I love them because they're hilarious people if they're playing alone, but they're so, so much funnier when they're together, and they make me laugh so much.*

## Performer

This is a viewer with a very different motive for watching gameplay. For *Performer*, viewing is motivated primarily by a desire to receive *help* and *advice* regarding his or her own playing. In that sense, watching YouTube videos feels like a walkthrough when he or she is seeking help or trying to finish a game with a 100% score. Compared to *Spectator*, *Performer* has a specific perception of gameplay watching. *Performer* understands the video as a *source of advice* whenever difficult gaming situations must be resolved:

*What I like most about the videos is really the help. Seeing the other gamers play from start to end helps me pick my options for how I want to do the mission, and it helps me go back to areas if I missed something important.*

For *Performer*, seeing other gamers play helps him or her create his or her own approach to playing the game and learning the technique of playing. As one participant admitted, "I watch stuff to get better. Like, I'll watch videos about League that have strategies or insights from people that are significantly better than I am."

## Selector

This persona seems to be a very rational one. *Selector* would mainly watch gameplay to acquire information about a new game before deciding whether to buy it. For *Selector*, gameplay watching seems to be more rationally contextualized within the general framework of the gaming industry, exemplified as follows: "The game industry has gotten huge and expensive, so I like to know what and for how long I'm getting into something before dropping \$60+ on it."

Another example is as follows: "I usually watch the gameplay/reviews of new games to get ideas about whether I want to buy a game." This shows a very pragmatic purpose of watching gameplay—namely, a preview. It is not the gamer as a person that is at the forefront; rather, the costs associated with the game, in terms of time and money, seem to trigger gameplay watching.

## Viewer

Contrary to the above, *Viewer* watches gameplay videos primarily for entertainment and relaxation. For *Viewer*, watching video gaming is similar to watching television; that is, he or she watches videos mostly at the end of the day, just before going to bed, or to avoid boredom: "I usually watch videos on my days off with nothing to do and at night before bed."

Alternatively, it appears that *Viewer* also considers watching to be a great stress-reliever: "They help the stress and are a great way to unwind. They keep me entertained, especially if it's a You-Tuber I like." Thus, for *Viewer*, watching is a means of escapism, either from the busy outside world or from, in a social sense, an empty everyday life.

## Substitutor

This persona is quite specific to the YouTube channel. For *Substitutor*, watching in a way that seems to replace gaming itself is the core motive for gameplay watching. *Substitutor* is usually not an actual player, and his or her reasons for not being able to play are quite diverse: either because of financial limitations, lack of time to play, not owning a console, or lack of skills. For instance, one participant stated, "I don't have much gaming time, and I'm really stressed most days. Watching is easier." Another participant stated, "I don't have any friends to play games with, and I don't have to waste money on a game when I can just watch it."

Therefore, for *Substitutor*, watching is either an easy way out or an ersatz for playing the real game.

## Remaining categories – from learners to passive viewers

The other three categories of purposes—trivia, background noise, and sport competition—seemed less common in our sample. The trivia category contained those who viewed gameplay videos as a way of learning about a game or the industry in terms of story, production, user experience, etc.:

*I tend to watch people who can offer me greater insight into the game: either developers, journalists, or fans who have been playing a game or series for far too long. For example, there is a group of three men who repeatedly play every Metal Gear game, giving a kind of director's commentary to it, drawing attention to story themes, character motivations, things that were scrapped or changed, its flaws, etc.*

A smaller number of participants evinced very different motives as compared to those stated above. Instead of actively watching, some used gameplay videos as background noise while doing other chores, treating them much like podcasts. As one participant stated, "I'll usually watch them as background noise while I'm playing another game or working, or when trying to sleep, oddly enough."

The last purpose was a much more competitive one. Here, a primary reason for watching video games was to follow competitive matches or recaps, much like a regular sport. These participants watched gameplay videos on YouTube due to a time difference or unavailability of the live content: "I watch mostly competitive stuff. I don't watch Let's Play unless I'm stuck somewhere."

## DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Several interesting findings emerged from this study on YouTube gameplay watchers. By tapping into motives or gratifications sought, we first noticed that these YouTube gameplay watchers had some similar motives to both gameplay watchers on Twitch and spectators of other YouTube content as well as audiences of more traditional media. This positions video gameplay spectatorship as a unique media experience situated between traditional viewing and game playing. On the one hand, viewers tend to watch these

videos to entertain themselves and experience the “story” behind the game; on the other hand, they want to satisfy the cognitive need to acquire information and new knowledge of how to play a game. In this regard, our study detected some particularities to YouTube videos in the sense that viewers can get more gratification by having the ability to view, review, and analyze a pre-recorded video several times over. That being said, YouTube gameplay videos can further be understood as cultural artifacts worthy of closer analysis and reflection that might not be possible in the rush of live-streamed gameplay (Burwell, 2017). This corroborates the findings of Sjöblom and Hamari (2017), who determined that seeking help and advice is not at the forefront of live-stream gameplay watching and that viewers driven by this kind of motive seek to fulfil such needs through other sources, such as recordings on YouTube.

Meanwhile, participants’ motives for watching video gameplay also reflect the valuing of creators and their personalities—motives characteristic of the *Spectator* persona and rather unique to YouTube gameplay watching. Although the motive to observe the creator can also be found in the case of games live-streamed via Twitch, our findings reveal a subtle difference in the purpose of watching. For Twitch users watching live streams, the player’s personality seems primarily important due to social interaction and a sense of belonging to a community that manifest while the game is being played and live-streamed (e.g., Anderson, 2017; Hilvert-Bruce et al., 2018). However, for YouTube users, who mostly watch pre-recorded videos, the ways in which the player engages with and appropriates the game are at the forefront (e.g., Burwell, 2017; Glas, 2015). This indicates a subtle form of voyeurism and an interesting attachment to a person whom one has never met or had any contact with and, thus, positions gameplay watching on YouTube as a distinct media spectating experience.

Two sets of motives not fully captured in existing uses and gratifications typologies of live-streaming gameplay audiences relate to the *Selector* and *Substitutor* personas. First, for *Selector*, previewing a game to decide whether the game is worthy of his or her attention and financial investment is the prime motive. This is another type of cognitive motivation that is obviously best met via watching YouTube recordings rather than live-streaming. Viewers have the possibility to experiment and explore unknown territories before reaching a decision. Thus, recordings also work as trailers or advertisements for a game (e.g., Menotti, 2014). Second, *Substitutor* is rather unique to the YouTube gameplay watching domain because the motives of this persona do not appear in previous UGT research on gameplay watching. *Substitutor* is motivated to watch for the opportunity to feel and enjoy the game through vicarious play and imagined participation.

Against this background, our research makes several theoretical contributions. As our study shows, not all motives and gratifications can be neatly placed in the existing typologies of UGT, even when they have already been adapted to gameplay watching. Although few motives are unique per se, the qualitative approach revealed subtle but important differences in the case of YouTube gameplay watching compared to live streaming. This clearly implies the need to challenge the established genre labels in media research and understand how and why new hybrid genres are evolving and gaining

prominence. Our study's contribution is in providing grounds for understanding these new forms and developments by exploring audiences' motives and uncovering subtleties in the reasons why people consume specific media and genres.

As our findings suggest, the experience of vicarious play is very important for YouTube gameplay watchers, first, due to its "fandom" effect (i.e., becoming a fan of a particular player) and, second, because of a vicarious achievement without personally experiencing stress and drama. Thus, these new types of videos effectively alter the meaning of gaming by becoming paratexts themselves (Burwell & Miller, 2016) with the potential to also affect the development of video game culture.

In relation to wider media research, our study separates YouTube as a particular media platform that is markedly different from traditional outlets, such as television or movies, as well as from live-streaming gameplay videos. As Glas (2015) concluded, the success of this particular hybrid genre is based on the fact that play practices on display seem to be very meaningful to the audience in several ways. In this regard, an implication of our study is that types of gratifications—namely, help and advice and, to a certain extent, preview—are quite important for YouTube gameplay video watchers. Burwell and Miller (2016) argued that pre-recorded gameplay videos convert the playing of the game into a series of representations that can be reviewed and analyzed multiple times. This is important not just in terms of learning new strategies for playing a game but also in terms of having an opportunity to "reflect, at a distance, on games and gameplay" (Burwell & Miller, 2016, p. 120). Thus, this might be what most sharply distinguishes the motives of YouTube and Twitch users, and it has wider implications for mobilizing digital media literacy practices (Burwell, 2017).

## CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study employed the UGT approach in the context of YouTube gameplay video watching. Although we identified several motives and gratifications sought that fall into categories similar to those used in previous UGT studies, our qualitative approach for uncovering motives and gratifications helped us define certain subtle differences in what characterizes particular categories. Our findings also suggest that some motives might be triggered by the technological characteristics of the medium itself, as suggested by the gratifications related to seeking help and advice and preview. These gratifications are, for example, not at the forefront of live-streaming gameplay but, instead, are strongly connected to the fact that videos featured on YouTube are usually pre-recorded. Similarly, the motives and gratifications related to personality are associated with more emphasis on following a particular gameplay persona and fandom than (para)social interactions and closeness, as is the case in live streaming on Twitch. To sum up, with the rapid evolution of digital technology and culture, one's interest in, and gratifications associated with, certain genres are becoming much more complicated. Therefore, the straightforward study of motives using pre-defined categories must be revisited and



re-defined to reflect the ambiguity and specificity of newly emerging and converging media consumption practices.

Importantly, this study was not without limitations. First, a thicker description of viewers and their characteristics would give the uncovered motives even more merit and provide a richer foundation, both for scholars and game producers and developers, for better understanding YouTube gameplay video watchers. Furthermore, although we tried to add some new perspectives to the UGT approaches for studying new media forms, more empirical evidence is needed to reinforce our findings and conclusions. Second, it would be meaningful to explore unintended gratifications, which can add to a better understanding of viewers, and the effects that such gratifications have on viewers' daily lives. These unintended features would provide deeper insight into the role of YouTube game playing within the everyday lives of different types of personas. For now, we can only speculate as to the extent to which gameplay watching is really a feel-good activity and to what degree it emerges as an activity with which people can have a more ambivalent relationship with outcomes or feelings that are not necessarily positive. Third, future research could provide more insight into the technological specifics of YouTube as a medium for gameplay watching and how they affect viewers' motives, which our study did not specifically address.

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## GLEDANJE VIDEOIGARA: ŠTO POTIČE GLEDANJE IGRANJA VIDEOIGARA NA YOUTUBEU?

Urša Golob :: Medeja Kraševac :: Tanja Oblak Črnič

**SAŽETAK** Ovaj se znanstveni rad bavi fenomenom gledanja videa na YouTubeu koji prikazuju igranje videoigara. Studija ispituje što ljude potiče na gledanje igranja videoigara te koje zadovoljstvo u tome traže. Autori se pozivaju na teoriju koristi i nagrada (uses and gratifications theory – UGT) te se koriste kvalitativnom metodologijom. Autori su proveli tri online grupne rasprave sa 100 članova međunarodne gaming zajednice. Iako se u kao najvažiji motiv gledanja ističe atraktivnost igrača, važni su i drugi razlozi, poput promatranja i učenja, ali i zamjene za pravo igranje. Taj kvalitativni pristup omogućuje otkrivanje jedinstvenih aspekata motiva gledanja igranja videoigara na Youtubeu. Tako je u ovom radu identificirano pet različitih vrsta gledatelja – promatrač, izvođač, onaj koji bira, gledatelj i zamjena – pri čemu se svaki uključuje u gledanje videoigara zbog specifičnih motiva i pratećeg zadovoljstva.

### KLJUČNE RIJEČI

GLEDANJE IGRANJA VIDEOIGARA, GLEDANJE, YOUTUBE, PLATFORME ZA IGRANJE IGARA, TEORIJA KORISTI I NAGRADA, DIGITALNE IGRE

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# MANNER OF USAGE AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION ON THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC BY CITIZENS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FIVE CORE CONCEPTS OF MEDIA LITERACY

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## **ABSTRACT**

*The COVID-19 pandemic has fully revealed the significance of media literacy. A great amount of fake news, as well as information lacking background, has been distributed. The paper aims to determine the manner of usage and evaluation of information on the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the context of five core concepts of media literacy. The results of the survey conducted online, have shown that the majority of respondents resorted to the Internet in their search for information, that they were confused by the sheer amount of information, that they often failed to double-check it, and that they were often not able to recognise any offensive content in it.*

## **KEYWORDS**

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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, MEDIA LITERACY, DISINFORMATION, FAKE NEWS, COVID-19 VIRUS

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*Author's note* \_\_\_\_\_

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## INTRODUCTION

By all means, the notion of media literacy is not a novel one and the emergence of new media has certainly had no impact on its essence, since it incorporates the features of critical approach, analysis, evaluation, and media content production, regardless of the fact whether we have traditional or new media in mind. It is a discipline providing a special frame for critical questioning and media production, founded simultaneously by Len Masterman in the UK and Barry Duncan in Canada. The first core concepts were presented in 1989 (Masterman, 1989), and they still remain central to the paradigm and conceptual frame of teaching media literacy in global terms (Jolls & Wilson, 2014). In 1987, in Ontario (Canada), Duncan and the Association for Media Literacy (AML) developed the ideas based on Masterman's work into eight core concepts of media literacy:

1. All media are constructions; 2. The media construct reality; 3. Audiences question content/messages in the media; 4. The media have commercial implications; 5. The media contain ideological messages and opinions; 6. The media have social and political implications; 7. The form and content are closely connected to each other in the media; and 8. Every medium has its own aesthetic form. (Wilson & Duncan, 2008, p. 129)

These eight core concepts still provide a theoretical background for developing media literacy. In 1989, this concept was furthered by J. Francis Davis, who wrote an article in which he presented five ideas concerning teaching children about media. Consequently, the article served as a prelude to Elizabeth Thoman, who founded the Centre for Media Literacy (CML) in 1989, to develop five concepts of media literacy:

1. All media messages are 'constructed'; 2. Media messages are constructed using a creative language with its own rules; 3. Different people experience the same message differently; 4. The media have embedded values and points of view; and 5. Most media messages are organised to gain profit and/or power. (Thoman & Jolls, 2004, p. 23)

Thoman describes the action learning model, based on the work of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator (Paulo Freire Institute, 2014), and sums it up in four steps: process of empowering consciousness, analysis, reflection, and action. Through these four steps, individuals or groups can formulate a constructive idea, an action that will lead towards changing their media choice and their habits concerning the usage of media at local, national, and global levels (Thoman, 1993).

In 2000, Tessa Jolls, who joined the CML as an executive managing director in 1998, introduced novelties into the aforementioned core concepts, by concluding that children find it difficult to learn about media literacy by virtue of notions, and that they would be much more comfortable in this respect if they dealt with questions instead (Jolls & Wilson, 2014). For that purpose, the CML puts all these elements together (the basic definition of media literacy, empowering of the spiral of consciousness, analysis, reflection, action, and

a set of questions for children and the young, as well as for experienced practitioners of media literacy), in order to visually connect the concepts for the first time (Thoman et al., 2002). The core questions are:

1. Who created a media message?
2. What creative techniques are used for drawing attention?
3. How is it possible for different people to understand the same message differently?
4. What values, way of life, and viewpoints are reflected in or left out of the message?
5. Why was the message sent? (Thoman & Jolls, 2004, p. 24)

Given the fast development and progress of technology enabling an instant video production, sharing content through social media, and multitude of other possibilities, the Concept of media literacy has been broadened in that the latest version of the CML's Core concept and Core questions, nicknamed Questions/TIPS (Q/TIPS), is characterised by addition of Five core questions for building (creating) media content (Jolls, 2007).

Table 1. CML's Questions / Tips

#	Key Words	Deconstruction: CML's 5 Key Questions (Consumer)	CML's 5 Core Concepts	Construction: CML's 5 Key Questions (Producer)
1.	Authorship	Who created this message?	All media messages are constructed.?	What am I authoring?
2.	Format	What creative techniques are used to attract my attention?	Media messages are constructed using a creative language with its own rules.	Does my message reflect understanding in format, creativity and technology?
3.	Audience	How might different people understand this message differently?	Different people experience the same media message differently.	Is my message engaging and compelling for my target audience?
4.	Content	What values, lifestyles and points of view are represented in or omitted from this message?	Media have embedded values and points of view.	Have I clearly and consistently framed values, lifestyles and points of view in my content?
5.	Purpose	Why is this message being sent?	Most media messages are organized to gain profit and/or power.	Have I communicated my purpose effectively?

Source: *CML's Questions/TIPS (Q/TIPS)*, Center for Media Literacy ([www.medialit.org](http://www.medialit.org)) in Jolls & Sund, 2007, p. 8

Image 1. features Concepts referring to deconstruction and construction (Jolls & Sund, 2007). This graphic display provides any individual with a quick and clear frame for analysing any media text in any media. As a result, the young can, through practice, apply this frame to their role of both media consumers and producers, and establish, over the course of time, habits of critical thinking (Jolls & Wilson, 2014).

## FIVE CORE CONCEPTS OF MEDIA LITERACY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC

It is important to understand each of the aforementioned concepts of media literacy in order to successfully apply it to deconstruction of media content. With regard to this, when one reads a piece of news, or hears or watches some content, one should take these concepts into consideration if one is to better understand their context, to make sure they are verified, or to use them properly.

1. AUTHORSHIP – If all media messages are ‘constructed’, it does not mean that they are fabricated, but only that they are put into certain context and presented from the point of view of the sender (the media, individual, group, etc.). For this reason, the first issue to be raised during the process of deconstruction is that of authorship: Who created this media message, is it public or commercial media? Who is the owner? Who is, actually, the author of the message: a journalist (media organisation) or some other organisation, a political party, an individual, or a certain lobby? The answers to all these questions are available to the recipient of the message by their closely interpreting the text. Whether it is a piece of news, or a billboard on a street, or a political campaign flyer, the media message in question is created by an individual (or, most likely, by a group of people), with the pictures shot and photoshopped and the text written and edited, all put together to make a single product. Yet, the words, pictures, and constructions left out and rejected are beyond reach for us as an audience. We only see, hear, and read what has been accepted. With this in mind, what is important for critical thinking is a recognition that whatever it is that several people ‘constructed’ becomes ‘the way it is’ for the rest of us. Helping people understand the process of creating media content and things that can be left out during that process, as well as the way the media shape the world we live in, is the crucial first step in accepting the fact that media constructions are not natural. Contrary to an established opinion, the media are neither a window into the world nor a reflection of the real world. It is, in fact, a carefully designed cultural product (Thoman & Jolls, 2004). If the text we are reading is not authored, with no references to its source or with no clear instructions as to how to trace back the original text, such content should be double-checked (whether this piece of information has been released by other media as well or whether its source has been cited) and not shared or published on any platform. With reference to the COVID-19 pandemic, the media released information (depending on the source) that the virus was ‘created’ in China, the USA, or the UK. It was not an official piece of information, but, rather, some politicians qualified it as either ‘Chinese’, ‘American’, or ‘British’ instead. Statements of this kind cannot be taken as objective since they lack scientific background. Instead, on such occasions, we should turn to an expert opinion, preferably from multiple sources.



It is the level of our media literacy that our selection of information source depends on. With regard to this, the information we use should be taken from relevant sources, such as official institutions and organisations.

2. **FORMAT** – Media messages reach us in all sorts of formats: text, photograph, audio recording, video footage, various digital forms featuring numerous creative techniques in order to amplify the effect of a message or draw our attention to a certain segment of the message so we would fail to observe what is really important or missing. This is why we should ask ourselves the second core question: What creative techniques have been used to draw our attention? This issue is implied by the concept stating that media messages are ‘constructed’ by using a creative language based on its own rules, and it questions the components used during a construction of words, music, pictures, colour, movement, camera angle, etc. Most forms of mass communication, whether taking place by means of printed media, TV shows, horror movies, or alike, depend on the type of ‘creative language’. For instance, ‘frightening’ music amplifies fear, close-up camera shots convey intimacy, whereas large headlines point to the significance of a piece of information in question. Understanding the grammar, syntax, and metaphoric system of the media, especially its visual language, not only helps us become less susceptible to manipulation, but it also increases our respect for and indulging into the media as a construed cultural product. The best way for one to understand the creation of media content is to do it themselves: to create a video release, a website, or a commercial (Thoman & Jolls, 2004).

If we are exposed to content using enlarged photographs displaying inappropriate material, a footage containing disturbing images, or a large, vague, sensationalist headline offering no information but luring us into reading the text as a technique for drawing attention, we are certain not to find any verified and useful piece of information in them. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the following headlines appeared: “Killer-virus shows no signs of letting up”, “Catastrophic death toll of COVID-19”, “More terrifying news coming”, “No end to pandemic in sight”, “Be prepared for the worst” etc., followed by disturbing photographs from hospitals or by unauthentic video footages. For instance, a video footage featuring some Chinese eating bats, used to support the claim of the origin of the virus, which was later disproved, given that the video was not shot in China. On the opposite, the media that release verified information use clear, informative headlines, with the text followed by appropriate photographs or videos.

3. **AUDIENCE** – Different people experience the same media message in a different way. The way we interpret a piece of information depends on ourselves, our knowledge and experience, our current role/position, education, economic status, sex, race, nationality, sexual orientation, ethnic and religious designation, environment, family, and a series of other factors. Within this context, we should raise the following issue upon construction or deconstruction: In what way are different people going to experience the same message? This is particularly important when certain content is shared. This issue refers to the notion of what we are, what determines us, impacts our understanding of a media text. Each member of an audience informs a media text by a unique set of their life experiences (age, gender, education, moral education), which, when applied to the

text in question or in combination with it, creates a unique interpretation. We may not be aware of it, but most of us (even children) constantly try to find sense in what we read, watch, or hear. The more questions we ask about how we and other people experience messages around us, the more ways there are for us to accept or reject them. Listening to someone else's interpretations may contribute to us respecting other cultures and taking into consideration opinions of minority groups (Thoman & Jolls, 2004). That way, a piece of news announcing that certain countries have banned all religious gatherings and services, with a view to preventing disease spread, is not likely to affect believers and atheists in the same way. Similarly, there has been increased discrimination of certain professions, races, and nations/peoples during this pandemic. With regard to this, the first case of discrimination against Chinese nationals in Bosnia and Herzegovina was recorded on 26 January 2020, when the *Izdvojeno.ba* news portal released an article teeming with disinformation on the COVID-19 virus and the ways it spread, demanding for Chinese tourists to be banned from entering Bosnia and Herzegovina. The article fueled unsubstantiated fears on the basis of racial constructions. Furthermore, there have been threats and calls for violence registered on the Facebook in relation to the pandemic, with the authorities taking prompt actions and identifying and processing the perpetrators (The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation, 2020, p. 10). In case of isolation as a pre-emptive social measure, a specific situation humans are unaccustomed to, additional caution needs to be taken upon creating and sharing media content, given the fact that what we find amusing might be considered disturbing by someone else, causing fear and spreading panic. In this respect, we must be aware of the fact that it is the recipient who is the final interpreter of the message. We may have the best intention, but the recipient could take in a different way. For this reason, it is important that we remain responsible in this respect and always take the position of a possible recipient, asking ourselves what sentiments our message might cause.

4. CONTENT – The media, with regard to their content, promote certain points of view, values, opinions, ways of life, whereas they remain ignorant of others. Whenever we approach certain media content, we should ask ourselves the following: What values/ points of view are promoted in or left out from the message? With reference to these points of view, there are concerns about them being unilateral, as well as about their origin and their advocates (experts, official sources, or certain individuals). In the end, we should ask ourselves what values have been left out and why. This issue deals with content of a media message, starting from the core concept of the media 'installing' certain points of view and opinions into its content. Upon construction of media messages, choices must be made that inevitably reflect the values, opinions, and points of view of those who construct them. The decision on incorporating the features of age, gender, or race into a message, combined with those of lifestyle, opinions and behaviour presented, together with the selection of social environment (urban, rural, high-end, low-end) and action and counter-action in certain situations, represent some of the ways of 'embedding' values into TV shows, films, and commercials. News programmes are no exceptions to this rule, with values being 'embedded' in the news by means of decisions being made on major/ lead stories, their duration, photographs to follow etc. What is important with regard to this issue is not the fact that ideas and values have been 'embedded', but the fact that

the information burdened with the aforementioned values amplifies or changes the way in which we interpret the world around us. If we are equipped with skills to rationally identify clear and latent values in a mediated message, either coming from the media or our colleagues, we are more likely to be much more tolerant towards differences and much more selective upon deciding whether to accept or reject the message on the whole. An ability to recognise missing perspectives is another critical skill as well (Thoman & Jolls, 2004).

When we find certain media content suspicious in terms of openly advocating for a political option and of promoting quacking, without a genuine meaning of the message being expressed clearly, without scientifically credible sources to support them, and stripped of public interest, we should compare them against different sources and thus provide ourselves with the complete image of the event in question. Any piece of information expressing unilateral points of view should be approached critically. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been strange and unverified pieces of news claiming that shipments from China are dangerous, that the disease could be treated and prevented by eating garlic and drinking alcohol (which was disproved by the World Health Organisation), along with numerous instances of *fake news* spreading panic (such as those referring to possible lockdown of cities and lack of basic provisions in stores).

5. PURPOSE – Although it is a known fact that the public media should release content of public interest (and not the content the public is interested in), the fifth core concept tells us that all media messages are sent with a view to gain profit and/or power. Therefore, there is a desire for either gaining profit and/or power behind every media message (Thoman and Jolls, 2004). Almost every medium, both public and commercial, is financed partly or on the whole by advertisers, depending on its ownership structure. In order for a medium to find advertisers, it must provide an audience which, in turn, guarantees advertisers. With this in mind, it is clear that there is a desire for profit behind most messages, or at least behind the way they are created. That is what urges us to pose the following question: Why was the message sent?

This concept deals with the motivation behind or purpose of a media message, and it serves to determine whether a message can be influenced by money, ego, or ideology, and in what way. Today, a great deal of global mass media companies operate as commercial enterprises, and this fact helps us evaluate whether a message is profit-driven. Many people find a commercial influence more acceptable when the media company offering entertainment content is concerned, in comparison to the one producing news. Given the development of democracy, every citizen should be familiar with a possible impact of economy and ideology on all media content. As for the issue of motivation, it has drastically changed with the emergence of the Internet, where many people have access to powerful tools that can be used to persuade others into their points of view. The Internet offers an opportunity to users from all age groups to notice instances of inadequate reasoning, to check for an information source, and to evaluate the quality of a research (Thoman & Jolls, 2004).

In addition, it is important to question whether the media content we are using contains information of public interest and to look into the way they are presented. If a message is lacking elements of public interest or if they are presented in a sensationalist and unethical manner (for instance, information on public health that violates the right to privacy, offends someone's feelings, or contains disturbing content), we should not use or share such content, but seek information from official sources (such as the Ministry of Health, the Institute of Public Health, the WHO etc.).

During this pandemic, there have been cases recorded in the media of disclosing identity of people tested positive for COVID-19 and their subsequent stigmatisation, of ridiculing the pandemic, and of certain measures undertaken by respective countries and the World Health Organisation in order to control the spread of virus. Such approach to this phenomenon is both unprofessional and unethical. In April 2020, two nurses employed with the University Clinical Hospital in the city of Mostar (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) took shots of patients and shared this content. In this material, the faces and identities of the patients can be clearly seen and recognised (The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation, 2020, p. 5).

## METHODOLOGY

The research was conducted between 27 April and 5 May 2020. It aims at determining the way in which citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina gather information on the COVID-19 virus during the pandemic and especially: a) what sources they find credible, b) are they confused by the sheer amount of information, c) are they able to recognise *fake news*, a fake video material, or a fake photograph, and d) can they identify pieces of news on COVID-19 whose release violates the right to privacy or whose content might be offensive for some viewers.

The data are gathered by an online survey using the *Google forms* programme ([www.google.com/forms/about/](http://www.google.com/forms/about/)). This type of research is a result of inability to organise a research that includes a physical contact, due to restrictions concerning public gatherings and freedom of movement. The data was gathered using an adequate sample of 1,151 respondents, with application of an online/offline sample taking – the sample is created by contacting the respondents and directing them to the Internet to fill in a questionnaire (Popadić et al., 2018). Not all respondents are contacted in person, but the technique of *snowball* sampling is applied (Milosavljević & Radosavljević, 2013). The link leading to the online study was delivered to around 1,500 accounts of major citizens from 95 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with limitations imposed on the process by allowing to send only one questionnaire from a single account, thus eliminating multiple participation in the survey.

The instrument used for conducting the survey is a formalised (standardised) questionnaire with precisely defined questions and modalities of answers offered (Milosavljević & Radosavljević, 2013). Some questions required a single answer while

some offered the option of multiple answers. Questionnaire included 15 questions in total: questions regarding general data of the respondent, questions regarding the way and frequency of acquiring information on COVID-19, and questions regarding the credibility of sources, sharing content, and recognising *fake news*, fake video materials and fake photographs concerning COVID-19. The process of formatting and designing of the questionnaire is adapted to an online form. An optimum number of questions is selected due to the inability of controlling the conditions and turnout rate, given that the duration of a study is a major factor of sample dwindling and abandoning an Internet research (Edwards et al., 2002).

A logical strategy of funnel type is used in organising the questionnaire sections (Milosavljević & Radosavljević, 2013), with questions ranging from general to specific ones. Bearing in mind that much concerning a respondent is not within researcher's control (Popadić, et al., 2018), the questions referring to the legibility of respondents are listed on the homepage of the study website (for instance, people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina). The initial question of the questionnaire deals with the type of media used to gather information on COVID-19, the final one with our ability to recognise information on COVID-19 that may be offensive in terms of race, nation, or an individual's beliefs.

This research enables measuring the level of media literacy of respondents in relation to obtaining and evaluating media information in specific situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, it enables determining specific competences of media literacy of respondents and associating these features with their education level.

## DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

One third of the respondents come from the city of Banja Luka, followed by the cities of Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, Istočno Sarajevo, Mostar etc. The modal respondent is a female, holding an academic degree, aged 18-40. The majority of respondents are women (70.1%), young, aged 18-24 (50.6%), and academic degree holders (37.9%) (Tables 2, 3 and 4).

Table 2. Sex structure of respondents

Sex	Male	Female
f	344	807
%	29.9	70.1

Table 3. Age structure of respondents

Age	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	Over 65
F	582	218	201	106	34	10
%	50.6	18.9	17.5	9.2	3	0.9

Table 4. Education level of respondents

Education	f	%
Secondary school	352	30.5
College	65	5.6
University graduate degree	437	37.9
MA degree	123	10.7
PhD degree, PhD candidate	174	15.1

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### Manner and frequency of gathering information on COVID-19

The results show that the respondents mostly turned to online media portals in their search for information (80.2%), followed by television (70.7%), social media (42.4%), and finally print media (5%).

Table 5. Media used for gathering information on COVID-19 (multiple choice)

What media do you usually use for gathering information on COVID-19?	f	%
Online media/ Internet portals	924	80.2
TV	814	70.7
Radio	97	8.4
Print media	58	5
Social media	488	42.4
Applications for exchanging messages	96	8.3

These results are expected, concerning the fact that this is an online study that includes respondents who use the Internet on a daily basis, and who are, at the same time, young and academically educated.

When it comes to frequency of gathering information on COVID-19, most of the respondents do it several times a week (28.3%), 26.6% do it once or twice a day, 26% once a day while 11.1% of the respondents search for information two to three times a day (Table 6).

The data reveal that the respondents did not search for information on COVID-19 very frequently. Such results show a rational approach to gathering information, since uncontrolled and frequent gathering of information on the same phenomenon can lead to the feeling of being fed up and confused by the sheer amount of information, which is illustrated in Table 7.

Table 6. Frequency of gathering information on COVID-19

How often do you gather information on COVID-19?	f	%
Several times a week	326	28.3
Once a day	299	26
Once-twice a day	307	26.6
Two to three times a day	128	11.1
Three to five times a day	39	3.4
More than five times a day	52	4.5

Table 7. Attitude towards the amount of information on COVID-19

Are you confused by the amount of various information on COVID-19?	f	%
Yes, often	367	31.9
Sometimes	515	44.7
No, because I can select proper information	269	23.4

Most of the respondents are confused by the sheer amount of information – sometimes (44.7%) and often (31.9%) - while 23.4% of them claim that they can select proper information. Bearing in mind that the respondents gathered information mostly on the Internet, it is likely that they were exposed to the amount of information they found hard to absorb.

### Double-checking and sharing information on COVID-19

Table 8. indicates that that 33.4% of the respondents have sometimes double-checked information on COVID-19 when there was no reference to the source, 25.6% have done it often and 8.9% never.

Table 8. Checking information on COVID-19

Do you double-check information on COVID-19?	f	%
Yes, often	295	25.6
Sometimes, when there is no reference to the source	385	33.4
Seldom	369	32.1
No, never	102	8.9

Although the results show that a quarter of the respondents have often double-checked information on COVID-19, and the rest sometimes, seldom, or never, it is hardly satisfying, especially when one takes into consideration the amount of disinformation and *fake news* released during the pandemic. In their report based on a four-month monitoring

process of the situation related to the pandemic, the Balkan Investigative Network (BIRN) and the SHARE Foundation recorded 163 cases of digital rights violation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and North Macedonia, of which more than half are related to propaganda, disinformation, untrue content, and release of unverified data, whereas in 80% of these cases citizens were targeted as a vulnerable group. The report singles out an incident in the city of Tuzla, where a Facebook user called for destruction of an alleged 5G mobile relay network, and a release of disinformation on blood types less susceptible to COVID-19 on the Buka portal (The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation, 2020).

Table 9. Credibility of information on COVID-19 (multiple choice)

How do you know that a piece of information on COVID-19 is credible? f		%
I trust the media that released it	265	23
I trust the source cited	503	43.7
There are many views	12	1
There is a lot of liked/shared content	10	0.9
Several media companies released the same information	522	45.4
I do not think about it	295	25.6

In most cases, the respondents (45.4%) claim that they know that a piece of information on COVID-19 is credible based on the fact that it has been released by several media companies, then based on a trustworthy source (43.7%), whereas 25.6% did not think about it (Table 9). One can conclude that almost half of the respondents use reliable parameters for evaluating information credibility, while only several respondents resort to views, likes, and shared content as credibility parameters. Still, there is a high percentage of those who do not think about credibility - fact-checking platforms from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia claim that the pandemic has contributed to the "flood" of disinformation on a single topic, released constantly and intensely, with "a devastating impact on people" (Pamuk, 2020, p. 3).

Table 10. Sharing information on COVID-19

Do you share information on COVID-19 that you are not sure it is credible?	f	%
Yes, often	12	1
Sometimes, because it might be credible	96	8.3
Seldom	235	20.4
No, never	808	70.2

Most of the respondents (70.2%) have never shared pieces of information on COVID-19 if they were not sure that it was credible; 20.4% did it seldom, and only 1% often (Table 10). These results point to a high level of awareness of respondents on a possible harmful effect



of sharing unverified information that can cause panic and fear among citizens. When sharing such content in an irresponsible way, there is little concern for the consequences their release might cause, since that text is intended as a clickbait (Pamuk, 2020).

### Identifying *fake news*, disinformation, photographs, and video footages featuring COVID-19

According to the results presented in Table 11, most of the respondents (75.1%) have encountered some instances of *fake news* or disinformation on COVID-19, 13.4% of them claim they have not had that experience, while 8% of the respondents say that they are not able to tell whether a piece of information is a *fake news* or disinformation.

Table 11. Fake news and disinformation on COVID-19

Have you encountered a fake news or disinformation on COVID-19?	f	%
Yes, on several occasions	864	75.1
Just once	41	3.6
I cannot tell the difference	92	8
No, I have not	154	13.4

These results support the claim that a high percentage of the respondents can differentiate between *fake news* and disinformation and a credible piece of information because they have encountered such news on several occasions during the pandemic. During April 2020, the *Raskrinkavanje* fact-checking platform from Bosnia and Herzegovina analysed and deconstructed 68 pieces of *fake news* and disinformation that were released or distributed by media companies from the country.

Table 12. Fake photographs and video footages of COVID-19

Have you encountered a fake photograph or a video footage of COVID-19 pandemic?	f	%
Yes, on several occasions	571	49.6
Just once	62	5.4
I can not tell the difference	133	11.5
No, I have not	385	33.5

Nearly half of the respondents (49.6%) have encountered fake photographs and video footages of COVID-19 on several occasions during the pandemic, 33.5% of them claim they have not been exposed to such content, whereas 11.5% of the respondents cannot tell the difference between genuine photographs and video footages and fabricated ones (Table 12). The results suggest that half of the respondents can identify fake photographs and video footages and that they have done so on several occasions during the pandemic. It is a good indicator, given that there have been frequent cases of fake, fabricated

photographs and video footages accompanying texts featuring COVID-19 stories. The results further suggest that half of the respondents possess media literacy competences which enables them to identify fake photographs and video footages. Still, there is some percentage of those who do not (11.5%).

### Level of trust in source of information on COVID-19 and recognition of offensive and inappropriate content

The level of trust placed in sources of information on COVID-19 is presented in Table 13. Evidently, the respondents put most trust in scientists, medical doctors, health experts (86.6%), then international public health institutions (54%), national public health institutions (40.2%) and professional journalists (22.7%). Entity authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trusted only by 6.9% respondents<sup>1</sup>.

Table 13. Level of trust in sources of information on COVID-19 (multiple choice)

What sources of information on COVID-19 do you trust the most?	f	%
Professional journalists	262	22.7
Bloggers	8	0.7
Local politicians	24	2.1
Scientists, medical doctors, health experts	998	86.6
International public health institutions	622	54
National public health institutions	463	40.2
Entity authorities	79	6.9
Famous public figures	7	0.6
Common people that inspire trust	109	9.5

The results demonstrate a high level of their ability to choose a relevant source of information on COVID-19. In the first place, it is scientists, experts, members of international and national public health institutions, who are far more preferred in this respect to bloggers, famous public figures and local politicians. The respondents put little trust in entity authorities as a source of information on COVID-19. Professional journalists score higher than politicians but still much lower than scientists, medical doctors and health experts.

Table 14 demonstrates that 58.2% of respondents perceive that they have had no experience of offensive content during the pandemic, whereas 30.6% have had on several occasions and 6.6% respondents were not able to tell the difference. At the same time, The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation argue that "during the COVID-19 pandemic, the vulnerable groups to have been exposed to threats, discrimination, and hatred campaigns have been journalists, medical workers, citizens ordered to quarantine, migrants, women, Roma, Chinese, and Jews" (2020, p. 9). Given the

<sup>1</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina is comprised of two dependent administrative-political entities, the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Brčko District.

fact that such offensive content permeated information on COVID-19 pandemic, a media literate audience should have recognised them.

Table 14. Information on COVID-19 that contains offensive content

Have you noticed a piece of information on COVID-19 that might be offensive in terms of race, nation, or an individual's beliefs?	f	%
Yes, on several occasions	352	30.6
Just once	53	4.6
I cannot tell the difference	76	6.6
No, I have not	670	58.2

Table 15. Information on COVID-19 that violates the rights to privacy

Have you noticed any piece of information on COVID-19 that violates the rights to privacy?	f	%
Yes, on several occasions	501	43.5
Just once	69	6
I would not know how to recognise such information	90	7.8
No, I have not	491	42.7

Table 15 suggests that 43.5% of the respondents have on several occasions encountered content that violates right to privacy, that 42.7% have not encountered it and that 7.8% of the respondents have not been able to recognise such content.

This may suggest that almost half of the respondents were not able to recognise content violating the right to privacy since The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation warned that "there have been violations of the right to protection of personal data, and among 18 cases registered there is an example from the Republic of Srpska, whose authorities started a website with daily updates on the list of persons who disrespected the measures of self-isolation" (2020, p. 5). On the other hand, it is an encouraging fact that almost half of the respondents can recognise such content, although the percentage should be considerably higher, given the dominant academic background of participants in the survey.

### Media competences of the respondents in relation to their sex, age, and education

This section investigates to what extent the categories of sex, age, and education impact the media competences of respondents in relation to usage and evaluation of media information on COVID-19 pandemic. The following dependent variables are used: frequency of getting informed on COVID-19; confusion of respondents by the amount of information; checking; credibility of information and sharing; contact with fake news or disinformation; contact with fake photograph or video footage.

Table 16. Frequency of getting informed about COVID-19 in relation to respondents' age

Variables		How often do you get informed about COVID-19?					Overall
		Once a day	1-2 times a day	2-3 times a day	3-5 times a day	More than 5 times a day	
Age							
18-24	F	159	152	48	10	12	381
	%	41.7	39.9	12.6	2.6	3.1	100.0
25-44	F	109	112	56	19	20	316
	%	34.5	35.4	17.7	6.0	6.3	100.0
Over 45	F	31	43	24	10	20	128
	%	24.2	33.6	18.8	7.8	15.6	100.0
Overall							
	F	299	307	128	39	52	825
	%	36.2	37.2	15.5	4.7	6.3	100.0

$$\chi^2=44,841; df=8; CV=0,165; p=0,000; N=825$$

The chi-squared test shows that there is a difference in frequency of getting informed among the respondents distributed in three age categories ( $CV=0,165$ ). In addition, the difference is statistically significant ( $F=21,136$ ; sig. 0,000). Using multiple comparison method applied on the aforementioned three groups<sup>2</sup>, along with the use of Tukey's range test, it is determined that there is an increase in the frequency of getting informed on COVID-19 as age progresses. The oldest respondents have searched for information the most, the youngest the least, which points to a conclusion that the former wanted to be better informed since they are, in all probability, more concerned about the whole situation. The COVID-19 virus, as a new disease, caused fear and a sense of impotence in many people, resulting in citizens looking for relevant information to help them cope with the current situation.

Table 17. Consumption of information on COVID-19 in relation to education of respondents

Variables		How often do you get informed about COVID-19?					Overall
		Once a day	1-2 times a day	2-3 times a day	3-5 times a day	More than 5 times a day	
Education							
Secondary school	f	96	97	32	2	8	235
	%	40.9	41.3	13.6	0.9	3.4	100.0

<sup>2</sup> The dependent variable is presented as an ordinal one, featuring 6 modalities, with the modality of "Once a day" being assigned with value of 1, and the modality of "More than 5 times a day" with value of 6.



College or faculty	f	133	127	54	19	29	362
	%	36.7	35.1	14.9	5.2	8.0	100.0
MA / PhD degree or PhD student	f	70	82	42	18	15	227
	%	30.8	36.1	18.5	7.9	6.6	100.0
Overall							
	f	299	306	128	39	52	824
	%	36.3	37.1	15.5	4.7	6.3	100.0

$\chi^2=24,140$ ;  $df=8$ ;  $CV=0,121$ ;  $p=0,002$

The chi-squared test shows that there is a difference in frequency of getting informed among the respondents of different educational level ( $CV=0,121$ ). In addition, the difference is statistically significant ( $F=7,560$ ; sig. 0,001). By means of the multiple comparison method applied to the respondents of various educational level, along with the use of Tukey's range test, it is determined that the respondents who graduated from a college or university have searched for information on COVID-19 more frequently than those who have a secondary school certificate. The results point to a conclusion that better educated respondents were more aware of the significance of being informed (Table 17).

Table 18 indicates that the respondents who earned their MA or PhD degree have had more experiences with fake photograph or video footage. This can probably be assigned to their abilities to recognise such content. This suggests that MA or PhD degree holders may have an advantage in terms of recognising fake photographs or video footages. The results potentially point to the significance of educational level in identifying and evaluating false information.

Table 18. Contact with fake photographs or video footages concerning COVID-19 in relation to level of education

Variables	Have you ever encountered a fake photograph or video footage concerning COVID 19?			Overall	
	Yes, on several occasions	Just once	No, I have not		
Education					
Secondary school	F	142	28	136	306
	%	46.4	9.2	44.4	100.0
College or faculty	F	253	23	174	450
	%	56.2	5.1	38.7	100.0
MA / PhD degree, or PhD student	F	175	11	75	261
	%	67.0	4.2	28.7	100.0
Overall					
	F	570	62	385	1017
	%	56.0	6.1	37.9	100.0

$\chi^2=26,951$ ;  $df=4$ ;  $CV=0,115$ ;  $p=0,000$

Finally, the analysis shows that the variable of sex has an impact on five dependent variables. Yet, the data suggest that male respondents are more educated on average than female ones, thus showing that the variable of sex actually reveals a hidden impact of a respondents' educational level. In other words, it is a false predictor. It is visible if we look up the data in Table 19, with T-test conclusive in this respect ( $T=3,694$ ; sig. 0,000).

Table 19. Sex of respondents in relation to educational level

Variables	Education			Overall	
	Secondary school	College or faculty	MA / PhD degree, PhD student		
Sex					
Male	f	89	140	115	344
	%	25.9	40.7	33.4	100.0
Female	f	263	362	181	806
	%	32.6	44.9	22.5	100.0
Overall					
	f	352	502	296	1150
	%	30.6	43.7	25.7	100.0

## CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a great amount of information and media content, from articles in journals to disinformation and *fake news*, all in response to numerous issues raised by citizens regarding a new disease. Apart from daily reports by international and national public health institutions, statements made by medical doctors, scientists, health experts, and representatives of authorities, there has been a great amount of disinformation and conspiracy theories concerning the pandemic. The increase in the number of disinformation and *fake news* has been verified by numerous studies across the world (Nielsen, et al., 2020) and organisations (EUDisinfoLab, 2020), as well as national platforms for fact-checking (The Balkan Investigative Network-BIRN and SHARE Foundation, 2020; Raskrinkavanje.ba, 2020). This paper investigated usage and evaluation of information on COVID-19 by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sources they have trusted, and whether they have been confused by the amount of information.

The issue discussed in the paper is placed within the context of five core concepts of media literacy. In addition, this concept offers five questions that could be used in the process of deconstruction of any piece of information. These questions were posed to the respondents in order to determine their media competences regarding usage, interpretation, and analysis of media content, as well as the level of trust in sources of information on the COVID-19 pandemic.

The results show that the respondents have mostly turned to online media portals for credible information, several times a week and that they were often or sometimes confused by the amount of information. One third of the respondents have double-checked information when they could not trace it back to a credible source, which is not a satisfying percentage, given the amount of disinformation and *fake news* circulating during the pandemic. Almost half of the respondents claim that their belief in the credibility of a piece of information rests upon the fact that the information has been released by several media companies and the fact that they place trust in the source of information, which are solid parameters of credibility. Most respondents have not shared information whose validity they found difficult to establish, which points to a high level of awareness of the respondents about a possible harmful effect of sharing information that can cause panic and fear among people. There is a high percentage of respondents who are able to recognise *fake news* and disinformation because they have encountered such content on several occasions during the pandemic. The data reveal that half of the respondents are able to recognise fake photographs. Yet, there is a relatively concerning percentage of those who are not (11.5%).

In terms of the agents they trust the most, the respondents appraise scientists, medical doctors, health experts, international public health institutions and national public health institutions. The results show a high level of ability of respondents to choose a relevant source of information on COVID-19. Still, at the same time, the results point to a low level of ability of respondents to recognise offensive content in terms of race, nation, or an individual's beliefs, with almost half of the respondents being ignorant about the content violating the right to privacy of citizens. The oldest respondents have searched for information the most, the young the least, which indicates that the former have wanted to be better informed, given that they are, in all probability, more concerned about the whole situation. As for the respondents who hold college degrees, they have sought information more frequently than those who have a secondary school degree, which leaves us with a conclusion that the higher educated respondents are more aware of the significance of being informed. Similarly, the respondents who hold MA or PhD degree have had more experience with fake photographs or video footages during the pandemic. It can be possibly assigned to their increased ability to recognise such content.

The Questions/TIPS (Q/TIPS) model of media literacy offers a basis for deconstruction and creation of media content to all users, especially in terms of developing habits of critical thinking. The four-step action learning model – consciousness empowerment process, analysis, reflection and action (Thoman, 1993) – if applied on a regular basis, can result in the emergence of critical thinking in media users, in particular with regard to media selection and media habits.

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# NAČIN KORIŠTENJA I VREDNOVANJA INFORMACIJA O KORONAVIRUSU (COVID 19) GRAĐANA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE U KONTEKSTU PET KLJUČNIH KONCEPATA MEDIJSKE PISMENOSTI

Dragana Trnić

**SAŽETAK** U vrijeme pandemije koronavirusa pokazalo se koliki je značaj medijske pismenosti. Pojavio se velik broj lažnih vijesti te informacija kojima nedostaje kontekst, iako su podaci točni (Arao, 2020). Cilj je rada utvrditi na koji su se način građani Bosne i Hercegovine koristili informacijama o koronavirusu i vrednovali ih, u kontekstu pet ključnih koncepata medijske pismenosti. Rezultati istraživanja, koje je provedeno online, upućuju na to da se većina ispitanika o koronavirusu informirala putem interneta, da ih je zbunjivala velika količina informacija, da često nisu provjeravali informacije i da ne znaju prepoznati uvredljiv sadržaj.

## KLJUČNE RIJEČI

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA, MEDIJSKA PISMENOST, DEZINFORMACIJE, LAŽNE VIJESTI, KORONAVIRUS

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# POLITIČKA KOMUNIKACIJA KANDIDATA NA DRUŠTVENIM MREŽAMA NA HRVATSKIM PREDSDJEDNIČKIM IZBORIMA 2019./2020.

Gabriela Galić :: Domagoj Bebić

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**SAŽETAK** Porast „politike usmjerene na kandidata“ utjecao je na promjenu u komunikacijskim strategijama političara koji se sve češće koriste tehnikama privatizacije politike za zblizavanje s biračima. Društvene mreže pokazale su se kao idealan kanal za „smekšavanje“ njihovih imidža. Cilj je ovog rada istražiti jesu li se kandidati, i u kojoj mjeri, na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. koristili društvenim mrežama za privatizaciju, odnosno personalizaciju politike. Metodom analize sadržaja utvrđeno je da su kandidati u svojim objavama u značajnoj mjeri koristili tehnike privatizacije politike kako bi se prikazali kao „jedni od nas“. Pobjedu na izborima odnio je Zoran Milanović koji je u potpunosti vodio personaliziranu kampanju u kojoj je najčešće naglašavao svoj osebujni karakter i svoje privatne osobine.

## KLJUČNE RIJEČI

HRVATSKA, PREDSDJEDNIČKI IZBORI, FACEBOOK, PRIVATIZACIJA POLITIKE, PERSONALIZACIJA

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## UVOD

Personalizacija politike proteklih je desetljeća postala jedan od važnijih fenomena u suvremenoj politici. S jedne strane, u tome su veliku ulogu odigrali mediji koji nastoje medijske sadržaje vezane uz politiku prikazati što zanimljivijima svojim publikama. Sve se više usmjeravaju na pojedine kandidate i čelnike stranaka, na njihove osobine i privatne živote, dok politički programi i konkretna rješenja padaju u drugi plan.

Međutim, s druge strane, političari često i sami u kampanjama naglašavaju svoj karakter i otkrivaju informacije iz privatnih života. Time se nastoje približiti biračima i prikazati sebe kao obične građane, odnosno kao „jedne od nas“. Korištenje navedenih tehnika posebno je karakteristično za predsjedničke izbore na kojima se biraju pojedini kandidati. Svatko od kandidata traži način da se istakne i privuče birače pa tako kandidati u svojim kampanjama često posežu za tehnikama koje ih „humaniziraju“ i prikazuju njihovo „drug“ lice s kojim se građani mogu lako poistovjetiti.

Društvene mreže, koje su namijenjene upravo povezivanju ljudi i dijeljenju osobnog sadržaja, čine idealan kanal za korištenje navedenih tehnika. Ipak, istraživanja koja su analizirala korištenje društvenih mreža u kampanjama na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2014./2015. pokazala su da kandidati nisu koristili društvene mreže za personalizaciju i stvaranje emotivne veze s biračima, nego pretežito za dijeljenje informacija o kampanjama (Šimunjak i sur., 2017). Pet godina poslije, uslijedili su novi predsjednički izbori na kojima su, čini se, korištene i drugačije komunikacijske strategije. Ovaj rad nastojat će ponuditi odgovor na pitanje jesu li kandidati na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. prepoznali potencijal društvenih mreža i koristili ih za privatizaciju, odnosno personalizaciju politike.

Uzimajući u obzir poruke koje su kandidati slali za vrijeme svojih kampanja i objave koje su u predizbornom razdoblju dijelili na svojim privatnim *Facebook* profilima, početna teza rada je da su predsjednički kandidati na *Facebooku* u vrijeme svojih kampanja u značajnoj mjeri koristili tehnike privatizacije politike s ciljem „humaniziranja“ svog imidža i približavanja građanima.

## PERSONALIZACIJA POLITIKE

### Modernizacija i slabljenje utjecaja političkih stranaka

Lipset i Rokkan 1967. godine iznijeli su tezu da su ideološke i stranačke podjele u društvu zapravo proizašle iz društvenih rascjepa koji su postojali unutar nacija (Lipset i Rokkan, 1967). Ti su rascjepi, objašnjava Grbeša, „ukorijenjeni u razlikama između konkurentskih društvenih skupina – poput klase ili religijskih skupina – i odražavaju dugotrajne društvene i ekonomske podjele, što pruža temelje za potencijalni politički sukob“ (Grbeša, 2008, str. 20).

Referirajući se na Lipseta i Rokkana, Dalton navodi kako su društveni rascjepi „kroz povijest oblikovali sadržaj političkog i izbornog diskursa u zapadnim demokracijama, te stoga i stranačku opredijeljenost i izbore birača“ (Dalton, 2003, str. 319). Međutim, proces modernizacije sa sobom je donio značajne promjene u društvenom i političkom okruženju. Društvo tada postaje sve složenije, što je rezultiralo nizom „radikalnih društvenih promjena, koje uključuju, posebice, promjene u obliku i praksama demokratske vladavine“ (Swanson i Macini, 1996, str. 7).

Dolazi do porasta razine obrazovanja građana, razvoja masovnih medija, a samim time i veće dostupnosti informacija. Birači postaju osvješteniji, razvijaju svoje političke vještine te kao rezultat toga više i propitkuju odluke koje stranke i kandidati donose, ili se pak odlučuju za nestranački oblik političkog djelovanja (Dalton, 2000, str. 11).

Slabljem društvenih rascjepa, mijenjaju se i temelji ideoloških podjela u brojnim zapadnim demokracijama. „Publike u ovim društvima proširile su svoje interese na neekonomska pitanja koja se tiču kvalitete života, koja predstavljaju novu postmaterijalnu agendu“ (Dalton, 2003, str. 320). Javljaju se, primjerice, različiti pokreti žena koje zahtijevaju jednaka prava kao i muškarci, pokreti koji se zalažu za zaštitu manjina u društvu ili pak za zaštitu okoliša. Na agendu se stavljaju nove teme koje se više ne tiču klasnih podjela i koje su „stvorile nove baze za stranačke konflikte“ (Dalton, 2003, str. 320). Istodobno raste i broj birača koji svoju odluku o tome kome će dati svoj glas donose na temelju odnosa kandidata prema specifičnim problemima i pitanjima.

S modernizacijom dolazi i do svojevrstne promjene životnog stila, čime se otvara prostor sve većoj individualizaciji. Grbeša navodi (2008, str. 22) kako su članstva u tradicionalnim društvenim institucijama, kao što su stranke ili sindikati, zamijenila članstva u pokretima koji se bave specifičnim problemima, poput pokreta za zaštitu okoliša. “U takvom promijenjenom okruženju, glasovanje na izborima u sve većoj mjeri postaje izraz individualnog izbora, prije nego izraz pripadnosti grupi” (Grbeša, 2008, str. 22). Swanson i Macini iznose sličnu tezu te pišu kako glasovi birača sve više ovise o njihovoj vezi s pojedinačnim kandidatom, dok tradicionalne veze između birača i političkih stranaka, kao rezultat toga, slabe (1996, str. 14).

Upravo je slabljenje tradicionalnih veza jedan od dvaju faktora koji su prema Van Aelst i sur. (2011, str. 204) utjecali na porast ‘politike usmjerene na kandidata’. Drugi faktor koji navode odnosi se na promjene u medijskom okruženju, s posebnim naglaskom na ulogu televizije u političkoj komunikaciji. Razvoj televizije „fundamentalno je promijenio prirodu političke komunikacije“, a jedna od najvažnijih promjena je ta što je televizija „nametnula nova pravila izvještavanja i proizvela novi stil prezentacije koji je skloniji vidljivim osobnostima više nego kompleksnim problemima i institucijama“ (Grbeša, 2008, str. 31). Budući da se političari zbog novonastalih promjena u društvenom i političkom okruženju više nisu mogli s jednakom sigurnošću osloniti na birače koji su tradicionalno glasovali za njih ili njihovu političku stranku, oni počinju mijenjati svoje komunikacijske strategije i prilā-

gođavati ih novim okolnostima. Istodobno se sve više počinje govoriti i o “personalizaciji politike”, koja postaje jedan od ključnih pojmova u suvremenoj politici.

### Koncept personalizacije politike

Proteklih desetljeća personalizacija politike postala je popularna tema brojnih radova iz područja političkih znanosti. Međutim, usprkos velikom interesu za taj fenomen, u znanstvenoj zajednici još uvijek ne postoji jedinstvena definicija “personalizacije”. Grbeša nudi definiciju tog pojma u širem smislu:

Personalizacija se odnosi na povećani interes medija za kandidate i čelnike stranaka, kao i porast njihovog značaja i vidljivosti unutar stranačke strukture i za vrijeme izbornih kampanja, što se prvenstveno razvilo kao posljedica propasti politike cijepanja, pojave novih medijskih tehnologija i brzog širenja medijskog tržišta. (Grbeša, 2008, str. 12)

Većina autora koji se bave personalizacijom slažu se da je riječ o fenomenu koji je potrebno promatrati u više dimenzija. Van Aelst i sur. (2011) tako pišu o jednoj od dimenzija koju nazivaju „individualizacija“. Ona se odnosi na prebacivanje fokusa s političkih stranaka i tema „na pojedine političare kao središnje aktere u političkoj areni, uključujući njihove ideje, kapacitete i politike“ (Van Aelst i sur., 2011, str. 204). Karvonen (2009, str. 4) tu dimenziju definira kao „pojavu kada pojedini politički akteri postaju sve istaknutiji, na štetu stranaka i kolektivnih identiteta“.

Uz pojam individualizacije, u parlamentarnim sustavima često se veže i još konkretniji koncept „prezidencijalizacije“ (Mughan, 2000). Taj se pojam odnosi na pojavu u kojoj „premijeri u parlamentarnim sustavima imaju sve sličniji položaj predsjednicima u predsjedničkim sustavima s obzirom na njihovu važnost i vidljivost u političkoj komunikaciji, ali i politici generalno“ (Šimunjak, 2012, str. 35-36). Međutim, budući da su tema ovog rada predsjednički izbori, ovaj se rad neće baviti tom dimenzijom, već će fokus biti na dimenziji personalizacije poznatoj pod nazivom “privatizacija političara” (Holtz-Bacha, 2004), odnosno “politizacija privatnosti” (Langer, 2010).

Šimunjak (2012, str. 36) taj pojam definira kao “proces kojim se u političkoj komunikaciji fokus s političkih persona političara premješta na njihove privatne persone”. Drugim riječima, sve veći naglasak stavlja se na političare kao “obične ljude” te na njihove privatne živote i osobine.

Važno je istaknuti kako se tim tehnikama koriste i mediji i političari. Mediji, usmjereni na profit i stjecanje što brojnije publike, medijske izvještaje o političkim zbivanjima pokušavaju učiniti što atraktivnijim pa tako nerijetko u izvještajima o političarima ističu detalje i priče iz njihovih privatnih života. S druge strane, političari te tehnike koriste kako bi se približili biračima te im pokazali da su i oni zapravo samo „obični građani“.

## PRIVATIZACIJA POLITIČARA KAO STRATEGIJA KANDIDATA

### Koncept privatizacije političara

Prema Van Aelst i sur. (2011, str. 206), privatizacija političara odnosi se na „porast važnosti političara kao ‘obične’ osobe“. Drugim riječima, fokus se premješta na njih kao privatne pojedince, a „političar više nije predstavljen samo kao kreator politike ili kao glasnogovornik, već kao predani roditelj ili strastveni ljubitelj glazbe“ (Van Aelst i sur., 2011, str. 206).

Langer (2006, str. 51) politizaciju privatne persone definira kao „vidljivost koja je data osobnoj sferi političkih figura u procesu stvaranja njihovih javnih osoba i koja ih prikazuje kao one koji otkrivaju, namjerno ili nenamjerno, svoje ‘autentične’ sebe“.

Govoreći o privatizaciji političara, za početak je potrebno definirati što to podrazumijeva “privatni život” političara. Van Aelst i sur. (2011, str. 213) privatni život definiraju kao domenu “izvan političke arene, gdje postupci i riječi političara nisu eksplicitno povezani s njegovom ili njezinom javnom ulogom”. Upravo se ti elementi sve češće koriste u izbornim kampanjama za „konstruiranje prikladne autobiografije za potencijalnog političara, što pruža uvid u osobu iza imidža“ (Stanyer i Wring, 2004, str. 3).

Više je razloga zašto političari ističu informacije iz svojih privatnih života. Prema Šimunjak (2012, str. 36), komercijalni mediji, kojima je uvelike stalo do profita, vode se logikom da publici ponude ono što ih zanima. Drugim riječima, ako publiku ne zanima politika, onda će politike na televiziji biti manje ili će ju se prikazati u nekoj “lakšoj” formi. Političari se stoga prilagođavaju interesima medija i publika te pristaju otkrivati zanimljive detalje iz svog privatnog života.

Drugi je razlog taj što političari žele osvojiti i drugačiju publiku, odnosno žele pridobiti glasove nezainteresiranih i mladih birača. Svjesni su da takve birače dobar dio pitanja koja se tiču ideologije i svjetonazora ne interesira pa do njih pokušavaju doprijeti otkrivanjem zgoda i crtica iz svoga privatnog života, s kojima se lako poistovjetiti. Njima se nastoje svidjeti ponajprije kao osobe, a zatim i kao političari.

Šimunjak (2012, str. 37) kao još jedan od razloga navodi i potrebu za diferencijacijom u društvima koja nisu ideološki i vrijednosno podijeljena. U okruženju u kojemu slabe tradicionalne veze između birača i stranaka, političari moraju naći nove načine da se razlikuju od konkurencije, odnosno da biračima pokažu zašto su baš oni pravi izbor za njih.

### Funkcije privatizacije političara

Holtz-Bacha definira (2004, str. 49) četiri funkcije privatizacije političara: humanizacija, pojednostavljivanje i distrakcija, emocionalizacija te dosezanje *celebrity*-statusa.

Humanizacija je, prema Holtz Bachi (2004, str. 49), strategija upravljanja imidžom, koju političari koriste kako bi se glasačima prikazali kao obični građani, odnosno kao “jedni od nas”. Slikajući se sa svojom obitelji, otkrivanjem svojih hobija i druženjem s građanima,

političari nastoje prikazati svoju privatnu stranu kako bi se glasači mogli lakše poistovjetiti s njima. Krajnji je cilj korištenja tehnika humanizacije u strategijama političara, objašnjava Holtz-Bacha (2004, str. 49), da pokažu razumijevanje za birače, kako bi se maknuli od ideje da oni ne mare ili ne razumiju "obične ljude" i njihove probleme.

Sljedeća funkcija privatizacije je pojednostavljivanje. Holtz-Bacha navodi kako se ona odnosi na "čest način nošenja s kompleksnim političkim problemima koje je teško priopćiti biračima" (Holtz-Bacha, 2004, str. 49). Drugim riječima, političari utjelovljuju građanima ponekad teško shvatljive političke programe i ideje. Pored pojednostavljivanja, političari se također služe privatizacijom politike za distrakciju, kako bi skrenuli fokus s nekih neugodnih tema ili pitanja.

Emocionalizacija se koristi kako bi se kod birača izazvalo suosjećanje te kako bi se s njima stvorila emotivna veza. Holtz-Bacha ističe (2004, str. 49) kako je to posljedica slabljenja stranačke identifikacije, budući da sociodemografske karakteristike sve slabije mogu opisati glasačko ponašanje birača. Političari s glasačima dijele svoja osobna iskustva i emocije, kako bi izazvali empatiju te se tako dublje povezali s njima.

Posljednja funkcija odnosi se na doseganje *celebrity*-statusa, odnosno na "ideju da političari žele i imaju potencijal za stjecanje *celebrity*-statusa koji je inače rezerviran za zvijezde iz šoubiznisa, koji bi ih možda mogao učiniti privlačnijima širim publikama" (Grbeša, 2008, str. 36). Povezivanje s popularnom kulturom dobra je prilika političarima da dopru do nezainteresiranog dijela birača te da sebe prikažu u drugačijem svjetlu.

### Društvene mreže i upravljanje političkim imidžom

Novi mediji i društvene mreže proteklo su desetljeće postale važne platforme u političkim kampanjama. Toj tezi u prilog ide činjenica kako je u Hrvatskoj u lipnju 2020. godine, prema podacima *Internet World Statsa*, 92,3 posto građana koristilo internet. Odnosno, u brojkama ukupno 3,787,838 hrvatskih građana, od kojih njih više od pola, točnije 2,077,000, koristi društvenu mrežu *Facebook* (Internetworldstats.com, 2020). Iz toga proizlazi da se na *Facebooku* nalazi polovica hrvatskoga stanovništva, a samim time i velik broj birača, što političarima predstavlja novo mjesto za privlačenje potencijalnih birača različitih društvenih i dobnih skupina.

Istraživanja hrvatskih predsjedničkih izbora 2014./2015. pokazala su da su kandidati u velikoj mjeri koristili društvene mreže u svojim kampanjama, ali ne i za personalizaciju i zbližavanje s biračima (Šimunjak i sur., 2017; Sinčić Ćorić i sur., 2017).

Govoreći o učestalosti korištenja društvenih mreža tijekom kampanje, Šimunjak i sur. zaključuju (2017, str. 548) kako je "značajno više izjava objavljeno na društvenim mrežama nego u dnevnim novinama". Zanimljiv je podatak da je svih četvero kandidata na spomenutim izborima značajno više naglašavalo svoje vrline i kvalitete u posredovanim izjavama nego na društvenim mrežama (Šimunjak i sur., 2017, str. 549). Najčešće su promovirali istu svoju vrlinu, odnosno svoju sposobnost za obnašanje dužnosti predsjednika Republike, što

pokazuje da "nisu prepoznali ili nisu bili voljni razlikovati se od konkurencije svojim jedinstvenim vrlinama i vještinama, i posljedično, stvoriti prepoznatljiv brend" (Šimunjak i sur., 2017, str. 549). Također, nitko od kandidata nije želio iznositi detalje iz svojih privatnih života.

Analizirajući doseganje, uključivanje i zblizavanje s biračima na istim predsjedničkim izborima, Sinčić Ćorić i sur. zaključuju (2017, str. 68) kako su u izjavama svih kandidata najčešće teme bile one koje su vezane za kampanju, a uvida u njihov privatni život gotovo da nije ni bilo.

Navedeni podatci upućuju na to da su kandidati na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2014./2015. propustili iskoristiti potencijal društvenih mreža za zblizavanje s biračima te da su ih više koristili za slanje političkih poruka i dijeljenje informacija o samim kampanjama. Na spomenutim predsjedničkim izborima pobjedu u drugom krugu protiv aktualnog predsjednika Ive Josipovića odnijela je kandidatkinja Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, Kolinda-Grabar Kitarović. Pet godina kasnije uslijedili su novi predsjednički izbori, a s njima i nove političke kampanje s različitim komunikacijskim strategijama.

## PREDSJEDNIČKI IZBORI 2019./2020.

### Kontekst predsjedničkih izbora 2019./2020.

Na posljednjim hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. bilo je čak 11 službenih kandidata. Već na samom početku kampanje, ankete i brojni politički analitičari prognozirali su kako je najvjerojatnije da će u drugi krug ući tada još uvijek aktualna predsjednica Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović i Zoran Milanović, a nešto slabiji izgledi za ulazak u drugi krug davali su se i Miroslavu Škori. Primjerice, u istraživanju agencije IPSOS koje je početkom prosinca 2019. objavio *Dnevnik Nove TV*, Grabar-Kitarović se prognoziralo 27,4 posto glasova birača, Milanoviću 24 posto, a Škori 23 posto. Ostalim kandidatima nisu se davale šanse za prolazak u drugi krug (Bago, 2019a). Ovo istraživanje obuhvatit će objave vodećih troje kandidata kojima su se davale najveće šanse za ulazak u drugi krug. U sljedećem dijelu rada svatko od njih bit će pojedinačno predstavljen.

### Žena iz naroda

„Ja sam vaša i bit ću vaša predsjednica“ – tim je riječima u prosincu 2014. godine u rodnom Dražicama na Grobniku Grabar-Kitarović započela svoju službenu kampanju za predsjedničke izbore. Predstavljajući se na svom prvom skupu kao žena „skromnih, teških korijena“, uz poruku „ja sam Kolinda, žena iz naroda“ (Opačak Klobučar, 2014), bilo je jasno kako će Grabar-Kitarović voditi kampanju u kojoj će se služiti populizmom kako bi osvojila naklonost hrvatskih građana.

U vrijeme kada se Grabar-Kitarović kandidirala za svoje prve predsjedničke izbore, Zoran Milanović obnašao je dužnost predsjednika Vlade. Upravo su napadi na Milanovićevu Vladu obilježili njezinu predsjedničku kampanju. Primjerice, na završnom skupu održanom u zagrebačkom Domu sportova, Grabar-Kitarović tadašnju je Vladu nazvala



„nesposobnom“, „bezidejnom“ i „beščutnom“,<sup>1</sup> dodavši; „dosta je bilo Zorana Milanovića i Ive Josipovića jer oni su samo dva lica iste devalvirane kovanice“ (Opačak Klobučar, 2014).

Raos objašnjava (2015, str. 37) kako „sraz Josipovića i Grabar-Kitarović, dakako, nije bio samo sraz dvaju pretendena na mjesto predsjednika odnosno predsjednice, već i sučeljavanje Kukuriku koalicije i HDZ-a“. U tijesnoj pobjedi, s 50,74 posto osvojenih glasova birača, Grabar Kitarović odnijela je pobjedu u drugom krugu, dok je SDP-ov kandidat Ivo Josipović osvojio 49,26 posto glasova (Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske, 2014). Time je postala prva žena na funkciji predsjednice Republike.

O utjecaju Grabar-Kitarović u vrijeme kada je obnašala funkciju predsjednice govori činjenica da ju je ugledni američki časopis *Forbes* uvrstio na listu najmoćnijih žena svijeta 2017. godine i to na 39. mjestu, dok se godinu dana kasnije na istoj listi našla na nešto nižem 47. Mjestu (Forbes, 2019). Njezin petogodišnji mandat obilježila su brojna putovanja – kako u Hrvatskoj, tako i u inozemstvu – koja je kasnije često isticala u kampanji za drugi predsjednički mandat, navodeći u svojim govorima i na društvenim mrežama kako je obišla „svaki kutak Domovine“ (Dnevnik.hr, 2019a). Obilazeći Hrvatsku nije se ustručavala zapjevati, zaplesati baranjsko kolo, kuhati, ribariti i družiti se s građanima. Na društvenim mrežama dijelila je sadržaj na kojem je prikazana u neformalnom, svakodnevnom okruženju. Primjerice, na *Facebooku* je objavljivala fotografije na kojima pozira s građanima, sa svojim psom, kako kupuje na tržnici, sudjeluje u svetoj misi i slično.

Prema podacima Državnog izbornog povjerenstva, u prvom krugu predsjedničkih izbora 2019./2020. pobjedu je odnio Milanović, s 29,55 posto podrške birača, dok je Grabar-Kitarović ostvarila rezultat od 26,65 posto (Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske, 2020). Iznenadjenje izbora svakako je bio Škoro, koji je ostvario značajno veći rezultat nego što su mu predizborne ankete davale uoči samih izbora. Dva dana prije predsjedničkih izbora *Dnevnik Nove TV* objavio je rezultate posljednje ankete prije izbora, prema kojoj je Škoro trebao osvojiti 18 posto glasova birača (Bago, 2019b). Međutim, osvojio je 24,45 posto glasova, odnosno u brojkama samo 41.924 glasa manje od Grabar-Kitarović. Svoje birače pozvao je da u drugome krugu ponište listić i time Grabar-Kitarović uskratilo dio potencijalnih glasova svojih birača.

U drugom krugu s 1.034.170 glasova pobjedu je odnio Milanović. Imao je 104.463 glasova više od protukandidatkinje (Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske, 2020). Uspoređujući političku retoriku kandidata koji su se borili u drugom krugu, profesor s Fakulteta političkih znanosti u Zagrebu Dražen Lalić u razgovoru za N1 dao je zanimljivu usporedbu. „Milanovićeva je retorika moćna, u usporedbi s retorikom Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović njegova je retorika kao moćni Mercedes, a njena kao polovni Golf“ (Hr.n1info.com, 2019).

Na predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. pobjedu je odnio kandidat koji je uživao podršku u tom trenutku slabije stranke. Prema istraživanju agencije IPSOS objavljenom u

<sup>1</sup> Puljić-Šego, I. (2015, 7. siječnja). *Euforičan skup HDZ-a u Domu sportova: 'Dosta je bilo Zorana Milanovića i Ive Josipovića'*. Večernji.hr. Preuzeto 15.7.2020., s <https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/euforican-skup-hdz-a-u-domu-sportova-dosta-je-bilo-zorana-milanovica-i-ive-josipovica-982956>

*Dnevniku Nove TV*, Hrvatska demokratska zajednica potkraj studenog 2019. uživala je potporu 27,1 posto građana, dok je Socijaldemokratska partija imala 20,7 posto (*Dnevnik.hr*, 2019b). Iz toga proizlazi zaključak da na ovim predsjedničkim izborima presudnu ulogu nije imala stranačka potpora. Grabar-Kitarović uvelike je i sama utjecala na svoj poraz, a Hrvatska je dobila „predsjednika s karakterom“.

### Predsjednik s karakterom

“Nisam predsjednik i nikada neću biti predsjednik Republike Hrvatske”, poručio je to u travnju 2014. godine tadašnji predsjednik Vlade i šef Socijaldemokratske partije Milanović (Mahmutović, 2019). Od tada se mnogo toga dogodilo u njegovoj političkoj karijeri – od poraza na parlamentarnim izborima, napuštanja Sabora i okretanja privatnom biznisu u konzultantskoj tvrtki – do pobjede na predsjedničkim izborima.

Bivši djelatnik Ministarstva vanjskih poslova i diplomat u svojoj karijeri ostvario je strelovit uspjeh. Početkom 2000-ih počeo se aktivno baviti politikom, a nakon smrti tadašnjeg predsjednika SDP-a Ivice Račana u travnju 2007. godine, iste godine u studenome Milanović pobjeđuje na izvanrednim unutarstranačkim izborima. Nakon četiri godine provedene u oporbi, u prosincu 2011. godine uslijedili su parlamentarni izbori, a veliki pobjednik tih izbora bila je Kukuriku koalicija predvođena SDP-om s 80 osvojenih mandata (Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske, 2011).

U svome se mandatu Milanović nije ustručavao upuštati u žustre rasprave s političkim neistomišljenicima, a upravo se zbog svog osebjnog stila komunikacije često našao na meti kritika. Grbeša-Zenzerović navodi neke od najistaknutijih primjera koji ilustriraju komunikacijski stil bivšeg premijera:

Tu sarkastično-podcjenjivačku komunikaciju hrvatski premijer demonstrirao je na različitim publikama: neposlušnim ministrima (‘Samo kaj mi nije palo 20 kila smeća na nogu kad sam čuo izjavu ministrice’, komentar na Mirelu Holy dok je bila ministrica zaštite okoliša i prirode); političkim protivnicima (‘Ruža Tomašić gora je od elementarne nepogode. Građani su u mnogim zemljama birali svašta.’); prebjezima (‘Lesi se vraća kući’, komentar na djelatnicu Ministarstva rada koja je prešla u sindikat zdravstva); novinarima (‘Mislim da je kriv pokojni predsjednik Kennedy’, odgovor na pitanje novinara je li Vlada odgovorna za provođenje referenduma inicijative U ime obitelji); i građanima (‘Stručnjaci za finski rat iz Špičkovine ili Vukovine nam objašnjavaju koliko je bilo mrtvih kao da su ih oni osobno prebrojavali’, antologijski komentar na profesora povijesti kojeg su novinari zamolili da iznese povijesne činjenice o građanskom ratu u Finskoj, a na koje se Milanović ranije netočno referirao). Takav komunikacijski obrazac sasvim je u suprotnosti s popularnim svjetskim trendovima koji nastoje političare približiti ‘običnim građanima’. (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, str. 42)

Milanović je gradio imidž iskrenog političara koji govori ono što mu je na umu, bez uljepšavanja i dodvoravanja drugima. Međutim, pritom je „zastranio u ekstreman komunikacijski obrazac koji je teško opisati raspoloživim stručnim pojmovima“ (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, str. 42). Ulazeći u zadnju godinu mandata, popularnost njegove Vlade sve je

bila manja. Grbeša-Zenzerović navodi podatke ankete koje je u studenom 2014. provela agencija Ipsos Plus koji to ilustriraju: „Prema rezultatima ankete koju je provela agencija Ipsos Puls, prosječna ocjena Vlade u studenom 2014. iznosila je 2,1. Vladinoj politici u istome mjesecu protivilo se 77 posto ispitanika, dok je njih 85 posto smatralo da Hrvatska ide u pogrešnom smjeru“ (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, str. 39).

Na loš imidž Milanovićeve Vlade utjecalo je više čimbenika, a kao jedan od važnijih Grbeša-Zenzerović ističe upravo Milanovićev stil komunikacije (2014, str. 43). Pad popularnosti SDP-a odrazio se i na rezultat predsjedničkih izbora 2014./2015. kada je njihov kandidat Josipović izgubio od HDZ-ove kandidatkinje Grabar-Kitarović. Nedugo nakon predsjedničkih izbora, uslijedilo poraz SDP-a na parlamentarnim izborima u studenom 2015., a potom i na prijevremenim parlamentarnim izborima u srpnju 2016. godine. Novi katastrofalni poraz SDP-a rezultirao je time da je Zoran Milanović na izvanrednoj konferenciji objavio kako se neće više kandidirati za funkciju predsjednika SDP-a. Nedugo nakon toga objavio je i da se povlači iz aktivne politike.

U lipnju 2019. na svom *Facebook* profilu objavio je fotografiju s natpisom „predsjednik s karakterom“ te time potvrdio nagađanja da će se kandidirati na nadolazećim predsjedničkim izborima. Slogan njegove kampanje najavio je da će Milanović voditi personaliziranu kampanju u kojoj će u fokusu biti njegov karakter – koji mu je u vrijeme njegove Vlade istodobno bio najveća kvaliteta, ali i uteg. U svom uvodnom obraćanju građanima dao je naslutiti da će ga u ovoj kampanji imati priliku vidjeti u nešto drugačijem svjetlu – kao smirenijeg, manje konfliktnog i staloženijeg političara.

Tijekom kampanje u svojim objavama na društvenim mrežama naglašavao je svoj karakter, vrline i dosadašnja postignuća. Pozivao je građane za da glasaju za promjenu, odnosno za modernu i „normalnu“ Hrvatsku. Napadao je protukandidatkinju Grabar-Kitarović i HDZ, a tek u pokojoj objavi osvrnuo se i na protukandidata Miroslava Škoru, kojeg je nešto manje od 42 tisuće glasova birača dijelilo od drugog kruga predsjedničkih izbora.

### Narodni predsjednik

U petominutnom videu na svom *Facebook* profilu Miroslav Škoro u lipnju 2019. objavio je svoju kandidaturu za predsjednika Republike. „Želim biti narodni predsjednik i samo ću vama polagati račune“, poručio je hrvatskim građanima. Pjevač, skladatelj, producent i poduzetnik pretežito konzervativnih i tradicionalnih stajališta nakon duge pauze u svijetu politike odlučio se kandidirati za funkciju predsjednika države. U svom uvodnom obraćanju na *Facebooku* istaknuo je da Hrvatska treba predsjednika koji će biti oruđe naroda i koji će se boriti protiv političkih elita i vratiti vlast narodu. To obraćanje sadržavalo je sve značajke populizma. Berto Šalaj navodi koje su temeljne ideje na kojima počiva populizam:

Središnja je ideja populizma da je društvo podijeljeno u dvije homogene i antagonističke skupine: poštenu narod i korumpiranu elitu. Tako Meny i Surel (2002) naglašavaju da populizam prožima ideja dobrog, poštenog i jednostavnog naroda kojega su prevarile i izmanipulirale korumpirane, nekompetentne i međusobno umrežene elite. Populisti tvrde da društvo i politiku treba korjenito promijeniti kako bi se ukinula do-

minacija elita te obnovile zamisao i praksa politike kao izraza volje naroda. (Šalaj, 2012, str. 55)

Upravo se tim tehnikama u svojoj kampanji služio Škoro – kritizirao je protukandidate Grabar-Kitarović i Milanovića, na koje se referirao kao na pripadnike elite, ističući da su oni „dva lica istog korumpiranog klijentelističkog sustava“.

Henjak objašnjava (2019, str. 420) kako se posljednji predsjednički izbori „uklapaju u trend slabljenja blokova i povećanja broja birača koji su izvan blokova i koji glasaju za stranke i kandidate koji traže promjenu prevladavajućeg modela politike i zamjenu političkih elita“. Škoro se „uspio nametnuti kao najvjerodostojniji nositelj kritike prevladavajućeg modela politike“ i uspio je „okupiti podršku koja je znatno šira od razočaranih birača HDZ-a i desnice, i koja uključuje velik broj protestnih birača koji nemaju jasan stranački ili blokovski identitet“ (Henjak, 2019, str. 421).

U svojoj kampanji obraćao se široj publici i svima onima nezadovoljnima trenutnom vlašću. Na društvenim mrežama dijelio je fotografije na kojima je sebe nastojao prikazati kao ozbiljnog političara, ali i kao „predsjednika iz naroda“. Usprkos tome što nije ušao u drugi krug, na ovim se predsjedničkim izborima pozicionirao kao čvrsta treća opcija na hrvatskoj političkoj sceni, što je potvrdio i na parlamentarnim izborima u srpnju 2020., na kojima je sa svojim Domovinskim pokretom osvojio 16 mandata u Hrvatskom saboru.

## METODOLOGIJA I ISTRAŽIVAČKI NACRT

Kao što je prethodno u radu objašnjeno, privatizacija političara može se promatrati na dvije razine: kako mediji ističu privatne živote i karakteristike kandidata te kako to rade sami kandidati. Ovaj rad fokusirat će se isključivo na drugu razinu i nastojat će ponuditi odgovor na sljedeće istraživačko pitanje: jesu li i u kojoj mjeri kandidati na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. koristili društvene mreže za privatizaciju, odnosno personalizaciju politike?

Kako bi odgovorili na postavljeno pitanje, metodom analize sadržaja autori su istražili *Facebook* objave troje predsjedničkih kandidata. Jedinica analize istraživanja je jedna objava na *Facebooku*. Analiza obuhvaća sve objave objavljene u prvom krugu predsjedničkih izbora između 1. i 22. prosinca 2019. na privatnim *Facebook* profilima troje kandidata koji su tijekom studenoga i prosinca uživali najviši stupanj potpore birača, odnosno na profilima Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović, Zorana Milanovića i Miroslava Škore. Istraživanje tako uključuje 243 objave.

Prilikom kreiranja analitičke matrice autori su se oslonili na istraživanje Grbeše (2008) na temu personalizacije politike na hrvatskim parlamentarnim izborima 2003. i 2007. godine. Matrica uključuje deset pitanja. Prvo pitanje odnosi se na format objave na društvenim mrežama. Objava je kodirana kao tekst, fotografija, fotografija i tekst, galerija fotografija, galerija fotografija i tekst, video te video i tekst.

Druga kategorija istražuje tko su glavni akteri u objavi, kako bi se utvrdilo u kojoj su mjeri sami kandidati bili u fokusu svojih objava, a u kojoj su mjeri glavni akteri objava bili predstavnici stranke koja ih podupire, građani, predstavnici određenih interesnih skupina, slavne osobe, članovi obitelji ili drugi.

Treće pitanje vezano je uz dominantnu strategiju objave. Pored napada na protivnike, u odgovorima su ponuđene i strategije isticanja domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije, zatim isticanje kandidata, njegova/njezina karaktera, vještina ili vrlina kao glavni razlog glasovanja za tog kandidata/kandidatkinju, isticanje dosadašnjih postignuća, poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost i davanje obećanja za budućnost, podrška slavni osoba, humor ili ironija te ostalo.


Naposlijetku, zadnji set pitanja usmjeren je na korištenje tehnika privatizacije u objavama kandidata. Četvrto pitanje odnosi na to jesu li kandidati u objavi prikazani kao državnici, „jedni od nas“, kao kombinacija toga dvoga ili nije moguće utvrditi.

Od petog do desetog pitanja nastoji se utvrditi postojanje nekih od elemenata privatizacije u objavama kandidata, kao što je prisutnost supruge ili supruga, poznatih osoba iz svijeta *showbusinessa*, sporta ili kulture te referiranje na religiju. Pored toga, analizira se je li kandidat prikazan u neformalnom, svakodnevnom okruženju, u interakciji s građanima te otkriva li informacije iz privatnog života (o svom podrijetlu, djetinjstvu, obitelji). Podudarnost kodera iznosi od 81 % do 100 %, ovisno o kategoriji.

## PRIKAZ REZULTATA

### Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

Kandidatkinja Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović u analiziranom razdoblju ukupno je objavila 78 objava, koje su pretežito bile u formatu fotografije i teksta (28,10%) te galerija fotografija i teksta (24,36 %). U *Grafikonu 1.* prikazano je koliko je koji format objave u analiziranom razdoblju bio zastupljen na njezinu *Facebooku*.



▲ Graf 1.  
Format objava Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović

Glavni akteri u objavama Grabar-Kitarović navedeni su u Tablici 1. U najvećem broju objava Grabar-Kitarović glavni akter bila ona (74,36 %), nakon čega slijedi kombinacija nje i predstavnika stranke (8,97 %). Među predstavnicima stranke koji su je podržali i pojavljivali se u njezinim objavama jesu predsjednik HDZ-a Andrej Plenković, tadašnji glavni tajnik HDZ-a Gordan Jandroković, tadašnji ministar obrane Damir Krstičević, ministar branitelja Tomo Medved, vukovarski gradonačelnik Ivan Penava, župan Osječko-baranjske županije Ivan Anušić te župan Šibensko-kninske županije Goran Pauk. U 3,85 % objava glavni akteri bili su Penava, Medved te Anušić.

Tablica 1. Glavni akter u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović

Glavni akter u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović	
Kandidatkinja	74,36 %
Predstavnik stranke	3,85 %
Građanin	/
Predstavnik određene društvene ili interesne skupine	2,56 %
Slavna osoba	/
Član obitelji	/
Kandidatkinja + predstavnik stranke	8,97 %
Kandidatkinja + predstavnik stranke + član obitelji	1,28 %
Kandidatkinja + predstavnik stranke + slavna osoba	3,85 %
Nije moguće odrediti	5,13 %
UKUPNO	100

Grabar-Kitarović u svojoj se kampanji najviše oslanjala na strategiju isticanja domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije (24,36 %), što govori da je u svojoj kampanji kao jedan od glavnih ciljeva imala zadržavanje glasova desnoga biračkog tijela, za čiju se naklonost i Škoro borio. Pored toga, u objavama je često pozivala na promjene, isticala optimizam za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijizam i/ili davala obećanja za budućnost (17,95 %). U 14,10 % objava dominantna strategija bila je isticanje sebe, svog karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća. Pretežito je isticala svoja dosadašnja postignuća, dok svoj karakter za vrijeme kampanje gotovo da uopće nije isticala. Napad na protivnike kao dominantna strategija korištena je u 10,26 % objava, što je najmanji postotak među troje kandidata obuhvaćenih analizom.


Tablica 2. Dominantna strategija u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović

Dominantna strategija u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović	
Napad na protivnike i/ili stranke koje su ih predložile za kandidate	10,26 %
Isticanje domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije	24,36 %



Isticanje kandidatkinje, njegova/njezina karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća kao glavni razlog glasanja za kandidatkinju	14,10 %
Isticanje kandidatkinje kao osobe bliske narodu, okružene građanima	15,39 %
Poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijazam i/ili davanje obećanja za budućnost	17,95 %
Podrška slavnih osoba	2,56 %
Humor ili ironija	/
Poziv na predizborni skup	15,39 %
Ostalo	/
UKUPNO	100

Grabar-Kitarović u 41 % svojih objava prikazana je kao državnica, dok je u 27 % objava prikazana kao „jedna od nas“. Dodajmo tome da je u 23 % objava kombinirala prikazivanje sebe kao državnice i kao „jedne od nas“, što nam zapravo govori da je, ukupno gledajući, Grabar-Kitarović u svojoj kampanji na društvenim mrežama u polovici svojih objava nastojala sebe u potpunosti ili djelomično prikazati kao „jednu od nas“.



▲ Graf 2.

Kako je Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović prikazana u objavi?


Tehnika privatizacije kojom se Grabar-Kitarović uvjerljivo najviše služila za vrijeme svoje kampanje, i to u gotovo polovici svojih objava, je prikazivanje sebe u interakciji s građanima (48,72 %), dok je u trećini objava prikazana u neformalnom okruženju (33,33 %). Njezin suprug Jakov Kitarović bio je prisutan u 12,82 %, a tek u 7,69 % objava podijelila je neke detalje iz svoga privatnog života, pretežito vezane uz svoje podrijetlo i užu obitelj. Podrška slavnih osoba u njezinim je objavama zastupljena u samo 5,13 % objava.

Tablica 3. Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović

Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović	
Prisutnost supruge/supruga	12,82 %
Prisutnost poznatih osoba iz svijeta showbusinessa, sporta ili kulture	5,13 %
Kandidatkinja je prikazana u neformalnom, svakodnevnom okruženju	33,33 %
Kandidatkinja je prikazana u interakciji s građanima	48,72 %
Kandidatkinja otkriva informacije iz privatnog života	7,69 %
Referiranje na religiju	14,10 %
UKUPNO	100

### Zoran Milanović

Kandidat SDP-a Zoran Milanović u analiziranom razdoblju objavio je ukupno 80 objava, a u *Grafikonu 3.* prikazani su formati tih objava. Njih 60 % objavljeno je u formatu fotografije i teksta. Potom slijede objave u formatu videa i teksta s 24 % te galerija fotografija i teksta s 14 %.



▲ Graf 3.  
Format objava Zorana Milanovića

Milanović je glavni akter u 63,75 % analiziranih objava. Potom slijedi veliki postotak objava u kojima nije bilo moguće odrediti glavnog aktera, u njih čak 22,50 %. Razlog tome je taj što je kandidat u velikoj mjeri objavljivao fotografije s porukama koje nisu sadržavale njegov lik, kao ni pozivnice na predizborne skupove koje čine 15,00 % svih analiziranih objava. „Obični građanin“ ili građani glavni su akteri u 5 % objava, jednako kao i kombinacija kandidata i predstavnika stranke. Od članova SDP-a, u Milanovićevim objavama pojavljivali su se članovi Predsjedništva SDP-a Biljana Borzan i Domagoj Hajduković te istaknuti član SDP-a Orsat Miljenić.



Tablica 4. Glavni akteri u objavama Zorana Milanovića


Glavni akteri u objavama Zorana Milanovića	
Kandidat	63,75 %
Predstavnik stranke	/
Građanin	5,00 %
Predstavnik određene društvene ili interesne skupine	/
Slavna osoba	/
Član obitelji	/
Kandidat + predstavnik stranke	5,00 %
Kandidat + član obitelji (supruga Sanja Musić Milanović)	3,75 %
Nije moguće odrediti	22,50 %
UKUPNO	100

Najavivši početak svoje kampanje sloganom „predsjednik s karakterom“, bilo je jasno kako će Milanović u središte svoje kampanje staviti upravo svoj osebujni karakter. Isticanje sebe, svog karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća bila je dominantna strategija u 26,25 % objava. U 25 % objava kao dominantnu strategiju koristio je poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijizam i/ili davanje obećanja za budućnost. Svoje protivnike i/ili stranke koje su ih predložile za kandidate često je u svojim objavama napadao, a time se kao dominantnom strategijom služio u 20 % svojih objava. Na Miroslava Škoru neizravno se referirao u samo tri objave, a glavne mete njegovih napada u najvećoj su mjeri bile Grabar-Kitarović i stranka HDZ. *Tablica 5.* prikazuje strategije kojima se Milanović koristio u svojoj kampanji.

Tablica 5. Dominantna strategija u objavama Zorana Milanovića

Dominantna strategija u objavama Zorana Milanovića	
Napad na protivnike i/ili stranke koje su ih predložile za kandidate	20,00 %
Isticanje domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije	5,00 %
Isticanje kandidata, njegova/njezina karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća kao glavni razlog glasovanja za tog kandidata	26,25 %
Isticanje kandidata kao osobu blisku narodu, okruženu građanima	6,25 %
Poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijizam i/ili davanje obećanja za budućnost	25,00 %
Podrška slavni osoba	/
Humor ili ironija	/
Poziv na predizborni skup	15,00 %
Ostalo	2,50 %
UKUPNO	100

U više od pola svojih objava Milanović je prikazan kao državnik (51 %). Kao „jedan od nas“ nastojao se prikazati u 14 % objava, dok je u 10 % objava kombinirao prikazivanje sebe kao državnika i običnog građanina. Za 25 % objava nije bilo moguće odrediti kako je kandidat prikazan, budući da njegova lika u objavi nije bilo.



▲ Graf 4.

Kako je Zoran Milanović prikazan u objavi?


Baš kao i u slučaju njegove protukandidatkinje Grabar-Kitarović, prikazivanje u interakciji s građanima bila je tehnika privatizacije političara kojom se Milanović najčešće koristio u svojim objavama, u 16,25 % analiziranih objava. U nešto manjem postotku, u 15% objava, Milanović je prikazan u neformalnom okruženju. Milanovićeva supruga Sanja pojavljuje se u 10 % objava, a u samo 6,25 % objava Milanović je dijelio informacije iz svoga privatnog života, koje se pretežito odnose na njegovu obitelj i razdoblje koje je proveo izvan politike. U analiziranom razdoblju Milanovićeve kampanje nije zabilježena nijedna objava na kojoj su prisutne slavne osobe iz svijeta *showbusinessa*, sporta ili kulture.

Tablica 6. Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Zorana Milanovića

Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Zorana Milanovića	
Prisutnost supruge/supruga	10,00 %
Prisutnost poznatih osoba iz svijeta showbusinessa, sporta ili kulture	/
Kandidat je prikazan u neformalnom, svakodnevnom okruženju	15,00 %
Kandidat je prikazan u interakciji s građanima	16,25 %
Kandidat otkriva informacije iz privatnog života	6,25 %
Referiranje na religiju	2,50 %
UKUPNO	100

## Miroslav Škoro

Miroslav Škoro predsjednički je kandidat koji je u svojoj kampanji objavio najviše objava, njih 85. Objave u formatu videa i teksta dominirale su u njegovoj kampanji s 38 %, dok su u 35 % slučajeva objave bile u formatu fotografije i teksta.



▲ Graf 5.  
Format objava Miroslava Škore

Škoro je glavni akter u 69,41 % svojih objava. Kao i u slučaju Zorana Milanovića, u gotovo istom postotku, u 22,35 % Škorinih objava nije bilo moguće odrediti glavnog aktera u objavi zbog velikog broja objava u formi teksta (15 %) te zbog fotografija s porukom koje nisu sadržavale Škorin lik. Zatim s istim postotkom od 3,53 % slijede građani kao glavni akteri objave te kombinacija kandidata i slavne osobe, među kojima su pjevači Jacques Houdek, Tiho Orlić i Marko Pecotić te glumac Vedran Mlikota.

Tablica 7. Glavni akter u objavama Miroslava Škore

Glavni akter u objavama Miroslava Škore	
Kandidat	69,41 %
Predstavnik stranke	/
Građanin	3,53 %
Predstavnik određene društvene ili interesne skupine	/
Slavna osoba	/
Član obitelji	/
Kandidat + član obitelji	1,18 %
Kandidat + slavna osoba	3,53 %
Nije moguće odrediti	22,35 %
TOTAL	100

Poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijazam i/ili davanje obećanja za budućnost dominantna je strategija u 36,47 % Škorinih objava. Uspoređujući s protukandidatima, Škoro je na svom *Facebooku* najčešće kao dominantnu strategiju koristio napad na svoje protivnike, odnosno stranke koje ih podržavaju (21,18 %).


Isticanje domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije bila je dominantna strategija u 12,94 % Škorinih objava, dok je isticanje sebe, svog karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća kao dominantnu strategiju koristio u 7,06 % objava. Pretežito je isticao svoje poduzetničko radno iskustvo i sebe kao nezavisnoga kandidata.

U jednakom postotku, kao jedini među kandidatima obuhvaćenim ovom analizom, koristio je humor kao dominantnu strategiju objave. Posebice se koristio tom taktikom u vrijeme predizborne šutnje, koju je kršio kada je tijekom 21. i 22. prosinca objavio četiri objave u formatu fotografije i teksta, u kojima je na humorističan način pozivao građane da izađu na birališta.

Tablica 8. Dominantna strategija u objavama Miroslava Škore

Dominantna strategija u objavama Miroslava Škore	
Napad na protivnike i/ili stranke koje su ih predložile za kandidate	21,18 %
Isticanje domoljublja, podržavanja tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije	12,94 %
Isticanje kandidata, njegova/njezina karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća kao glavni razlog glasovanja za tog kandidata	7,06 %
Isticanje kandidata kao osobu blisku narodu, antielitista	2,35 %
Poziv na promjene, isticanje optimizma za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijazam i/ili davanje obećanja za budućnost	36,47 %
Podrška slavni osoba	/
Humor ili ironija	7,06 %
Poziv na predizborni skup	5,88 %
Ostalo	/
TOTAL	100

Iznenadujuće, Škoro je od svih analiziranih kandidata u najvećem postotku objava prikazan kao državnik (62 %). Najmanje se prikazivao kao jedan od nas, u 7 % objava, a tek u 5 % objava kombinirao je prikazivanje sebe kao državnika i „jednog od nas“. Jedan od mogućih razloga koji bi objasnio takve podatke jest taj što je Škoro osoba koja dolazi iz svijeta *showbusinessa* i koja je, naspram svojih protukandidata, politički neiskusna. Škoro, kao pjevač po zanimanju, u svojoj kampanji naprosto nije imao potrebu sebe dodatno „humanizirati“, već mu je glavni zadatak bio da sebe predstavi kao ozbiljnog političara te da se makne od imidža estradnog pjevača.



▲ Graf 6.

Kako je Miroslav Škoro prikazan u objavama?

Referiranje na religiju najčešća je tehnika privatizacije kojom se Škoro koristio, u 18,82 % svojih objava. Najmanje od kandidata prikazivao se u neformalnom okruženju (11,77 %) i u interakciji s građanima (10,59 %), a više od drugih protukandidata dijelio je informacije iz privatnog života, koje se uglavnom odnose na njegovo podrijetlo i privatni posao (9,41 %) objava. U istom postotku u njegovim objavama bile su prisutne poznate osobe iz svijeta *showbusinessa*, sporta ili kulture.

Tablica 9. Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Miroslava Škore

Tehnike privatizacije u objavama Miroslava Škore	
Prisutnost supruge/supruga	4,71 %
Prisutnost poznatih osoba iz svijeta <i>showbusinessa</i> , sporta ili kulture	9,41 %
Kandidat je prikazan u neformalnom, svakodnevnom okruženju	11,77 %
Kandidat je prikazan u interakciji s građanima	10,59 %
Kandidat otkriva informacije iz privatnog života	9,41 %
Referiranje na religiju	18,82 %
UKUPNO	100

## ZAKLJUČAK

Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da su kandidati na hrvatskim predsjedničkim izborima 2019./2020. u značajnoj mjeri koristili *Facebook* za privatizaciju, odnosno personalizaciju politike. Koristili su različite tehnike i u različitoj mjeri, ali s istim ciljem – kako bi se približili biračima i djelovali im kao „jedni od nas“.

Grabar-Kitarović u analiziranom razdoblju objavila je 78 objava, od kojih je najveći broj bio u formatu fotografije i teksta te galerije fotografija i teksta. Uspoređujući je s protu-

kandidatima, objavila je najviše fotografija, ali i najmanje objava u videoformatu. U gotovo 75 posto objava Grabar-Kitarović je glavni akter objave, što potvrđuje da je vodila personaliziranu političku kampanju. U značajnom dijelu objava uz sebe je imala i predstavnike Hrvatske demokratske zajednice iz čega proizlazi da joj je jedan od ciljeva u kampanji na *Facebooku* bio zadržavanje naklonost birača te političke stranke. Tome u prilog ide i podatak da je najčešća dominantna strategija u njezinim objavama bila isticanje domoljublja, podržavanje tradicionalnih vrijednosti, zajedništva i/ili ideologije. Usto, isticala je pobjednički entuzijazam i davala obećanja za budućnost, prikazivala se kao osoba bliska narodu i pozivala birače na predizborne skupove. Svoje vrline i karakter u objavama nije isticala te je samim time propustila priliku da se istakne među ostalim kandidatima. Grabar-Kitarović najmanje se kao dominantnom strategijom služila napadima na protukandidate. Fokus njezine kampanje bio je usmjeren na to da se prikaže kao kandidatkinja bliska narodu, što potvrđuje i podatak da je u polovini svojih objava u potpunosti ili djelomično prikazana kao „jedna od nas“. Pritom se najčešće služila tehnikom prikazivanja u interakciji s građanima i prikazivanjem u neformalnom okruženju. U svojim objavama uspješno je „humanizirala“ svoj imidž i ostavila dojam „žene iz naroda“.

Milanović je u analiziranom razdoblju objavio 80 objava koje su najčešće bile u formatu fotografije i teksta te videa i teksta. U 63,75% objava Milanović je glavni akter, a najčešće se kao dominantnom strategijom koristio isticanjem sebe, svog karaktera, vještina ili dosadašnjih postignuća. Pored toga, pozivao je na promjene te žestoko napadao protukandidatkinju Grabar-Kitarović i stranku HDZ. Svoj osebujni karakter i komunikacijski stil, koji je javnost imala priliku upoznati dok je obnašao funkciju predsjednika Vlade, stavio je u središte kampanje i javnosti se predstavio kao autentičan kandidat koji ima čvrst stav. Sarkastično-podcjenjivačku komunikaciju o kojoj piše Grbeša-Zenzerović (2014) uspio je obuzdati te je u vrijeme ove kampanje nastojao „humanizirati“ svoj imidž. U većini objava prikazivao se kao državnik, no također se i u značajnom postotku objava prikazivao u neformalnom okruženju, u interakciji s građanima ili u društvu supruge. Iskoristio je potencijal društvenih mreža da istakne svoju osobnost i stvori osobni brend te je naposljetku pobijedio u drugom krugu predsjedničkih izbora.

Škoro je objavio najviše objava, njih 87, od čega je najveći dio objava bio u formatu videa i teksta, a zatim i fotografija i teksta. U gotovo 70 posto objava Škoro je glavni akter, a u svojim objavama najčešće je pozivao na promjene, isticao optimizam za budućnost, pobjednički entuzijazam i/ili davao obećanja za budućnost. U usporedbi s protukandidatima, na svom je *Facebooku* najčešće kao dominantnu strategiju koristio napad na svoje protivnike, odnosno stranke koje ih podržavaju. Taj podatak ne iznenađuje, budući da je Škoro populist koji je čitavu svoju kampanju temeljio na napadima na vladajuće elite. Sebe je predstavljao kao „predsjednika iz naroda“, no istodobno se najmanje u kampanji na *Facebooku* prikazivao kao „jedan od nas“. Za razliku od protukandidata, u puno manjoj mjeri je sebe prikazivao u interakciji s ljudima ili u neformalnom okruženju. Mogući razlog tome leži u činjenici da je Škoro osoba koja dolazi iz svijeta *showbusinessa* i koja je do kandidature za predsjednika Republike imala tek nekoliko mjeseci iskustva u aktivnoj politici. Njemu je u ovoj kampanji veći izazov predstavljalo da sebe afirmira kao ozbiljnog političara i državnika nego kao osobu iz naroda. Ostavlja se otvoreno pitanje bi li Škoro osvojio

više glasova u prvom krugu da se u većoj mjeri služio tehnikama privatizacije politike. Kao i Grabar-Kitarović, nije isticao svoje privatne osobine i karakter. Unatoč tome što nije ušao u drugi krug, ostvario je značajan uspjeh i time se pozicionirao na hrvatskoj političkoj sceni. Uspoređujući s prethodnim istraživanjima privatizacije na društvenim mrežama u Hrvatskoj, ovo istraživanje pokazalo je da su se kandidati u velikoj mjeri služili tehnikama privatizacije politike. Pobjedu na izborima odnio je „predsjednik s karakterom“ koji se uspješno istaknuo među ostalim kandidatima, naglašavajući svoje privatne osobine i dosadašnja postignuća. Daljnja istraživanja fenomena privatizacije politike u Hrvatskoj mogla bi ponuditi odgovor na pitanje je li značajno korištenje tehnika privatizacije politike na predsjedničkim izborima dio trenda koji će se nastaviti te kako korištenje komunikacijske strategije u čijem su središtu osebjuni karakter i privatne osobine kandidata utječu na rezultate izbora.

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## POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF THE CANDIDATES ON SOCIAL NETWORKS IN 2019-2020 CROATIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Gabriela Galić :: Domagoj Bebić

**ABSTRACT** *The rise of "candidate-centered politics" has influenced a change in communication strategies of politicians who are increasingly using privatisation techniques to get closer to their voters. Social media have proven to be an ideal channel for "softening" their images. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether, and to what extent, the candidates used social media for privatization, i.e., personalization of politics, in the 2019-2020 Croatian presidential election. Using the content analysis method, researchers discovered that the candidates significantly used privatization techniques on social media to present themselves as "one of us". The winner of the election was Zoran Milanović, who led a completely personalized campaign in which he emphasized rather frequently his distinctive character and his personal characteristics.*

### KEY WORDS

CROATIA, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, FACEBOOK, PRIVATISATION OF POLITICS

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# DRUŠTVENA REPREZENTACIJA NOVIH PSIHOAKTIVNIH SUPSTANCI NA HRVATSKIM PORTALIMA

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**SAŽETAK** U članku se medijska reprezentacija novih psihoaktivnih supstanci razmatra primjenom teorije društvene reprezentacije. Budući da nove psihoaktivne supstance u hrvatskom društvenom kontekstu predstavljaju relativno nepoznat fenomen, u članku je obrazložena analitička upotrebljivost komunikativnih mehanizama društvene reprezentacije koji se mogu koristiti u istraživanju medija. S tom svrhom provedena je analiza sadržaja priloga o novim psihoaktivnim supstancama koji su u razdoblju od sedam godina objavljeni na odabranim hrvatskim internetskim portalima. Rezultati su pokazali da imenovanje, emocionalno sidrenje i emocionalno upredmećivanje predstavljaju ključne komunikativne mehanizme u procesu medijski posredovane društvene reprezentacije novih psihoaktivnih supstanci. Analiza implicitnih temeljnih vrijednosti sadržanih u objavljenim člancima pokazala je da se isticanjem zdravstvenih rizika i slabosti u djelovanju društvene kontrole, nove psihoaktivne supstance konvencionaliziraju preko teme „društvo bez droga“.

## KLJUČNE RIJEČI

NOVE PSIHOAKTIVNE SUPSTANCE, DRUŠTVENA REPREZENTACIJA, SIDRENJE, UPREDMEĆIVANJE, UPOTREBA DROGA

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## UVOD

Pojava novih i nepoznatih supstanci karakterizira cjelokupnu modernu epohu tijekom koje su globalizirane i povećane proizvodnja, trgovina i upotreba niza psihoaktivnih proizvoda (Jamieson, 2001; Wallerstein, 1986). Prevladavajući obrazac u tom procesu najčešće se zasnivao na nekoliko faza, počevši od razmatranja mogućnosti medicinske primjene novih tvari, preko širenja nekontrolirane upotrebe iz užitka, nerijetko praćene ovisnošću i zdravstvenim tegobama, do pokušaja regulacije već etablirane upotrebe u terminima komercijalizacije i stvaranja sustava legalne trgovine takvim proizvodima (Courtwright, 2001). Razvoji na području medicine, prema Courtwrightu, tijekom 19. stoljeća ubrzali su proces širenja upotrebe psihoaktivnih sredstava i stvorili svojevrstan „sintetički psihoaktivni okvir“ u kojem su se etablirale danas ilegalne droge poput heroina i kokaina. Premda su ubrzani razvoji na području farmakologije na prijelazu u 20 stoljeće rezultirali identificiranjem novih psihoaktivnih sastojaka (ibogain, harmin i harmalin, MDA, a 1943. i LSD), sve do pred kraj 20. stoljeća taj okvir ostao je relativno jednostavan, sa spomenutim etabliranim drogama u njegovu središtu.

Krajem 20. stoljeća proces sintetizacije novih tvari ponovno se intenzivira, najprije u proizvodnji i rekreativnoj upotrebi ecstasija (MDMA), ketamina i gama-hidroksibutirata (GBH), a potom se u 21. stoljeću dodatno ubrzava ilegalnom proizvodnjom niza novih psihoaktivnih kemijskih spojeva koji u značajnijoj mjeri počinju zauzimati niše u postojećim tržištima rekreativne upotrebe droga (Reuter i Pardo, 2016). Ured Ujedinjenih naroda za drogu i kriminal promovirao je naziv „nove psihoaktivne supstance“ (*new psychoactive substances*, u daljnjem tekstu: NPS) koje se definiraju kao nove narkotičke i psihotropne droge koje „nisu pod kontrolom konvencija Ujedinjenih naroda o drogama, ali koje mogu predstavljati javnozdravstvenu prijetnju usporedivu onoj koju predstavljaju supstance već navedene u tim konvencijama“ (Council Decision, 2005/387/JHA, prema Pirona i sur., 2016). Kako na međunarodnoj tako i na nacionalnim razinama, politika prema drogama ubrzo se suočila s nemogućnošću da na učinkovit način prati snažnu dinamiku i kompleksnost NPS-a (Seddon, 2014). Usto, razvoj interneta na kojem je moguće pronaći informacije o kemijskim sintezama s ciljem ilegalne proizvodnje, globaliziranim kripto-tržištima i forumima za razmjenu znanja i iskustava, omogućio je da proizvodnja, trgovina i upotreba kontinuirano ostaju u prednosti pred postojećim regulativama (Seddon, 2014). Prema Sustavu ranog upozorenja Europske unije (EU EWS) broj novih prijavljenih tvari ubrzano je rastao od 2005. godine (Lugarić, 2018) kada je registrirano 13 novih supstanci, a vrhunac je doživio u 2014. godini u kojoj je registrirana 101 nova psihoaktivna supstanca. Nakon toga broj novih godišnje registriranih supstanci opao je na 51 u 2017. i 55 u 2018. godini (EMCDDA, 2019).

U službenim izvješćima kao i u većini istraživanja NPS se razmatra kroz tri skupine. Prvu i najveću skupinu čine sintetički kanabinoidi namijenjeni legalnoj prodaji, nerijetko kroz proizvode koji se promoviraju kao dodaci mirisima i osvježivači zraka i odražavaju povećanu potražnju za kanabisom (Reuter i Pardo, 2016). Drugu skupinu čine sintetski katinoni, koji se nerijetko koriste kao zamjena za ecstasy (MDMA), amfetamin i kokain i

prodaju se u obliku „soli za kupanje“ (Favretto i sur., 2013). Napokon, opiodi poput fentanila čine treću skupinu novih psihoaktivnih supstanci, prodaju se kao zamjena za heroin i predstavljaju posebnu prijetnju zdravlju.

Prevalenciju upotrebe novih psihoaktivnih supstanci u Europi još uvijek nije jednostavno utvrditi s obzirom na varijacije u uzorcima i primijenjenim metodologijama (Pirona i sur., 2016). Stopa isprobavanja 2014. godine iznosila je do 8 % među odraslim osobama u pojedinim zemljama Europske unije (EMCDDA, 2015), uz niz varijacija s obzirom na uže definirane dobne skupine i vrste NPS-a. Razine konzumacije novih psihoaktivnih supstanci na planu procjene godišnje stope prevalencije u Europi sveukupno su niske i u odrasloj populaciji kretale su se od 0,1 % u Norveškoj 2019. godine, do 3,2 % u Nizozemskoj 2016. (EMCDDA, 2019). Rezultati hrvatskog istraživanja na općoj populaciji (Glavak Tkalić, 2018) također su upozorili na nisku prevalenciju novih psihoaktivnih supstanci – probalo ih je 2,7 % odrasle populacije, a 1,3 % tijekom protekle godine. Najveći dio isprobavanja i korištenja odnosi se na sintetičke kanabinoide, a upotreba je najizraženija među mladim osobama (EMCDDA, 2019; Glavak Tkalić, 2018). Kada se fokus istraživanja pomakne od opće populacije prema ciljanim skupinama, poput redovitih posjetitelja noćnih klubova ili osoba koje injektiraju droge, stope prevalencije su veće i na takve skupine odnose se povećane razine zabrinutosti, poglavito kada je riječ o problematičnim oblicima upotrebe i pripadajućim štetama (EMCDDA, 2019; Pirona i sur., 2016).

NPS još uvijek predstavljaju relativnu nepoznanicu na planu 'javnog znanja'. Njihova upotreba praćena je moralnom indignacijom (Young, 1972) koja se i inače intenzivira u razdobljima pojave novih droga (Forsyth, 2001; Goode, 2008; Goode i Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Pritom, uloga medija istaknuta je u terminima artikulanog, a nerijetko i ideološkog oblikovanja ideja povezanih s drogama (Kordić i sur., 2017).

U istraživanjima medijske reprezentacije NPS potvrđeni su raznoliki utjecaji na šire kolektivne predodžbe, trendove u upotrebi i zaokrete u službenim politikama (Alexandrescu, 2018). Miller i sur. (2014) utvrdili su da je medijsko izvještavanje o sintetičkim kanabinoidima i „solima za kupanje“ u SAD-u u razdoblju od 2005. do 2013. godine bilo tijesno povezano s poduzetim zakonskim mjerama i njihovom zabranom. Istraživanja prikaza NPS-a u mađarskim *online* medijima pokazala su prevladavajući pristup prema kojem se radi o problemima „drugih“, pretežno socioekonomski depriviranih ruralnih i gradskih manjinskih skupina, pri čemu su korisničke informacije u potpunosti izostavljene (Kassai i sur., 2016; Pelbat i sur., 2016). Swalve i DeFoster analizirale su medijske prikaze NPS-a pri izvještavanju o nasilničkim sukobima u Miamiu 2012. godine izdvajajući, kao dominantne, senzacionalističke opise incidenata i s njima povezanih droga, opise upotrebe „soli za kupanje“ kao epidemije i zahtjeve za oštrijim kažnjavanjem njihovih korisnika (Swalve i DeFoster, 2016). Napokon, Alexandrescu je u komparativnoj analizi britanskih i rumunjskih medija upozorila na klasnu pristranost u izvještavanju o NPS s dominantnim portretiranjem korisnika iz srednje klase kao „naivnih“, ali inherentno vrijednih pripadnika društva za razliku od prikaza „prijezira vrijednih“ pripadnika marginaliziranih skupina, u medijima nerijetko zahvaćenih kroz termine zaraze i prijetnje društvu (Alexandrescu, 2018).

Budući da NPS u Hrvatskoj također predstavljaju nov fenomen o kojem se malo zna, smatrali smo da analiza njihove medijske reprezentacije omogućuje identificiranje dominantnih predodžbi koje mogu predstavljati konstitutivne elemente u formiranju 'javnog znanja' o tom fenomenu. Pritom smo smatrali da je u dijelu spomenutih studija utjecaj medija kvalificiran kao pretežno hegemonijski, a na planu dosega uglavnom kao determinirajući čimbenik u oblikovanju širih društvenih i zdravorazumskih predodžbi, što nije uvijek podložno provjeri (Skoko i Vrdoljak, 2018). Oslonili smo se na teoriju društvene reprezentacije kao mogući okvir za razmatranje medijski posredovanih predodžbi o NPS-u u kojem medijski prikazi predstavljaju tek jedan od čimbenika u procesu konvencionalizacije nekog novog i nepoznatog fenomena s kojim se društvena zbilja nerijetko oblikuje kroz osjećaje tjeskobe, straha i neizvjesnosti.

## TEORIJA DRUŠTVENE REPREZENTACIJE

Koncept društvene reprezentacije zasnovan je u okviru kognitivne socijalne psihologije, a elaboriran je u radovima Sergeja Moscovicija. Među brojnim Moscovicijevim određenjima društvene reprezentacije moguće je izdvojiti sljedeće u kojem ona označava:

sustav vrijednosti, ideja i praksi s dvostrukom funkcijom: prvo, da uspostavi poredak koji će omogućiti pojedincima da se orijentiraju u svojem materijalnom i društvenom svijetu i da njime ovladaju; i drugo, da omogući komunikaciji da zauzme mjesto među članovima društva dajući im kod za društvenu razmjenu, te kod za nedvosmisleno imenovanje i klasificiranje različitih aspekata njihovih svjetova i njihovih grupnih povijesti. (Moscovici, 1973, str. xiii, prema Höjjer, 2011, str. 5)

Premda Moscovici upućuje na pojam društvene reprezentacije na različite načine, ovisno o kontekstu na koji ga primjenjuje (Liu, 2004), ključne odrednice upućuju na to da se društvena reprezentacija generira u procesu društvene interakcije i komunikacije, kako bi na specifičan način konvencionalizirala objekte, osobe ili događaje s kojima se susrećemo (Lugarić, 2018) i kako bi ih postupno etablirala u terminima distinktivnih i dijeljenih spoznaja (Moscovici, 2000). Budući da neki objekti, osobe i događaji mogu predstavljati novost i nepoznanicu u nekom društvenom kontekstu, društvena reprezentacija predstavlja svojevrsno „prevođenje“ nečega složenog i apstraktnog u korpus „društvenog znanja“ putem prilagodbe već etabliranim i prihvaćenim vrijednostima i uvjerenjima (Joffe, 2003).

Stoga, društvenu reprezentaciju Moscovici smatra „preskriptivnom“ jer na podlozi već uspostavljenih struktura i tradicije determinira načine na koje članovi društva sagledavaju svijet oko sebe (Moscovici, 2000). Ipak, s obzirom na fragmentiranost suvremenih društava taj determinizam nije neosporiv, što znači da se društvene reprezentacije uspostavljaju, ali i s vremenom mijenjaju u procesu interakcije i komunikacije različitih aktera koji sudjeluju u njihovu formiranju.

Moscovici (2000) spominje dva sociokognitivna komunikativna mehanizma koji generiraju društvenu reprezentaciju – *sidrenje* i *upredmećivanje*. Sidrenjem kategoriziramo i

imenujemo nešto što nam je strano i što ne možemo opisati te ga zbog toga doživljavamo kao nešto nepostojeće i kao prijatnu (Moscovici, 2000). Budući da to rezultira otporom i distanciranjem, prema Moscoviciju, ljudi obično posežu za klasificiranjem i imenovanjem, ponajprije usporedbom uočenog fenomena s već poznatim prototipima za koje se pretpostavlja da ga mogu reprezentirati.

Höijer (2011) uz imenovanje navodi još nekoliko mehanizama sidrenja. *Emocionalno sidrenje* predstavlja komunikativni mehanizam kojim se, napose u medijima, nov fenomen interpretira upućivanjem na uvriježene emocije poput osjećaja odgovornosti zbog individualnog i kolektivnog sudjelovanja u konzumiranju proizvoda neposredno povezanih s klimatskom krizom. *Tematsko sidrenje* predstavlja dubinsku strukturu neke društvene reprezentacije, a prema Liu (2004) upućuje na povijesno ukotvljene i kulturno zasnovane antonimije koje nisu uvijek podložne neposrednom opažanju. Moscovici se u tom smislu koristio terminom „temat(i)“, upućujući na temeljne kolektivne ideje koje u specifičnim društvenim okolnostima posreduju u oblikovanju društvenih reprezentacija (Höijer, 2011). Radi se o implicitnim vrijednostima ili načelima koji upravljaju društvenim reprezentacijama i koje u njima tek trebaju biti prepoznate (Liu, 2004, str. 256). *Sidrenje u antonimima* upućuje na pojavu prema kojoj se davanje smisla nečemu zasniva na sposobnosti kreiranja distinkcija, tj. promišljanja fenomena iz svijeta oko nas u terminima suprotnosti i polariteta (Markova, 2003). Höijer (2011) upućuju na to da su antonimi vidljivi u medijskoj reprezentaciji klimatskih promjena, posebno na planu naglašavanja krivnje i nedužnosti. Napokon, *sidrenje putem metafora* omogućuje da stvari i fenomeni postanu razumljivima u terminima prenesenog značenja, tj. da ih se prema načelu sličnosti osmisli „kao nešto drugo“ (Höijer, 2011, str. 11), već poznato. U slučaju klimatskih promjena planet se pretežno opisuje kao „bolestan“ i kao „sve bliže smrti“. U tom smislu metafore ne samo da naglašavaju ozbiljnost problema već ga istodobno povezuju s našim egzistencijalnim bojaznima (Höijer, 2011).

Upredmećivanje predstavlja drugi komunikativni mehanizam generiranja društvene reprezentacije koji omogućuje da relativno strane i nerazumljive ideje poprime konkretne obrise koji ih povezuju s realnim i opipljivim svijetom. Upredmećivanjem se nešto što je „ispočetka spoznato u nekom intelektualnom i udaljenom univerzumu pred našim očima pojavljuje kao utjelovljeno i dohvatljivo“ (Moscovici, 2000, str. 49). Prema Moscoviciju, materijalizacija, odnosno upredmećivanje apstrakcije, inherentna je ljudskoj misli i govoru i omogućuje da ikonička obilježja neke nejasne ideje budu pretočena u koncept ili predodžbu – poput predodžbe u kojoj je Bog predstavljen kao otac i u kojoj nešto nevidljivo trenutno postaje dostupno našem umu i percipirano u terminima konkretne osobe kojoj se možemo izravno obraćati (Moscovici, 2000). Najvažnija značajka upredmećivanja sugerira da materijalizirane slike i predodžbe neke ideje predstavljaju zdravorazumsko i „društveno znanje“ o njoj samoj.

Höijer (2011) razmatra dva tipa upredmećivanja: *emocionalno upredmećivanje* i *upredmećivanje putem personifikacije*. Prvi uključuje snažnu emocionalnu komponentu poput vijesti koje klimatske promjene upredmećuju u slikama poplava, požara itd. (Höijer, 2011).

Drugim, personifikacijom, „neke ideje ili fenomeni postaju povezani sa specifičnim ljudima, kao kad, npr. Gandhi personificira nenasilnu političku borbu“ (Höijer, 2011, str. 13). Höijer tvrdi da je povezivanje nečega uz poznate javne ličnosti popularan diskurzivni mehanizam koji se u medijima koristi s ciljem usmjeravanja pozornosti.

Važnost uloge medija u generiranju društvenih reprezentacija nekih, poglavito novih i u terminima rizika raspravljanih fenomena, potvrđena je i u drugim istraživanjima. Kako navodi Joffe (2003), prvi kontakt običnih ljudi s potencijalnim opasnostima ne odvija se isključivo u njihovoj međusobnoj komunikaciji, nego i putem medijski posredovanih vijesti. Pritom, složeno i ekspertno znanje pojednostavljuje se i senzacionalizira uspostavljajući okvir za javne rasprave u kojima pitanja odgovornosti i krivnje bivaju postavljena u prvi plan. Primjerice, analize ranih društvenih reprezentacija sifilisa i AIDS-a pokazuju da su obje bolesti „sidrene kroz smrt, stigmatu, nemoralno ponašanje i pravednu kaznu“ (Joffe, 2003, str. 63). Joffe upozorava da pri razmatranju medijski generiranih društvenih reprezentacija treba voditi računa o ograničenosti njihova utjecaja na laičko znanje, kao i o tome da je vrijednosna dimenzija sadržana već u tzv. ekspertnom znanju koje prethodi medijskom inventorijskom. Ipak, u procesu transformacije reificiranog znanstvenog univerzuma u laičko mišljenje, mediji predstavljaju jedan od najvažnijih aktera i kao takvi naznačeni su već u Moscovicijevim radovima u kontekstu potrebe za „rekonstitucijom“ zdravorazumskog i na emocijama zasnovanog razumijevanja niza novih i s rizicima povezanih fenomena (Moscovici, 1984).

Medijski prikazi NPS-a predstavljaju važan, premda ne i jedini, aspekt generiranja društvene reprezentacije fenomena koji se u suvremenim društvima pojavljuje kao nov, otprije nepoznat u javnom diskursu, potencijalno opasan na planu zdravlja i podložan različitim tumačenjima. Gotovo svi spomenuti mehanizmi generiranja društvene reprezentacije upotrebljivi su za istraživanje medijske reprezentacije NPS: od sidrenja u terminima njihova imenovanja, emocionalno zasnovanih prosudbi o njihovom karakteru i upotrebi, tematskog sidrenja u okvirima postojećih ideoloških i sociokulturnih predodžbi o drogama i društvu, polariziranih stavova i na metaforama zasnovanih prikaza do emocionalnog i na personifikaciji zasnovanog upredmećivanja.

Stoga je osnovni cilj istraživanja bio utvrditi obrasce društvene reprezentacije NPS u dijelu hrvatskih medija. Usto, željeli smo utvrditi koji su komunikativni mehanizmi u najvećoj mjeri zastupljeni u društvenoj reprezentaciji NPS-a u odabranim medijima. Napokon, kvalitativnom analizom nastojali smo razabrati elemente dubinske strukture analiziranih članaka koje se u referentnoj literaturi obično zahvaća terminom *tema* (Liu, 2004; Moscovici, 1984). Istraživanje je provedeno zaključno sa srpnjem 2018. godine, zahvaćajući razdoblje od nekoliko godina tijekom kojih je izvještavanje o NPS-u postalo učestalije. Smatrali smo da teorija društvene reprezentacije omogućuje uvid u obrasce medijskog posredovanja u procesu oblikovanja „društvenog znanja“ o NPS.



## METODA I UZORAK

U istraživanju smo se koristili kvalitativnom i kvantitativnom analizom sadržaja priloga koji su o NPS-u objavljeni na odabranim nacionalnim, dnevnim internetskim portalima. Početne kategorije određene su uz upotrebu komunikativnih mehanizama sidrenja i upredmećivanja koje je u istraživanju društvene reprezentacije klimatskih promjena razvila Höijer (2011). To su: imenovanje, emocionalno sidrenje, sidrenje u metaforama, sidrenje u antonimima, emocionalno upredmećivanje i upredmećivanje putem personifikacije. Tijekom probne analize kodiranjem je razvijen dio preliminarnih tema, a uključen je i dodatni komunikativni mehanizam „sidrenje u etabliranim drogama“ s namjerom da utvrdimo u kojoj mjeri imenovanje NPS korespondira s njihovom taksonomijom prema kojoj ih se i promatra kao zamjenu za otprije poznate ilegalne droge.

Jedinice analize čine članci o NPS-u koji su putem ključnih riječi („droga“, „nove droge“, „nove psihoaktivne supstance“ i niza uličnih i službenih naziva proizvoda) prikupljeni na tražilicama odabranih internetskih portala. Jedinice analize zahvaćaju tekstualni sadržaj i naslove tih članaka i ne uključuju popratne ilustracije i komentare čitatelja. Spomenuti pojmovi bilježeni su i sa svrhom kodiranja jer su procijenjeni kao relevantni za razvrstavanje u komunikativne mehanizme i jer u generičkim terminima upućuju na NPS (nove psihoaktivne supstance, nova droga i sl.) ili predstavljaju njihove ulične nazive („Galaxy“, „Spice“, „sintetski kanabinoidi“, „katinoni“, „soli za kupanje“, „Blow“, „Krokodil“ itd.). Bilježeni su i pojmovi koji izazivaju emocije (smrt, patnja, zdravlje), pojmovi koji upućuju na neke uključene društvene kategorije (mladi, roditelji, službe društvene kontrole, stručnjaci) itd. Kontekstualne jedinice sastojale su se od tekstualnog okvira unutar kojeg se iscrpljuje opis jedinica bilježenja. Prema Krippendorffu (2004), jedna rečenica može biti promatrana kao kontekstualna jedinica, premda je češće slučaj da se opis nekog fenomena može razabrati kroz odlomke s više rečenica, a u nekim slučajevima i kroz cjelovit tekst. To se potvrdilo i u ovom istraživanju jer su se rečenice, kao kontekstualne jedinice u odnosu na odlomke, pojavile u 40 % slučajeva, što ne začuđuje ako se ima u vidu da svaki od 77 članaka ima naslov u formi rečenice koja se može promatrati kao jedinica u kojoj je sadržan pripadajući kontekst (npr. naslov članka objavljenog u Večernjem listu 29. 3. 2014.: „Majka i sin u Osijeku prodavali drogu krokodil od koje se raspada cijelo tijelo“). U ostalim slučajevima odlomci su promatrani kao prikladan okvir za definiranje kontekstualne jedinice.

Takav pristup rezultirao je potrebom da se određeni pojmovi smjeste u dvije kategorije, tj. u preliminarne teme. U 62 slučaja radilo se o formulaciji koja paralelno može biti promatrana kao imenovanje i kao sidrenje u antonimima (npr. *nova droga*). Preklapanje sidrenja u etabliranim drogama i sidrenja u antonimima evidentirano je 36 puta (npr. *jače od heroína*), a preklapanje emocionalnog sidrenja i emocionalnog upredmećivanja 17 puta (npr. *preminuli dječak*). Ostala preklapanja evidentirana su dva ili manje puta (Lugarić, 2018).

Dubinska struktura na kojoj se zasniva društvena reprezentacija NPS-a u analiziranim člancima razvijena je putem kvalitativne analize, provedene naknadno i zasebno. Radi se o temama koje su implicitno ugrađene u društvenu reprezentaciju nekog fenomena

i koje predstavljaju „historijski ukotvljene pretpostavke, kulturno prepoznatljivije antonimije i dublju logiku društvene misli“ (Liu, 2004, str. 255). One prožimaju i podupiru glavne aspekte društvene reprezentacije i reflektiraju implicitne i temeljne vrijednosti povezane s društvenom reprezentacijom nekog fenomena u specifičnom povijesnom kontekstu šireg društva (Markova, 2015). To nisu teme koje obično povezujemo s tematskom analizom u kvalitativnim istraživanjima i za koje se u ovom radu koristimo terminima „pragmatične manifestacije“ (Liu, 2004) i „preliminarne teme“, već temeljne vrijednosti koje stoje u njihovoj podlozi. S obzirom na to da smo namjeravali uočiti temeljne vrijednosti preliminarnih tema (ili aspekata) društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u analiziranim člancima, smatrali smo da odgovaraju temeljnim vrijednostima koje okružuju diskurs o svim drogama. To je zacrtalo smjer ponovljenog pristupa člancima, sada referiranjem na kulturno prepoznatljivije antonimije u pretežno emocionalnom sidrenju i upredmećivanju, kao i u sidrenju u antonimima i metaforama.

Kvantitativnu analizu sadržaja proveo je jedan, a kvalitativnu analizu sadržaja drugi autor. U oba slučaja pouzdanost se zasniva na stabilnosti (test-retest, odnosno višekratno čitanje i provjeravanje jesu li zabilježeni pojmovi na koherentan način razvrstani u kategorije i njihove preliminarne teme) koja predstavlja početni, ali svakako ne i najprikladniji kriterij pouzdanosti u analizama sadržaja koju provodi više istraživača.

Istraživanje je provedeno na portalima – 24sata, Večernji list i Jutarnji list – koje, u vrijeme neposredno prije prikupljanja empirijskog materijala (lipanj – rujan 2018.), istraživačke agencije Ipsos Puls i gemiusAudience navode kao najčitanije hrvatske portale s tiskanim izdanjem (Lugarić, 2018). Prema istraživanju Ipsos Pulsa iz ožujka 2017. (Skoko i Vrdoljak, 2018) utvrđen je porast čitanosti *online* portala u svim dobnim skupinama uz istodobno opadanje čitanosti dnevnih novina u usporedbi s čitanošću novinskih portala. S druge strane, Kordić i sur. (2017) u istraživanju medijske reprezentacije ovisnosti, dnevna tiskana izdanja promatraju kao jedan od važnih izvora informacija koji tradicionalno preferira starija populacija. Stoga smo se odlučili da se u ovom istraživanju koncentriramo na najčitanije nacionalne, dnevne *news* portale koji imaju i tiskano izdanje.

Pojašnjavajući metriku gemiusAudiencea, Skoko i Vrdoljak navode Jutarnji.hr i Vecernji.hr kao *news* portale koji su u travnju 2018. imali najveći doseg. Prema prikazu dnevne posjećenosti velikih *news* portala za 10. travnja 2018., u kojem su Gemius i Ipsos Dotmetrics kombinirali podatke jer se dio portala ne pojavljuje istodobno u istraživanjima obju agencija, Bernik (2018) je spomenutim portalima pridružio i 24sata.hr. Spomenute metrike svakako su ograničene jer su usmjerene pretežno na razvoj prostora za oglašavanje i ne omogućuju zaključivanje o tome koliki je stvarni utjecaj nekog sadržaja. Međutim, u vrijeme provođenja ovog istraživanja bolja metrika nije bila dostupna (Skoko i Vrdoljak, 2018).

Pretragom je utvrđeno da se kontinuitet objavljivanja članaka na spomenutim *news* portalima može identificirati s početkom u 2011. godini, nakon koje, premda donekle neravnomjerno, broj objavljenih članaka kontinuirano raste sve do sredine 2018. godine kada je istraživanje provedeno. Nakon pretrage 9 članaka nije se koristilo jer su bili istovjetni onima ranije objavljenima i uvrštenima u analizu. Članci u kojima se govori o

istom događaju, osobama ili stvarima, a razlikuju se u sadržaju, uključeni su u istraživanje. Uzorak obuhvaća 15 članaka iz prvih šest mjeseci 2018., 20 članaka iz 2017., 15 članaka iz 2016., 14 članaka iz 2015., 4 članka iz 2014., 6 članaka iz 2013., 1 članak iz 2012., te 2 članka iz 2011. godine. Od toga su 32 članka preuzeta s portala *24sata*, 19 s Jutarnjeg lista i 26 s Večernjeg lista. Ukupan broj analiziranih članaka je 77 (Lugarić, 2018). Ukratko, populaciju koja je zahvaćena istraživanjem i zaključcima čine članci s odabranih internetskih portala koji imaju i tiskano izdanje.

## REZULTATI ISTRAŽIVANJA

Tijekom analize razvijena je ukupno 31 preliminarna tema putem kojih se manifestira društvena reprezentacija NPS-a. S ciljem preglednijeg predstavljanja rezultata taj broj preliminarnih tema redefiniran je na sljedeći način: 13 preliminarnih tema sažeto je u 5 novih, nešto sveobuhvatnijih, uz preimenovanje i očuvanje analitičke i teoretske konzistentnosti. Sažimane su isključivo one preliminarne teme koje se nalaze *unutar* komunikativnih mehanizama jer se pokazalo da sažimanjem i namjerom za sveobuhvatnijim prikazom ne gube na deskriptivnosti. U sklopu mehanizma emocionalnog upredmećivanja dvije početne preliminarne teme: „opisi prizora predoziranja i smrti“ i „opisi konzumiranja neke supstance“ integrirane su u jednu sveobuhvatniju koju je moguće vidjeti u Tablici 1 pod nazivom *opisi konzumiranja, predoziranja i smrti*. U sidrenju putem metafora 2 početne preliminarne teme (opisi supstance i upotreba supstance) integrirane su u jednu – *opisi supstanci i njihove upotrebe*. U istom komunikativnom mehanizmu druge 2 početne preliminarne teme (opis događaja i brza pojava NPS) integrirane su u jednu – *opisi događaja i širenje NPS-a*. U sklopu mehanizma sidrenja u antonimima 4 početne preliminarne teme (vrijeme potrebno za učinak, jačina, duljina djelovanja supstance i štetnost) sažete su u jednu sveobuhvatniju: *djelovanje supstance*. Napokon, u tom istom komunikativnom mehanizmu 3 početne preliminarne teme (prepoznatljivost, zahtjevnost nabave supstance i cijena supstance) integrirane su u jednu pod nazivom *dostupnost NPS-a*.

Provedeni postupak vidljiv je u konačnom prikazu rezultata koji sadrži 5 mehanizama sidrenja i 2 mehanizma upredmećivanja s ukupno 23 preliminarne teme društvene reprezentacije NPS (Tablica 1).

Tablica 1. Preliminarne teme u komunikativnim mehanizmima prema broju jedinica bilježenja

Sidrenje u etabliranim drogama	N	%
Marihuana i hašiš	67	29
Heroin i morfij	57	24
Kokain i crack	15	6
Duhan i alkohol	34	15
“Speed”, amfetamini	9	4
Etablirane droge općenito	24	10
Ecstasy, MDMA i LSD	27	12

<b>Sidrenje putem metafora</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Opisi supstanci i njihove upotrebe	15	27
Opisi događaja i širenje NPS	6	11
Znanstvena fantastika	35	62
<b>Emocionalno sidrenje</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Smrtna opasnost	191	42
Zdravstveni problemi	265	58
<b>Imenovanje</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Ulični i sekundarni nazivi supstanci	229	34
Službeni nazivi i taksonomije	317	47
Proizvodi	123	19
<b>Emocionalno upredmećivanje</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Opisi konzumiranja, predoziranja i smrti	53	18
Djeca, maloljetnici, adolescenti	175	59
Članovi obitelji i bliske osobe	50	17
Siromašni i mentalno bolesni ljudi	17	6
<b>Upredmećivanje putem personifikacije</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Glazbenici/glumci	72	100
<b>Sidrenje u antonimima</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Djelovanje supstance	145	37
Dostupnost NPS	172	44
Zakonske odrednice	74	19

Najveći broj preliminarnih tema (7) razvijen je u mehanizmu „sidrenja u etabliranim drogama“, a najveći je broj jedinica bilježenja evidentiran u komunikativnom mehanizmu sidrenja pod nazivom „imenovanje“. To upućuje na to da se na planu „imenovanja“, uz upućivanje na njihove ulične nazive, službene taksonomije i same proizvode, NPS najčešće, s ciljem pojašnjavanja, povezuje s drogama čije učinke oponašaju (sidrenje u etabliranim drogama). To je povezivanje u najvećem broju slučajeva bilo konzistentno. Osim „sidrenja u etabliranim drogama“ najveći broj preliminarnih tema (4) razvijen je na planu „emocionalnog upredmećivanja“ koje sugerira različite, ali pretežno emocionalno zaokružene obrasce povezivanja NPS s njima inherentnim opasnostima i rizicima. Fokus reprezentiranja je na opasnostima za mlade osobe, a ta usredotočenost emocionalnog upredmećivanja na pripadnike društvene kategorije mladih u osnovi reflektira dugotrajnost jednog od ključnih aspekata moralne indignacije (Young, 1972) nad upotrebom droga u cjelini i u slučaju društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u ovom istraživanju ne ostavlja puno prostora za dodatno društveno posredovano razvrstavanje. Premda su pripadnici marginalnih skupina (siromašni, mentalno bolesni i beskućnici) s obzirom na emocionalno

korištene obrasce uvršteni u istu kategoriju, mahom je bila riječ o člancima koji prenose vijesti o posljedicama upotrebe NPS u Rusiji, Velikoj Britaniji i SAD-u. Ostali komunikativni mehanizmi iz Tablice 1 zahvaćeni su s 3 ili manje preliminarnih tema.

Svi komunikativni mehanizmi potom su rangirani s obzirom na broj i postotak pripadajućih jedinica bilježenja. U Tablici 2. vidljivo je da sidrenje kroz „imenovanje“ predstavlja pojedinačan komunikativni mehanizam koji se najčešće koristi u društvenoj reprezentaciji NPS-a i identificiran je u 30 % jedinica bilježenja.

Tablica 2. Komunikativni mehanizmi prema broju jedinica bilježenja

Komunikativni mehanizmi	N	%
Imenovanje	669	30
Emocionalno sidrenje	456	21
Sidrenje u antonimima	391	18
Emocionalno upredmećivanje	295	14
Sidrenje u etabliranim drogama	233	11
Upredmećivanje putem personifikacije	72	3
Sidrenje putem metafora	56	3
<b>Ukupno</b>	<b>2172</b>	<b>100</b>

Emocionalno sidrenje evidentirano je u 21 % jedinica bilježenja, nešto manje evidentirani su sidrenje u antonimima (18 %), emocionalno upredmećivanje (14 %) i sidrenje u etabliranim drogama (11 %), a upredmećivanje putem personifikacije kao i sidrenje putem metafora evidentirano je u 3 % jedinica bilježenja.

Obje tablice omogućuju rudimentarni pregled zastupljenosti komunikativnih mehanizama i pripadajućih preliminarnih tema koji u osnovi potvrđuje Moscovicijeve navode o imenovanju kao važnom mehanizmu sidrenja i generiranja društvene reprezentacije nekog novog i nepoznatog fenomena. Ako mu pridružimo mehanizam sidrenja u etabliranim drogama, uvažavajući da reference na već poznate ilegalne droge također predstavljaju svojevrsno „pojašnjavajuće“ imenovanje, tada taj komunikativni mehanizam zauzima ključno mjesto u generiranju društvene reprezentacije NPS-a i moguće ga je razabrati u ukupno 41 % jedinica bilježenja. Kad na isti način objedinimo komunikativne mehanizme emocionalnog sidrenja i emocionalnog upredmećivanja jer su usmjereni na osjećaje straha, štetnosti NPS ili na osjećaje empatije prema pojedinim društvenim kategorijama s kojima se upotreba NPS najčešće povezuje, tada oni slijede neposredno za imenovanjem i obuhvaćaju 35 % jedinica bilježenja u analiziranim člancima.

Također, pokazalo se da su identificirane preliminarne teme u komunikativnim mehanizmima u svakom članku međuupućene. One se gotovo uvijek pojavljuju istodobno, a termin „nova droga“ predstavlja najčešću inačicu službenog određenja koja na planu imenovanja reprezentira uglavnom sintetičke kanabinoide i sintetičke opioide.

Raspodjela komunikativnih mehanizama među portalima odgovara njihovu ranije opisanom ukupnom rangu. U tablici 3 vidljivo je da je imenovanje relativno podjednako zastupljeno u Večernjem listu i u *24sata* (33% i 32%), a nešto manje u Jutarnjem listu (28%). Emocionalno sidrenje najzastupljenije je u Jutarnjem listu (25%), a nešto manje u Večernjem listu (18%) i u *24sata* (20%). Sidrenje u antonimima više je vidljivo u Večernjem listu (23%), a sidrenje u etabliranim drogama najmanje je zastupljeno u *24sata* (9%). *24sata* u odnosu na preostala dva portala nešto više emocionalno upredmećuje NPS (15%), a metafore su u podjednakom omjeru zastupljene u sva tri portala. Premda se analizirani portali razlikuju u uređivačkoj politici i izvještavanju, pri čemu se *24sata* obično promatra kao tabloid (Kordić i sur. 2017), raspodjela komunikativnih mehanizama iz Tablice 3. ne nudi konzistentne nalaze za raspravu o jasnim razlikama u stilu izvještavanja, a tabloidnost ovdje nije svojstvo koje bi se nedvosmisleno moglo pripisati jedino portalu *24sata*.

Tablica 3. Raspodjela komunikativnih mehanizama među portalima prema jedinicama bilježenja

	Jutarnji list	Večernji list	<i>24sata</i>	Prosjek za sve portale
Imenovanje	28 % (168)	33 % (184)	32 % (317)	31 %
Emocionalno sidrenje	25 % (150)	18 % (101)	20 % (205)	21 %
Sidrenje u antonimima	14 % (89)	23 % (131)	17 % (171)	18 %
Sidrenje u etabliranim drogama	13 % (75)	11 % (60)	9 % (98)	11 %
Emocionalno upredmećivanje	12 % (70)	12 % (70)	15 % (155)	13 %
Sidrenje u metaforama	3 % (17)	3 % (11)	3 % (28)	3 %
Upredmećivanje putem personifikacije	5 % (30)	1 % (3)	4 % (39)	3 %

Članci najčešće počinju opisima događaja (42 članka) u kojima se uz sâm opis upućuje i na službene i ulične nazive proizvoda i supstanci. Smrt, umiranje, ozbiljni zdravstveni problemi (emocionalno sidrenje) i u nešto manjem dijelu djelovanje policije i zapljene predstavljaju glavne motive u opisima događaja. Akteri u početnim opisima u najvećem su dijelu mladi (39 članaka), što odgovara emocionalnom upredmećivanju, a u jednom manjem dijelu globalno poznate osobe iz popularne kulture povezane s upotrebom NPS (upredmećivanje putem personifikacije). Sidrenje u pretežno zastrašujućim metaforama („zaleđenost krvi u žilama“, „najgora noćna mora“ i sl.) u većini je članaka bilo sporadično, zabilježeno je njih 11 koje su evidentirane 56 puta u 19 članaka. Najvećim dijelom metafore su zabilježene u člancima iz 2017. i 2018. o posljedicama upotrebe sintetičkog kanabinoide pretežno u većim britanskim gradovima, a najčešće su se koristile metafore „zombi“ (19 puta) i „živi mrtvaci“ (7 puta). Tako je u članku s portala *24sata* (1. 9. 2017.) u opisu događaja moguće identificirati sidrenje u metaforama koje je praćeno imenovanjem, emocionalnim sidrenjem i upredmećivanjem te sidrenjem u antonimima: „Zora živih mrtvaca: Ova droga opasnija je od heroina i cracka. Ulicama Velike Britanije hoda sve više ‘zombija’. Tako nazivaju ovisnike o sintetičkoj drogi poznatoj kao ‘spice’ čije su posljedice jače od onih koje ostavljaju heroin i crack.“

Pojašnjavajući dijelovi u 38 članaka bave se službenim nazivima i taksonomijama. NPS su sidrene putem analogije s etabliranim drogama i uspoređivanjem jačine njihovih učinaka, definiranjem zakonskih odredbi, zahtjevnosti nabave i cijene (sidrenje u antonimima). Primjerice, u članku „Nova droga hara Rusijom. Opasnija i jeftinija od heroina“ (Večernji list, 20. 12. 2017.) pojašnjenje „soli za kupanje“ kombinira elemente imenovanja, emocionalnog upredmećivanja, sidrenja u antonimima i sidrenja u etabliranim drogama:

*Konzumiranje te supstance izaziva uzbuđenje, halucinacije, psihozu, suicidalne misli i srčani udar. Nova droga može se progutati, pušiti ili ušmrkavati, ali najjači udar, kao i kod drugih droga, ima ubrizgavanjem iglom u venu. Posebno je zabrinjavajuće jer je 'sol' opasnija i jeftinija od heroina.*

Kvalitativna analiza dubinske strukture društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u odabranim medijskim napisima omogućila je identificiranje teme „društvo bez droga“ koja reflektira dominantne i kolektivne ideje ili obrasce značenja u vezi s pojavom i širenjem NPS-a u Hrvatskoj. Kao ideološki obrazac tema „društva bez droga“ zasnovana je na legalističkim propozicijama i upućuje na društvo bez ilegalnih droga. Dijelom je zasnovana na antonimijskim propozicijama ljudskog mišljenja, a u člancima je prepoznata kao temeljni koncept u emocionalnom sidrenju i upredmećivanju te sidrenju u metaforama i antonimima. Ta tema sadrži dva dominantna motiva koji se podudaraju s uvriježenim i kulturno zasnovanim predodžbama o svim ilegalnim drogama: štetnost NPS-a za zdravlje njihovih konzumenata i prijetnju normativnim konturama društva koje proizlaze iz njihove raširene upotrebe (Tablica 4.).

Tablica 4. Dubinska struktura društvene reprezentacije NPS

Tema „društvo bez droga“	Jedinice bilježenja	N	%
Inherentna štetnost NPS		201	57
Društvena kontrola		151	43

Prvu pragmatičnu manifestaciju spomenute teme nazvali smo „inherentna štetnost NPS-a“ jer kroz semantičke elemente u jedinicama bilježenja vrijednosno korespondira sa širim zdravorazumskim predodžbama o ostalim psihoaktivnim supstancama čiju upotrebu društvo ne odobrava i promatra kao prijetnju zdravlju svojih članova. Štetnost NPS očituje se u svim mehanizmima sidrenja i upredmećivanja. Kada je riječ o imenovanju, zdravstveni rizici opisani su usporedbom s rizicima koji se pripisuju etabliranim ilegalnim drogama, nerijetko uz komparacije koje se koriste antonimima kako bi se uputilo na to da su NPS opasnije i štetnije, čime se implicira već „zdravo za gotovo“ prihvaćena inherentna štetnost svih etabliranih ilegalnih droga. Primjerice, to je vidljivo u članku koji govori o tome da su čak i djelatnici policije izloženi opasnostima predoziranja fentanilom, sintetičkim opijatom i u kojem je komparacija vidljiva već u naslovu – „Nova droga je 50 puta jača od heroina, konzumira se dodiranjem“ – a dodatno je naglašena u tekstu komentarom djelatnika policije: „Odahnemo svaki put kad nađemo samo heroin ili samo kokain ili samo crack i to je jako tužno“ (24sata, 7.11.2017). Na sličan način opasnost i štetnost za zdravlje

i život koja se pripisuje svim ilegalnim drogama očituje se u upozoravajućem karakteru članaka i elementima emocionalnog sidrenja i upredmećivanja. Termin „smrt“ moguće je identificirati u gotovo svim člancima. Na planu opasnosti i štetnosti za zdravlje i život NPS se povezuju s predoziranje, opasnim simptomima, smrću, ovisnošću, poremećajima i sl. Primjerice, u članku koji upozorava na moguće štetne posljedice upotrebe sintetskog kanabinoida Blow u Hrvatskoj naveden je niz zdravstveno nepoželjnih simptoma:

Dokazano je da su sintetski kanabinoidi izuzetno toksični i štetni za ljudsku konzumaciju. Diljem Europe bilježi se niz trovanja, od kojih neka čak sa smrtnim ishodom. Simptomi trovanja sintetskim kanabinoidima su ošamućenost, vrtoglavica, ubrzan rad srca, mučnina, povraćanje, bol u prsima, zujanje u ušima, glavobolja, anksioznost, tahikardija i kognitivne teškoće – upozorava Sanja Mikulić. (Jutarnji list, 7. 11. 2017.)

Premda se pojavljuju tek u 8 analiziranih članaka, iskustva konzumenata uklapaju se u dominantan tematski okvir opasnosti za zdravlje i život, a gotovo nigdje nisu izravno izrečena, već ih uglavnom prenose autori članaka ili različite službene osobe: „Konzumenti Spice-a izvještavaju o simptomima koji uključuju ubrzani rad srca, povraćanje, uzrujanost, zbunjenost i halucinacije“ (24sata, 28.5.2018). U nekoliko članka bilo je moguće naći suzdržanije prosudbe poput: „Još uvijek nema dovoljno podataka o utjecaju ovih proizvoda na ljudsko zdravlje te razinu toksičnosti. Bez daljnjih analiza teško je utvrditi koliko je ta bojaznost opravdana“ (24sata, 28. 5. 2018.). Užitak, kao mogući očekivani i ostvareni učinak upotrebe NPS, naznačen je ukupno tri puta. Ako se i radi o opisanim bihevioralnim ili osjetilnim manifestacijama koje korisnici droga mogu interpretirati kao elemente užitka u konzumiranju droga, one su stavljene u okvir nepoželjnosti odnosno rizičnih posljedica:

Udisanje sintetskog plina djeluje kao halucinogena, ali i stimulativna droga, kombinacija trave i, recimo, ecstasyja. Uz miješanje s alkoholom u glavi se stvara još veći kaos. Omamljujuće djelovanje pri udisanju plina preko balona traje desetak minuta. Za to se vrijeme mladi, kao u usporenom filmu, bacaju čas na lijevu, čas na desnu stranu, dižu ruke, glavu zabacuju prema dolje i vrte se radi boljeg efekta. Tih deset minuta ludila čuju glasove u glavi, a upućeni će reći da to 'strašno prži mozak'. (Večernji list, 8. 7. 2013.)

Drugi aspekt „društva bez droga“ kao dubinske strukture članaka je „društvena kontrola“. Ona je prepoznata kao implicitni ideološki obrazac društvene reprezentacije NPS-a kojim se njihova upotreba dovodi u vezu s pitanjem funkcioniranja pripadajućeg normativnog okvira. Radi se o propitivanju postojećih ili sugeriranju poželjnih mehanizama društvene kontrole NPS-a koji predstavljaju dominantan obrazac djelovanja na planu upotrebe etabliranih ilegalnih droga. Kao oblik društvenog djelovanja koji je na formalan i neformalan, kao i prisilan ili kooperativan način usmjeren na prilagodbu društvenim normama (Deflem, 2015), društvena kontrola predstavlja nezaobilazan dio u analiziranim člancima i manifestira se u svim mehanizmima sidrenja i upredmećivanja NPS-a. Ipak, kontrola se najviše provlači kroz emocionalno sidrenje te sidrenje putem imenovanja i sidrenje u antonimima, tj. kroz problematiziranje njihove dostupnosti, trenutnog statusa na



planu legalnosti i ilegalnosti i trenutnog djelovanja različitih aktera u području formalne i neformalne društvene kontrole.

Legalnost nekih NSP, prije svega sintetičkih kanabinoida, predstavljena je kao sastavni dio problema koji se povezuju s upotrebom NPS-a i s djelovanjem službi društvene kontrole, a njihova zabrana nameće se kao rješenje. Usto, pitanje legalnosti implicitno je sadržano i u prenošenju službenih informacija iz područja društvene politike prema drogama. Sljedeći navod pokazuje da je, uz imenovanje, legalnost NPS-a kao problem u djelovanju službi društvene kontrole sidrena i upotrebom metafora: „Borba s novim drogama slična je održanju trošnog brodića, koji na sve strane propušta vodu, na površini rijeke. Čim zapušite jednu rupu, odnosno detektirate novu drogu, iz laboratorija narkodilera pojavi se druga“ (24sata, 9. 5. 2018.). U 38 članaka evidentirane su formulacije koje se eksplicitno referiraju na problem legalnosti NSP-a i koje upućuju na to da se one „mogu legalno nabaviti“, da im je „olakšan pristup“, da „nisu kriminalizirane“, „ne podliježu zakonskim mjerama“, „prolaze ispod radara tržišnim inspekcijama“ i sl. Pritom, kao objekt od posebne važnosti na planu društvene kontrole, istaknuti su smartshopovi, tj. trgovine u kojima se dio NSP u razdoblju zahvaćenom ovim istraživanjem mogao legalno nabaviti.

Usto, društvena kontrola naznačena je i iskazivanjem potrebe za pojačanom prevencijom i uvođenjem reda. Ovisno o sadržaju i tipu pojedinog članka upozorenja su usmjerena na roditelje da paze na djecu, ljekarnike da obrate pozornost kome što prodaju, vlast da zatvori smartshopove i ukloni legalne NPS-e s tržišta legalnih proizvoda, djecu i učenike da će biti sankcionirani zbog upotrebe NPS-a, nastavnike da strože kontroliraju ponašanje učenika, policiju da bude djelotvornija u svojem djelovanju itd. – što predstavlja već dobro poznat repertoar upozorenja povezanih s kontrolom upotrebe droga u cjelini. Primjerice, usmjerenost na roditelje kao subjekte društvene kontrole i djecu kao njezine objekte najjasnije je izražena u članku posvećenom opasnostima koje sa sobom nosi upotreba sintetičkih kanabinoida i u kojem se roditelje upozorava: „... da više obrate pozornost što im rade djeca i tko su im prijatelji, da djeci objasne kako nije ‘cool’ s 13 godina imati cigaretu ili alkohol, da ne trebaju uzimati sve što im se ponudi kako bi bili prihvaćeni u društvu u kojem se nalaze, te da ima pametnijih sredstava relaksacije, poput bavljenja sportom“ (24sata, 10. 5. 2018.). S druge strane, striktnija kontrola koja uključuje poželjnost negativnih sankcija odnosi se na reguliranje poslovanja smartshopova koji su izravno spomenuti u 17 članaka:

Takvi su preparati dostupni u ‘smart shopovima’, vrećica s nekoliko grama prodaje se za stotinjak kuna i može je kupiti tko god hoće. Dijete do 18 godina ne može u trgovini kupiti cigarete i alkohol, ali može ući u ‘smart shop’ jer je takva droga deklarirana kao osvježivač zraka, baš poput mirisnih biljnih preparata koje stavljamo u ormare odjećom, a nitko kemijski ne može dokazati da ona to nije. (Večernji list, 10. 5. 2018.)

Premda se među navedenim i u člancima ciljanim akterima formalne i neformalne društvene kontrole može prepoznati dobar dio čitatelja, pojedina upozorenja odnose se na čitateljstvo i javnost u cjelini poput napisa koji upućuju na to da je djelovanje službi (policije i zakonodavca) nemoćno i neuspješno, ili da su te droge lako dostupne.

## ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA

Provedena analiza pokazala je da se sidrenje i upredmećivanje pretežno zasnivaju na imenovanju i emocijama kao komunikativnim mehanizmima koji NPS, kao relativno nov i nepoznat fenomen u hrvatskom kontekstu, konvencionaliziraju u smjeru zdravorazumskog znanja. Pritom, Moscovicijeve opaske o klasificiranju kao važnoj dimenziji imenovanja ovdje su se pokazale kao opravdane, posebno u dijelu koji se odnosi na usporedbu novog fenomena s već poznatim prototipovima poput sidrenja u etabliranim drogama.

Imenovanje i klasificiranje popraćeno je učestalim referencama na znanstvene spoznaje koje su u gotovo polovini analiziranih članaka osnažene izjavama stručnjaka. To korrespondira s teorijom društvene reprezentacije (Joffe, 2003; Moscovici, 1984) prema kojoj relativno nov i nepoznat fenomen, konceptualiziran u složenom i nerijetko teško razumljivom univerzumu ekspertnog znanja, mediji pojednostavljaju sa svrhom informiranja i šireg zdravorazumskog razumijevanja. Pritom je putem emocionalnog sidrenja i upredmećivanja uspostavljen okvir u kojem je NPS predstavljen kao opasnost i prijetnja zdravlju i životima njihovih konzumenata i ugrađen u proces podizanja društvene osjetljivosti.

Inherentna štetnost NPS-a prepoznata je kao jedna od dviju pragmatičnih manifestacija u analizi teme „društva bez droga“ kao dubinske strukture medijskih prikaza koja se podudara sa širim društvenim vrijednostima i dominantnim ideologijama na planu upotrebe droga općenito. U većini članaka popraćena je terminom „smrt“ i upućivanjem na niz problematičnih psihosomatskih simptoma. Kada je riječ o užitku, implicira se da NPS predstavlja neadekvatnu zamjenu za tri osnovne skupine otprije etabliranih ilegalnih droga, pri čemu očekivani učinci koje povezujemo s upotrebom, primjerice marihuane, heroina i kokaina, u slučaju NPS-a ustupaju mjesto onim nepoželjnim.

Druga pragmatična manifestacija teme „društva bez droga“ jest društvena kontrola nad upotrebom NPS-a. Njihova zakonska regulativa u većini članaka predstavlja ključnu poteškoću, a trgovine u kojima se dio njih može kupiti identificirane su kao negativni simboli (poput dilera) koje bi preventivnim djelovanjem društvene kontrole trebalo zatvoriti. Izglednost, pa i poželjnost represivnijeg djelovanja, sadržana je i u upozorenjima upućenim učenicima kao potencijalnim korisnicima i u tvrdnjama o poželjnosti kriminalizacije samih NPS-a. Napokon, ako se sintetske kanabinoide, opasne po zdravlje i život, imenuje i upredmećuje kao legalnu zamjenu za kanabis i kao „stvar“ koja treba biti kriminalizirana, a da se bilo gdje istodobno ne progovori o pravnom statusu kanabisa koji se već dulje vrijeme u samim medijima reprezentira u terminima polemičke društvene reprezentacije (Dubreta, 2005), onda se može govoriti o nekoj vrsti kulturno zasnovanog „refleksa“ kojem je kriminalizacija droga toliko u prvom planu da te dvije „stvari“ – sintetičke kanabinoide i kanabis – ne može dovesti u vezu kroz makar usputno problematiziranje trenutne ilegalnosti kanabisa.

Premda su u većini članaka istaknuti kao ključni akteri upotrebe NPS-a, mladi nisu demonizirani, već su više predstavljeni kao rizična skupina koja zaslužuje povećanu pozornost aktera u procesu socijalizacije i koja, prema Alexandrescu (2018), na planu upotrebe

droga nerijetko poprima simbolička obilježja „čistog“ i „vrijednog“, ali istodobno metaforički problematičnog. Pritom, kategorija mladih nije diferencirana u sociodemografskim terminima. Marginalizirane skupine poput beskućnika našli smo u člancima koji prenose vijesti o problemu upotrebe NPS-a u drugim zemljama. Ostala sociodemografska obilježja kategorije mladih, od pripadnosti društvenom sloju, (ne)zaposlenosti ili prostornih čimbenika u terminima centra (velikih gradova) i periferije nisu zabilježena. Radoznalost, eksperimentiranje, propitivanje uvriježenih moralnih naputaka na planu poželjnog i nepoželjnog ponašanja i sklonost rizičnom stilu života osnovni su elementi u reprezentaciji mladih kao potencijalne žrtve upotrebe NPS-a.

Sve u svemu, zdravstveni rizici i društvena kontrola na planu upotrebe droga impliciraju medijsko usmjeravanje na normativnu zabrinutost javnosti, što korespondira s Youngovim (1972) opažanjima o nametanju moralnih smjernica univerzumu diskursa poticanjem u smjeru dramatičnog kreiranja društvenih problema. Istraživanje društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u odabranim hrvatskim medijima omogućuje nam da je promotrimo kao važan čimbenik za razumijevanje prirode informacije o tim supstancama. Kao što je upozorio Stanley Cohen, u suvremenim društvima ta informacija je medijski posredovana i, kako se pokazalo u analiziranim člancima, moguće je zaključiti da je plasirana u javni prostor nakon što je prethodno izložena prosudbi predstavlja li vijest ili ne (Cohen, 1972). Stoga već puko izvještavanje o različitim aspektima nekog fenomena (od uhićenja i zapljena do razmjera raširenosti upotrebe) može biti dostatno za generiranje brige i straha. Napokon, inzistiranje na zdravstvenim rizicima i društvenoj kontroli implicitno predstavlja središnji okvir za upućivanje na obrise normativnih kontura društva, na dobro i loše, te dopušteno i nedopušteno. U tom smislu društvena reprezentacija NPS-a u analiziranim člancima prilagođena je zdravorazumskim predodžbama, a kao mehanizam za osmišljavanje proturječnih situacija povezanih s NPS-om kao novim fenomenom obavijenim nepoznicama, pojednostavljena je i konvencionalizirana u terminima upotrebe droga kao društveno nepoželjne prakse.

## OGRAIČENJA

Metodološka ograničenja odnose se na pouzdanost i na odabir jedinica analize. Dio kvantificiranja proveo je jedan, a dio drugi autor i neovisno o intezivnim zajedničkim provjerama, konzultiranju i usuglašenosti na planu prikupljanja i kodiranja empirijskog materijala, pouzdanost se zasniva tek na stabilnosti, tj. višekratnom čitanju i provjeravanju koherentnosti kodiranja i razvrstavanja jedinica bilježenja u kategorije i njihove preliminarnе teme. Premda smo se vodili time da je pouzdanost nalaza u dijelu literature također ostvarena putem stabilnosti (Kassai i sur. 2016), a tamo gdje se i zasnivala na standardnoj proceduri (inter-rater pouzdanost) rezultirala je prihvatljivim koeficijentom uz određenu teoretsko-empirijsku nekonzistentnost (Kordić i sur., 2017), ovaj rad podlozan je primjedbama o subjektivnosti procjena. Kada je riječ o određivanju jedinica analize, 105 stavki slikovnog materijala koje smo izdvojili u sklopu istraživanja nije uključeno u analizu jer nismo bili sigurni možemo li kvalitetno provesti vizualnu analizu. U osnovi, naknadno smo ustanovili da smo mogli identificirati neke od elemenata upredmečivanja (događaje,

objekte, društvene kategorije i sl.), ali smo zaključili da (naknadnim) kvantificiranjem to ne bi u bitnome promijenilo već dobivene rezultate.

Ograničenje mogućnosti procjene dosega i karaktera društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u Hrvatskoj upućuje na to da istraživanjem nisu zahvaćeni ostali akteri koje je nužno uključiti u razmatranje obrazaca društvene reprezentacije NPS-a – od čitatelja i šire javnosti, preko stručnjaka do društvenih kategorija koje se s upotrebom NPS-a najčešće povezuje. To znači da na temelju iznesenih rezultata ne možemo prosuđivati o dosezima i karakteru društvene reprezentacije NPS-a u cjelini i ne možemo utvrditi je li ona pretežno hegemonijska, emancipatorska ili polemička.

Napokon, istraživanjem je zahvaćen tek jedan dio medijski posredovane društvene reprezentacije NPS-a – najčitaniji portali koji imaju i tiskano izdanje. Cjelovit prikaz društvene reprezentacije u *online* medijima trebao bi zahvatiti ostale portale i medije, kao i razradu njihova neposrednog društvenog konteksta. To bi uključivalo ne samo usporedbu i širu kontekstualizaciju društvene pozicije i uloge svakog od uključena tri portala, nego i širu analizu medija u Hrvatskoj. Budući da su nam u fokusu bili obrasci društvene reprezentacije NPS-a na spomenutim portalima, nismo se bavili razradom pitanja poput njihove vlasničke strukture, političkih i svjetonazorskih orijentacija, tabloidnosti i sl., smatrajući da se radi o temi koja zaslužuju zasebnu studiju.

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## SOCIAL REPRESENTATION OF NEW PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ON CROATIAN NEWS WEBSITES

Nikša Dubreta :: Karlo Lugařić

**ABSTRACT** *This paper deals with media representation of new psychoactive substances in the light of the theory of social representation. Since new psychoactive substances represent a relatively unknown phenomenon in the Croatian social context, the article explains the analytical usefulness of communicative mechanisms of social representation that can be used in media research. The research was conducted by means of content analysis of articles addressing the issue of new psychoactive substances, posted on the selected news websites in a period of seven years. The results suggest that naming, emotional anchoring and emotional objectification are key communicative mechanisms in generating social representation of new psychoactive substances in the analysed media. The analysis of implied basic values, embodied in the published articles suggests that the emphasis on health risks and weaknesses in the activities of social control of new psychoactive substances are conventionalized through the theme of society without drugs.*

### KEY WORDS

NEW PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES, SOCIAL REPRESENTATION, ANCHORING,  
OBJECTIFICATION, DRUG USE

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**PRIKAZI KNJIGA**

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*BOOK REVIEWS*

Željka Tonković, Krešimir Krolo, Sven Marčelić

**KLASIKA, PUNK, CAJKE: Kulturni kapital i vrijednosti mladih u gradovima na jadranskoj obali**

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Knjiga *KLASIKA, PUNK, CAJKE: Kulturni kapital i vrijednosti mladih u gradovima na jadranskoj obali* bavi se kulturnim ukusima, kulturnom potrošnjom i vrijednostima mladih u pet glavnih istraživačkih tema. Autori Željka Tonković, Krešimir Krolo i Sven Marčelić, redom docenti na Sveučilištu u Zadru, u knjizi objavljuju rezultate kvantitativnog istraživanja provedenog anketom među srednjoškolcima završnih razreda 2015./2016. godine u šest najvećih jadranskih gradova: Puli, Rijeci, Zadru, Šibeniku, Splitu i Dubrovniku.

Unutar jedanaest poglavlja (uključujući uvod i zaključak) prikazani su teorijski okviri te analize iz pojedinih tematskih cjelina. Budući da su rezultati istraživanja uputili na moguće načine za poboljšanje kvalitete života mladih te na moguće čimbenike vezane uz kulturu koji bi mogli pridonijeti njihovoj želji da ostanu živjeti u ovim gradovima, na kraju knjige autori nude preporuke za javne politike.

Nakon uvoda u kojem se čitatelje upoznae s temeljima literature i provedenim istraživanjem te strukturom knjige, u drugom je poglavlju predstavljena teorija na kojoj se temelji cijelo istraživanje i interpretacija rezultata. Autori se naslanjaju na ove ideje i koncepte: 1) *homologije i kulturnog kapitala* Pierrea Bourdieua, 2) *individualizaciju, postmodernost i refleksivnu modernost* i 3) *omnivor i univori – hibridne distinkcije*. Ta su teorijska polazišta prikazana u pojedinačnim potpoglavljima, a potom ih autori stavljaju u suvremeni kontekst 21. stoljeća gdje njihov značaj objašnjavaju u vremenu globalizacije i globalne kulture u potpoglavljju *Globalna kultura – napetosti globalizirane modernosti*.

Treće poglavlje pregled je indikatora koji prikazuju razvojna obilježja i kulturne resurse u jadranskim gradovima uključenima u analizu. Razlike koje se uočavaju među gradovima autori vide kao izvor razlika u mogućnostima za oblikovanje kulturnog kapitala mladih. Tako je primjerice uočeno da postoji razlika u izvaninstitucionalnoj kulturnoj ponudi među gradovima, i to na način da Zadar i Šibenik zaostaju za većim gradovima, Splitom i Rijekom, te za gradovima s većim indeksom razvijenosti, Pulum i Dubrovnikom (63). Naknadno se u ostalim temama istraživanja prikazuje kako je upravo lokalni kulturni kontekst često izravno povezan s kulturnim kapitalom mladih.

U četvrtom poglavlju autori se bave pitanjem kulturnoga kapitala roditelja. Koncept kulturnog kapitala jedan je od najznačajnijih u ovom istraživanju, a kako je već spomenuto, autori prate teoriju Pierrea Bourdieua te kulturni kapital dijele na institucionalizirani, objektivirani i utjelovljeni. Obitelj vide kao „primarnu društvenu jedinicu u kojoj se mladi socijaliziraju“ (67), te je značaj roditelja i njihov utjecaj na kulturnu potrošnju i ukuse mladih istražen u svakoj dimenziji kulturnog kapitala mladih. U ovom se poglavlju pokazuje kako je većina roditelja učenika koji su sudjelovali u istraživanju imala završenu srednju školu, a paralelno s time manjina roditelja participira u visokoj kulturi. Autori zaključuju da među roditeljima prevladava tradicionalno-popularni ukus (91). Uz mjerenje kulturnog kapitala roditelja, anketom koju su ispunjavali učenici ispitivao se i socioekonomski status te autori u ovom poglavlju zaključno analiziraju odnos kulturnog kapitala i klasnog položaja roditelja. U sljedećim poglavljima analizira se kako je kulturni kapital roditelja povezan s kulturnom potrošnjom i ukusima mladih, te se uvelike potvrđuje teza o kulturnoj reprodukciji.

Predstavljanje rezultata koje opisuje kulturni kapital mladih započinje u petom poglavlju *Obrazovanje u kulturi kao pokazatelj institucionaliziranog kulturnog kapitala* u kojem su predstavljeni nalazi povezani s institucionaliziranim kulturnim kapitalom i kulturnom potrošnjom mladih. Rezultati pokazuju da učenice prednjače kada je riječ o kulturnom obrazovanju, ali zanimljiv je nalaz da tip srednje škole koju osoba pohađa nije imao očekivani utjecaj, to jest, učenici koji su išli u gimnaziju nisu bili više uključeni u programe obrazovanja u kulturi od učenika drugih srednjih škola (123). Važnost lokalnog konteksta ovdje je izražena te nije neočekivano da se u gradovima koji nude više kulturnog formalnog i neformalnog obrazovanja učenici i više kulturno obrazuju (123).

Najveći prostor u knjizi posvećen je utjelovljenom kulturnom kapitalu učenika koji je operacionaliziran i prikazan u trima poglavljima: šestom, sedmom i osmom. Šesto poglavlje odnosi se na posjećivanje kulturnih i zabavnih sadržaja koji se odvijaju u javnom prostoru i kojim se, kako autori objašnjavaju, potvrđuje društveni i kulturni identitet (159). Pokazuje se da postoji pet različitih kulturnih obrazaca, a visoka kultura je mladima najmanje interesantna. Distinkcija se pronalazi na temelju spola, tipa srednje škole i mjesta stanovanja, a kao izvor diferenciranja ponovno se javlja i kulturni kapital roditelja, no samo objektivirani i utjelovljeni kapital, dok institucionalizirani kulturni kapital roditelja nije bio prediktor pozicioniranja mladih u kulturi (161). Druga dva poglavlja bave se privatnim prostorom te se izučavaju glazbeni ukus učenika u sedmom poglavlju i preferencije televizijskih sadržaja u osmom. Čitatelji tako otkrivaju koji su glazbeni žanrovi popularni među mladima i koje televizijske sadržaje gledaju više, a koje manje.

*Kulturne potrebe, zadovoljstvo ponudom i želja za odlaskom iz grada* naslov je devetog poglavlja. Tu se redom prikazuju zadovoljstvo mladih ponudom koja postoji u gradovima, njihove potrebe i želje te razlike s obzirom na tip srednje škole i gradove. Promatrana je i želja mladih za odlaskom iz grada te je uočeno što bi mladi više voljeli vidjeti u svojem gradu (209-240).

Deseto poglavlje prikazuje tri tipa vrijednosne orijentacije mladih dobivene klsterskom analizom: moderni, prijelazni i tradicionalni. Ta se tri tipa potom povezuju s kulturnim ukusima, pa je interesantno vidjeti kako se određene vrijednosti kod mladih poklapaju s njihovim kulturnim ukusima.

Zaključno, u jedanaestom poglavlju, autori prevladavajući ukus mladih opisuju kao tradicionalno-popularni i konvencionalni. Uz to sažimaju i ponavljaju najvažnije nalaze prezentirane u knjizi te predlažu u kojem bi smjeru mogla ići daljnja istraživanja.

Osim činjenice da su autori na temelju rezultata istraživanja sastavili prijedloge za javne politike, ova knjiga predstavlja izuzetno važan pregled brojnih podataka i zaključaka dobivenih o mladim ljudima, njihovim ukusima i vrijednostima te načinima na koja se ona oblikuju. Knjiga tako čitateljima pomaže u boljem razumijevanju mladih, njihovih potreba i čimbenika koji bi mogli pridonijeti njihovu zadovoljstvu i ostvarivanju potreba, što bi u konačnici moglo značiti i kvalitetnije društvo u budućnosti. Rezultati istraživanja uz to su otvorili i velik prostor za daljnje analize, ponajprije one kvalitativnog tipa, koje bi pomogle još dubljem razumijevanju raznih problematika vezanih uz mlade.

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**METODOLOGIJA DRUŠTVENIH ISTRAŽIVANJA: TEMELJNI UVIDI**

Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, 2021., 336 str.

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Djelo pruža detaljan uvid u metodologiju znanstvenih istraživanja. Već se iz samog sadržaja vide brojne metodološke teme koje su obrađene u ovoj knjizi. Gotovo svi naslovi i podnaslovi navedeni su u sadržaju, što knjigu čini vrlo preglednom i praktičnom. Znanstvenici i istraživači u svakom trenutku mogu pronaći metodu ili pojašnjenja metodološkog pristupa koji su im potrebni za kreiranje dizajna ili provedbu istraživanja.

Uvodni dio knjige upućuje na obilježja i važnost znanstvenih istraživanja i metoda. Zašto bi se kao istraživači i znanstvenici trebali odlučiti za znanstveni pristup? Argumentacija se nalazi u podcrtanim riječima koje pojašnjavaju istraživanje kao „planirano, sustavno, kontrolirano, iskustveno i kritičko ispitivanje pojava“ (16). Uz to, autorica naglašava važnost znanstvene metode jer je empirijska, sustavna, kumulativna, planirana i iskustvena za razliku od preostalih metoda spoznavanja svijeta (17-18).

Pojašnjeni su pristupi induktivne i deduktivne metode te pregledno navedeni nedostaci i prednosti jednog i drugog pristupa. Nadalje, u knjizi se opisuju različite vrste istraživanja pa tako možemo razlikovati istraživanja prema osnovnome cilju koja su u načelu orijentacijska, deskriptivna ili eksplanacijska. S druge strane, autorica razlikuje znanstvena i stručna istraživanja s obzirom na spoznajni domet. Uzevši u obzir vremensku komponentu, razlikuje transverzalna i longitudinalna istraživanja te zaključuje kako se istraživanja mogu kategorizirati i s obzirom na istraživački predmet te stoga mogu biti disciplinarna, interdisciplinarna i specijalistička.

Sljedeće se poglavlje bavi fazama istraživanja. Od početne do posljednje faze. Autorica navodi fazu konceptualizacije kao temeljnu i početnu točku nakon koje slijedi operacionalizacija i na kraju realizacija istraživanja. Vrlo detaljno i precizno pojašnjeni su koraci u konceptualizaciji istraživanja. Od samog definiranja predmeta i svrhe istraživanja, pregleda literature i teorijskog utemeljenja, definiranja cilja istraživanja, oblikovanja hipoteza do definiranja varijabli i njihova međuodnosa. Nadalje, operacionalizaciju istraživanja prikazuje kroz odabir metoda i tehnika koje odgovaraju postavkama iz faze konceptualizacije istraživanja. Dodatna je pažnja usmjerena na razgraničenje kvalitativnih i kvantitativnih metoda ukazujući time na svrhu njihove primjene.

Posebna je pozornost u fazi operacionalizacije posvećena glavnim metodama društvenih znanosti. Njih autorica dijeli na *field*-metode odnosno istraživanja u stvarnom životnom okruženju i *desk*-metode kao istraživanja za stolom. Među *field*-metodama detaljno su opisane sljedeće metode: opažanje, intervju, fokus-grupe, anketa i eksperiment.

Metoda opažanja je opisana s obzirom na ulogu istraživača i njegovo sudjelovanje te su navedene prednosti i ograničenja primjene takve metode u društvenim znanostima. Intervju je definiran kao metoda koja se može razlikovati prema svrsi, obliku i načinu primjene. Također detaljno je razrađen pristup pripreme intervjua, uspostave kontakata s ispitanicima i vođenja samog intervjua. Pojašnjene su sve ostale popratne stavke provedbe intervjua kao što je bilježenje podataka, odnosno transkripti razgovora. Sadržaj je dodatno osuvremenjen s mogućnostima provedbe individualnih intervjua putem interneta. Kod metode fokus-grupa osobit je naglasak stavljen na izbor ispitanika, odnosno plani-

ranje uzorka, kao i na broj fokus-grupa koje su potrebne da bi se zadovoljila svrha i cilj istraživanja. Dodatno je pojašnjena uloga moderatora i način vođenja razgovora. Uz to su prikazani nedostaci i prednosti fokus-grupa. Također je opisano kako primijeniti metodu na internetu.

Anketa je predstavljena u širokom kontekstu povijesnoga razvoja i provedbi nekih od najpoznatijih anketnih istraživanja poput ankete u listu *The Literary Digest* iz 1936. godine (117). Uz sve prednosti i nedostatke upotrebe anketne metode, dodatno su pojašnjeni pristupi sastavljanja anketnih upitnika i o čemu sve treba voditi računa (sadržaju pitanja, formulaciji pitanja, jednoznačnosti pitanja, razdvajanju višestrukih pitanja, dužini upitnika, kako pripremiti uvodni dio upitnika itd.). Dodatno su opisane tehnike anketiranja pa čitatelji mogu saznati sve o pristupu u provođenju terenske ankete, doznati kako pripremiti pisanu i telefonsku anketu. Uz to su objašnjene ankete putem interneta i miješane anketne tehnike.

U knjizi su razrađeni osnovni pojmovi i eksperimentalni nacrti koji omogućuju bolje razumijevanje primijene eksperimenta kao metode u društvenim istraživanjima.

Od *desk*-metoda naglasak je stavljen na analizu arhivske građe i analizu sadržaja. Navedeni su nedostaci i prednosti takvih vrsta analiza. Posebno je opisana analiza sadržaja, njezin razvoj, vrste analiziranog sadržaja, ciljevi i svrha. S fokusom na kvantitativnu analizu sadržaja, pojašnjeno je kako se definira jedinica analize, postavlja analitička matrica i provodi analiza.

Knjiga daje uvid u načine i mogućnosti uzorkovanja. Opisan je postupak koji uključuje prije svega odabir ciljne populacije iz koje će se definirati osnovni skup i okvir za izbor uzorka. Što se tiče izbora uzorka, autorica razlikuje dvije osnovne vrste uzoraka, a to su probabilistički i neprobabilistički uzorak. Među probabilističkim uzorcima opisani su jednostavni slučajni, slučajni sustavni, slučajni stratificirani i klaster-uzorak. Dok su od neprobabilističkih uzoraka pojašnjeni kvotni uzorak, prigodni ili raspoloživi uzorak i uzorak dobrovoljaca, namjerni uzorak, pseudoslučajni uzorak i uzorak „snježne grude“.

Faza realizacije također je potanko obrađena. Razrađuje se postupak prikupljanja podataka, pojašnjava na koji način napraviti kvantitativnu i kvalitativnu obradu podataka te na kraju kako prikazati rezultate istraživanja. Nadalje, u završnim poglavljima pojašnjeno je kako vrednovati rezultate uzevši u obzir mogućnosti pogreške i pristranosti istraživača te koja su temeljna etička načela u provođenju znanstvenih istraživanja.

*Metodologija društvenih istraživanja: temeljni uvidi* izvrstan je priručnik za svakog znanstvenika i istraživača društvenih znanosti. Predstavlja sveobuhvatan pregled glavnih metoda i metodoloških pristupa u društvenim istraživanjima. Knjiga je korisna za studente na svim razinama studija koji imaju u planu dizajnirati i provoditi istraživanja.

**Hrvoje Jakopović**

Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu



**INFORMACIJE**

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*INFORMATION*

CALL FOR PAPERS

IPSA RC10 and RC22 supported workshop:

**“Media, Politics and Discourses of the New Normal”**

Interuniversity Centre Dubrovnik, Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 27 - 30 2021

The workshop is organized in Dubrovnik on September 27 and 28 2021, as a part of the **The 26<sup>th</sup> Annual International Conference on Information Technology and Journalism: “Media in Information Age: Old Dynamics, New Approaches”**.

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ABSTRACT SUBMISSIONS

**Abstracts should not be longer than 500 words and should include:**

- >Title
- >Author and Affiliation
- >Core theoretical premise of the paper
- >Methodology and relevant information on data collection and analysis
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Extended deadline for abstract submission: **July 25 2021**

Please send your proposal to [info@edemokracija.hr](mailto:info@edemokracija.hr)



## ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

The workshop is supported by IPSA RC10 and RC22 and organized by the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (<http://fpzg.hr/>) and InMed Institute (<http://www.edemokracija.hr/>).

Annual International Conference on Information Technology and Journalism (ITJ) conference has been organized for 26 years now. The joint RC10/RC22 workshop was first launched in 2010 and has been organized as part of the conference since then.

Conference venue: Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, Dubrovnik, Croatia (<http://iuc.hr/>) Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik is an independent international institution for advanced studies structured as a consortium of universities with a mission to organize and promote contact and exchange through projects, study programs, courses and conferences across a wide range of scientific concerns. Program directors and resource persons coming from about 170 member universities worldwide cooperate in organizing the activities. IUC is open to new member institutions as well as to new programs.

*Both conference and workshop will take place in a hybrid mode – participants can stay at IUC Dubrovnik or address conference via online platform.*

Members of the organizing committee of the **Workshop** are:

Domagoj Bebić (IPSA RC Liaison Representative; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb)

Mato Brautović (Department of Communication Science, University of Dubrovnik)

Óscar G. Luengo (Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, Universidad de Granada)

Marijana Grbeša Zenzerović (Faculty of political Science, University of Zagreb)

Božo Skoko (Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb)

Members of the organizing committee of the **Conference** are:

Nenad Prelog, InMed, University of Zagreb, [nenad@edemokracija.hr](mailto:nenad@edemokracija.hr)

Damir Boras, University of Zagreb, [dboras@unizg.hr](mailto:dboras@unizg.hr)

Inoslav Bešker, Mediterranis, Italy; University of Split, RH, [inoslav@besker.com](mailto:inoslav@besker.com)

If you have any questions about the conference please contact the organizing committee at [info@edemokracija.hr](mailto:info@edemokracija.hr).



### Upute suradnicima

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Citirani izvori navode se u tekstu (a ne u bilješkama) u skraćenom obliku i u zagradama, prvo prezime, zatim godina objave, a onda stranica (ako je riječ o izravnom citatu) npr. (Dahlgren, 2009, str. 67) ili ako je riječ o dvoje autora (Gillespie i Toynbee, 2006, str. 52). Za citiranje rada troje i više autora, sve na hrvatskom i na engleskom jeziku. Na dnu stranice u bilješci možete navesti zahvale kao i detalje o projektu (naziv i broj), ukoliko je članak nastao kao dio nekog projekta. Očekivani opseg rada (uključujući bilješke, bibliografiju i mjesta za grafičke priloge) je između 5000 i 8000 riječi. Izvori se citiraju prema APA stilu citiranja, 7. izdanje (<https://apastyle.apa.org/>).

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*Primjer:*

Dahlgren, P. (2009). *Media and Political Engagement*. Cambridge University Press.

Čapeta, T. i Rodin, S. (2011). *Osnove prava Europske unije*. Narodne novine.

#### Članci u časopisima:

Autor: Prezime, I. (godina). Naslov. *Časopis, godište*(broj), stranice. DOI (ako je dostupan)

*Primjer:*

McQuail, D. (2003). Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable. *The Public/Javnost*, 10(3), 13-28. DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2003.11008832

#### Poglavlje u knjizi ili članak u zborniku:

Autor: Prezime, I. i Prezime, I. (godina). Naslov poglavlja. U I. Prezime (Ur.), *Naslov knjige/zbornika* (str.). Izdavač.

**Primjer:**

Corbett, N. (2009). Digital performance, live technology: Video games and the remediation of theatrical spectatorship. U M. MacArthur, L. Wilkinson, i K. Zaiantz (Ur.), *Performing Adaptions: Essays and Conversations on the Theory and Practice of Adaptation* (str. 11–23). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

**Dokumenti s interneta:**

Autor ili institucija ili naziv mrežne stranice (godina, datum). *Naslov*. Izdavač. Preuzeto DD.MM.GGGG. (datum kada ste pristupili poveznici), s <https://URL>

**Primjer:**

Ridgeout, V., Foehr, U. i Roberts, D. (2010, srpanj). *Generation M2: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18- Years Olds. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation*. Preuzeto 28.10.2013., s <http://kff.org/other/poll-finding/report-generation-m2-media-in-the-lives/>.

UNICEF, Ured za Hrvatsku (2011, ožujak). *Mišljenja i stavovi djece i mladih u Hrvatskoj*. Preuzeto 19.11.2013., s <http://www.unicef.hr/upload/>.

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**Example:**

Dahlgren, P. (2009). *Media and Political Engagement*. Cambridge University Press.

Čapeta, T. & Rodin, S. (2011). *Osnove prava Europske unije*. Narodne novine.

**Journal Articles:**

Author: Surname, N. (year). Title. *Journal*, volume(number), pages. DOI (if available)

**Example:**

McQuail, D., (2003). Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable. *The Public/Javnost*, 10(3), 13-28. DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2003.11008832

**Book chapter or conference proceedings:**

Author: Surname, N. (year). Title of the chapter. In N. Surname (Ed./Eds.), *Title of the book/proceedings* (pages). Publisher. DOI (if available)

*Example:*

Corbett, N. (2009). Digital performance, live technology: Video games and the remediation of theatrical spectatorship. In M. MacArthur, L. Wilkinson, & K. Zaiontz (Eds.), *Performing Adaptions: Essays and Conversations on the Theory and Practice of Adaptation* (pp. 11–23). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

**Internet references:**

Author or institution or name of the webpage (year, date). *Title*. Publisher. Retrieved DD/MM/YYYY (date when retrieved), from <https://URL>

*Examples:*

Ridgeout, V., Foehr, U. & Roberts, D. (2010, July). *Generation M2: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18- Years Olds*. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Retrieved 28/10/2013. from <http://kff.org/other/poll-finding/report-generation-m2-media-in-the-lives/>.

UNICEF, Ured za Hrvatsku (2011, March). *Mišljenja i stavovi djece i mladih u Hrvatskoj*. Retrieved 19/11/2013., from <http://www.unicef.hr/upload/>.

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